1/30/09

As the United States experiences its own peaceful transition of power, Iraq heads toward provincial elections this week – the first of several critical touchpoints over the next year.  This memo takes stock of where the US stands in Iraq and identifies key challenges going forward.  

In January 2009, NSN convened a group of experts to discuss America’s options and provide recommendations.  The group concluded that the best way to maintain and increase stability is to work towards an inclusive and sustainable Iraqi political system that has the necessary legitimacy and competence to govern, provide security and deliver services.  

The situation in Iraq remains exceedingly complex, with no clear roadmap toward a functioning and inclusive Iraqi government and sustainable stability.  US influence is increasingly limited, and there are many demands on Washington’s attention, but in four critical priority areas, US action can make the difference for both US and Iraqi interests in 2009:

1.    Make an early down payment on the redeployment of American forces, which will give the new Administration credibility in Iraq and the region and disarm its critics;
2.    Work to diffuse Kurdish-Arab tensions, which form a dangerous fault line crossing political, economic and military issues;
3.    Take steps to ensure that the Sunnis feel included in the government, to engage their energies and defuse the threat of renewed sectarian violence; and
4.    Develop a comprehensive strategy for constructively engaging Iraq’s neighbors, the longterm since qua non for regional peace.

Many supporters of the war would have us believe that it  was “won” in 2007 and 2008 thanks to President Bush’s decision to send 40,000 additional troops into Iraq and follow General Petraeus’s counterinsurgency strategy.  According to this argument any backsliding that occurs should be laid at the feet of the new administration.  The reality is that the fundamental strategic failure left behind by the Bush administration will continue to haunt Iraq for years to come.

From a broader geostrategic perspective, the Iraq War has been a failure.  The war failed to achieve any of President Bush’s stated goals: ridding Iraq of WMDs it did not have, eliminating a terrorist threat that did not exist, and bringing liberal democracy to the Middle East.  It came at a tremendous cost both in terms of national treasure and lives lost.  Moreover, Bush’s decision to invade, and the subsequent chaos and violence introduced unprecedented instability, turned Iraq into a “cause célèbre” for international terrorism and empowered Iran.  The military paid an enormous cost and has been badly strained, while other priorities, most notably in Afghanistan and Pakistan, have been neglected.  Finally, the war caused a steep decline in U.S. global prestige in the Muslim world and among allies the US had counted as its closest supporters.

Inside Iraq, security has improved markedly since the horrific days of 2006 and 2007 due to a number of factors, including:  1) the increased American military presence and new counterinsurgency tactics; 2) an alliance among a number of Sunni tribal groups against Al Qaeda in Iraq; 3) the segregation of the population along sectarian lines as a result of massive ethnic cleansing; and 4) the consolidation of power by the central government and weakening of militias such as Muqtada al-Sadr’s Mahdi Army.  

However, the situation is still fragile; we must now, belatedly, encourage the Iraqis to do the political work left undone in order to leave behind a sustainable and inclusive political system that can ensure stability.  Underlying these efforts is the question of troop withdrawal, to which the US is now legally committed in the Status of Forces Agreement and politically committed through the rhetoric Iraqis heard – and welcomed – during the US presidential campaign.  Paradoxically, some troop withdrawals will make achieving political goals easier while too slow a pace of withdrawal will likely make them more difficult.  

Kurdish-Arab tensions.  Tensions between Kurds and Arabs over the control of the disputed Northern territories based around Kirkuk, as well as across Northern Iraq, present a major potential flash point.  This has been a major point of contention for years but is now becoming increasingly violent and making it difficult to achieve national reconciliation.  In fact, the disputed Mosul area remains the most violent in Iraq.  An added complication is the dispute between Arabs and Kurds over control of Iraq’s oil, with the Arabs wanting revenues to flow through the central government and the Kurds calling for provincial control.  The political process to resolve these tensions has been kicked down the road for years with the postponement of provincial elections in these areas serving as the latest example.  Meanwhile, as Prime Minister Maliki’s position and that of the Iraqi security forces grows stronger, tension and the possibility for a confrontation between Kurdish and Arab forces increases.

