Government Reports Indicate that the Surge has Failed

In January, the President outlined his surge, which was supposed to reduce violence and create the space for political reconciliation.  This week, a number of government and expert reports all found that the surge has failed to achieve these goals.  The Government Accountability Office found that 15 out of 18 of the benchmarks that were laid out by the Iraqi government and the President have not been met.  The nation's 16 intelligence agencies agreed that the political situation in Iraq is likely to get worse over the next year and that the security situation in Iraq remains dire.  A panel of twenty former senior military officers and defense officials found that the United States must reduce its military footprint in Iraq.  General Peter Pace, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs, is said to believe that steeper troop reductions are necessary.  Moreover, there are now reports that the casualty data that supposedly indicates "progress" on the security situation in Iraq, is misleading.  

The reality is that hundreds of defense and foreign policy experts, working in and outside the government, spent months working on these reports and analyzing the situation in Iraq.  All of the reports concluded that the political situation in Iraq has only further deteriorated while security has remained the same.  In other words, the surge has failed to accomplish its purpose.

The Iraqi government is making little progress and has met only one of eight political benchmarks.  The Iraqi government met one of eight legislative benchmarks: the rights of minority political parties in Iraq’s legislature are protected. The government has not enacted legislation on de-Ba’athification, oil revenue sharing, provincial elections, amnesty, and militia disarmament.  [GAO, 9/4/07]

Two of nine security benchmarks have been met.  “The government has not eliminated militia control of local security, eliminated political intervention in military operations, ensured even-handed enforcement of the law, increased army units capable of independent operations, and ensured that political authorities made no false accusations against security forces…  Iraq’s government has established various committees in support of the Baghdad security plan and established almost all of the planned Joint Security Stations in Baghdad. The government has partially met the benchmarks of providing three trained and ready brigades for Baghdad operations and eliminating safe havens for outlawed groups.” [GAO, 9/4/07]

The GAO report found that there is no way to measure sectarian violence in Iraq and that the numbers are too subjective to be of any use.  “It is unclear whether sectarian violence in Iraq has decreased—a key security benchmark—since it is difficult to measure whether the perpetrators’ intents were sectarian in nature, and other measures of population security show differing trends.”  [GAO, 9/4/07]

The current course is unlikely to lead to major changes in either the political or security situation.  “Broadly accepted political compromises required for sustained security, long-term political progress, and economic development are unlikely to emerge unless there is a fundamental shift in the factors driving Iraqi political and security developments.”  [National Intelligence Estimate, 8/23/07]

The Iraqi Government is going in the wrong direction, but there is no viable alternative to Prime Minister Maliki.  “The IC assesses that the Iraqi Government will become more precarious over the next six to 12 months because of criticism by other members of the major Shi’a coalition (the Unified Iraqi Alliance, UIA), Grand Ayatollah Sistani, and other Sunni and Kurdish parties. Divisions between Maliki and the Sadrists have increased, and Shi’a factions have explored alternative coalitions aimed at constraining Maliki.  The strains of the security situation and absence of key leaders have stalled internal political debates, slowed national decision-making, and increased Maliki’s vulnerability to alternative coalitions.  We judge that Maliki will continue to benefit from recognition among Shi’a leaders that searching for a replacement could paralyze the government.”  [National Intelligence Estimate, 8/23/07]

The security situation in Iraq remains dire.  "The level of overall violence, including attacks on and casualties among civilians, remains high; Iraq’s sectarian groups remain unreconciled; AQI retains the ability to conduct high-profile attacks; and to date, Iraqi political leaders remain unable to govern effectively. There have been modest improvements in economic output, budget execution, and government finances but fundamental structural problems continue to prevent sustained progress in economic growth and living conditions."  [National Intelligence Estimate, 8/23/07]

