Afghanistan
REFOCUS ON THE REAL THREAT
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In the fall of 2001, U.S.-led military forces toppled the Taliban and destroyed al Qaeda's safe haven. Five years later, the Taliban and their extremist allies are making a powerful comeback. Since May 2006, more than 1,000 people have been killed and hundreds more wounded. Tactics used by Iraqi insurgents, including suicide and roadside bombings, have migrated to Afghanistan, increasing the lethality of attacks on American forces.
U.S.-Afghan relations are fraying. Riots in Kabul in May 2006 underscore how disillusioned many Afghans feel about the failure to see real progress in securing and rebuilding their country.
Afghanistan is again becoming a narco-state as half of the country's GDP is drug-related. The administrator of the Drug Enforcement Administration told Congress in June 2006 that opium-related trade in Afghanistan has nearly quadrupled since 2001, and today Afghanistan produces more than 90% of the world's opium poppy. These drug proceeds often support the Taliban.
The Bush administration rightly portrays the initial U.S.-led campaign in Afghanistan as a victory in the global war on terrorism. Since then the Bush administration has been distracted by Iraq, and has taken its eye off the ball. As a result, the expansion of the insurgency and drug trafficking, and a weak central government has put Afghanistan at grave risk of again falling into chaos. High level attention and military and intelligence resources were diverted from the fight against the Taliban and al-Qaeda to fight a war of choice in Iraq. Worst of all, at Tora Bora, Osama bin Laden was allowed to escape and thousands of militants lived to fight another day.
In the months following the fall of the Taliban, the Bush administration promised a Marshall Plan for Afghanistan. It has not delivered. The sum spent on reconstruction by the U.S. and the international community has fallen well short of the $28 billion the World Bank initially estimated would be needed over a seven year period. Significant delays have also plagued the start of reconstruction and development programs.
The United States must remain committed to political and economic success in Afghanistan. A new US policy is needed to focus on the two principal areas the United States and the international community can make a major difference: enhanced security and increased reconstruction and development assistance. To improve the security situation, the U.S. should postpone its decision to reduce the size of its force by 3,000 troops and provide greater assistance to NATO. Greater priority must be given to standing up the Afghan Army and Police, both of which are badly under-resourced. Retired General Barry McCaffrey recommends that the U.S. provide $1.2 billion annually to train and equip the Afghan army and sustain it for ten years. Finally, Afghanistan needs a minimum of $4 billion per year to implement the comprehensive state-building and reform plan outlined at the beginning of 2006. The U.S. should provide half that amount over the next five years with the rest provided by Europe, Japan, and other partners.
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