Significant progress on security in the next 6-12 months is unlikely.  “We assess, to the extent that Coalition forces continue to conduct robust counterinsurgency operations and mentor and support the Iraqi Security Forces (ISF), that Iraq’s security will continue to improve modestly during the next six to 12 months but that levels of insurgent and sectarian violence will remain high and the Iraqi Government will continue to struggle to achieve national-level political reconciliation and improved governance.”  [National Intelligence Estimate, 8/23/07]

Sunnis are incapable of delivering on national reconciliation.  The Sunni Arab community remains politically fragmented, and we see no prospective leaders that might engage in meaningful dialogue and deliver on national agreements.  [National Intelligence Estimate, 8/23/07]

U.S. forces should reconfigure to a lighter footprint in 2008.  "Perceptions and reality are frequently at odds with each other when trying to understand Iraq's problems and progress.  Nowhere is this more apparent than in the impressions drawn from seeing our massive logistics footprint, our many installations and the number of personnel (military and civilian, especially in and around the Baghdad region.  The unintended message conveyed is one of 'permanence', and occupying force as it were.  What is needed is the opposite impression, one that is lighter, less massive, and more expeditionary."  [CSIS, 9/6/07]  

Iraqi Security Forces will not be able to operate independently for another 12-18 months.  "While severely deficient in combat support and combat service capabilities, the new Iraqi armed forces, especially the army, show clear evidence of developing the baseline infrastructures that lead to the successful formation of national defense capability.  The Commission concurs with the views expressed by U.S., Coalition, and Iraqi experts that the Iraqi Army is capable of taking over an increasing amount of day-to-day combat responsibilities from coalition forces.  In any event, the ISF will be unable to fulfill their essential security responsibilities independently over the next 12-18 months."  [CSIS, 9/6/07]

The National Police should be dissolved.  "The National Police have proven operationally ineffective, and sectarianism in these units may fundamentally undermine their ability to provide security.  The force is not viable in its current form.  [CSIS, 9/6/07]

Political reconciliation is the only way to security.  "The Iraqi Army and Iraqi Police Service have the potential to help reduce sectarian violence, but ultimately the ISF will reflect the society from which they were drawn.  Political reconciliation is the key to ending sectarian violence in Iraq."  [CSIS, 9/6/07]

The Pentagon and Administration’s definition of “Ethno sectarian violence” excludes many types of violence that would indicate that the security situation in Iraq is not improving.  Shi’a on Shi’a violence in the South is not included.  Sunni on Sunni violence in the central part of the country is not included.  “According to one senior intelligence official in Washington. ‘If a bullet went through the back of the head, it's sectarian,’ the official said. ‘If it went through the front, it's criminal.’"  [Washington Post, 9/6/07 ]

The military does not count car bombs as part of sectarian violence.  “According to U.S. military figures, an average of 1,000 Iraqis have died each month since March in sectarian violence. That compares with about 1,200 a month at the start of the security plan, the military said in an e-mailed response to queries. This does not include deaths from car bombings, which the military said have numbered more than 2,600 this year.”  [LA Times, 9/4/07 ]

There were significant revisions to the way the Pentagon’s reports measure sectarian violence between its March 2007 report and its June 2007 report.  The original data for the five months before the surge began (September 2006 through January 2007) indicated approximately 5,500 sectarian killings.  In the revised data in the June 2007 report, those numbers had been adjusted to roughly 7,400 killings – a 35% increase.  These discrepancies have the impact of making the sectarian violence appear significantly worse during the fall and winter of 2006 before the President’s “surge” began.  [DOD, 11/2006 .  3/2007.  6/2007 ]
 
According to numbers released by the Iraqi government, since July civilian casualties have risen 20% across Iraq.  The numbers fell significantly in Baghdad.  The figures, provided by Iraqi Interior Ministry officials on Saturday, mirrored the geographic pattern of the troop increase, which is focused on Baghdad. The national rise in mortality is partly a result of more than 500 deaths, in an August truck bomb attack on a Yazidi community in August north of the capital, outside the areas directly affected by the additional troops.  [NY Times, 9/2/07 ]