SOFA implementation.  The United States faces a hurdle in the form of the Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA) which commits American forces to be out of Iraq by 2011 and states that American combat troops must be out of Iraqi cities by June 30, 2009.  The SOFA also gives the Iraqis greater legal jurisdiction over American actions and ensures that they are more thoroughly consulted on military actions.  The Iraqi parliament’s agreement to the SOFA was conditioned on the holding of a national referendum this summer, with the specification that if the vote fails, Iraq will rescind the agreement.  Upon the agreement’s cancellation all American forces would have to leave Iraq within twelve months.  The campaign for the referendum should be a major point of concern for the US and is likely to pose a major source of tension with Iraqi officials.

Upcoming elections: an opportunity and a challenge.  The January provincial elections are the first of an array which includes the SOFA vote this summer and national elections at the end of this year or early next. They have the potential to move Iraq’s politics forward by creating a more inclusive polity.  But if they are perceived as illegitimate or the losers do not accept the outcomes, the elections could be a powder keg that sets the country back on a violent course – just as the elections of 2005 set the stage for the sectarian civil war that followed.  This is particularly true of the Sunnis who boycotted the elections in 2005 and have higher expectations of being brought into the process.

Prime Minister Maliki’s ascendance.  Over the past year, Prime Minister Maliki has dramatically increased his power and that of the central government.  In many ways this has been a positive development, especially in regards to stability, as many of the non-governmental militias have been weakened and power and security have been consolidated.  However, this consolidation comes with its own dangers.  Maliki has already begun taking some extra-constitutional steps to increase his power and there is a chance he may either overplay his hand or try to assume the position of a strongman.  Maliki’s increasing power has also led to greater tensions with the Kurds and Sunnis creating another potential irritant.  Finally, there is the possibility that his increasing power inspires a group that feels threatened by Maliki to take violent action to try and seize power.

Make an early down payment on redeployment and stick to an overall timeline similar to the one outlined during the campaign.  Inside Iraq, the failure to reduce the American presence early on would result in the perception that nothing has changed.  This could dramatically increase the likelihood that the SOFA referendum would fail, resulting in a hastier and messier withdrawal that is dictated entirely on Iraqi terms.  Within the context of an unpopular American presence, a failed SOFA referendum and an upcoming Iraqi national election, one could imagine a much higher likelihood that the Iraqi Government would try and test its authority by bringing American troops up on legal charges to score political points.  Moreover, a backlash throughout the Muslim world can be expected if by the summer of 2009 the US is perceived to have made no significant changes to troop levels in Iraq.  

On the other hand, if the US was perceived as following through on the agreement and the SOFA referendum were to pass, the remaining US presence would gain greater political legitimacy making it easier and safer for American forces to operate.  The administration could gain that  credibility with the Iraqi people through the announcement of early significant redeployments.  To address legitimate concerns about turbulence and violence around the election period, the drawdown could be slowed or halted during the six month period around the SOFA referendum and national elections.  After the national election it could continue with American combat forces being out of Iraq on or around the date originally proposed by President Obama during the campaign and residual forces being drawn down over the next year and a half before the expiration of the SOFA.  There would be little change in the overall end date of redeployment, while still allowing for some tactically beneficial sequencing adjustments.

The U.S. must pay greater attention to Kurdish-Arab tensions in the North, make clear that it will act as an evenhanded broker and support UN efforts to mediate the conflict.  Kurdish-Arab tensions are the most likely next potential flash point in Iraq.  The U.S. can do much more to improve the situation by making clear that this is a top priority and ensuring that senior officials in the U.S. government and the American embassy in Baghdad are paying sufficient attention to the issue.  It must also send an important signal by making clear that it will be an evenhanded mediator as opposed to the previous administration, who was often perceived as taking the side of the Kurds.  Finally, the U.S. should take a more active role in supporting the UN Assistance Mission in Iraq (UNAMI) in its continued efforts to mediate the conflict and, if the possibility exists, support the oil for soil proposal outlined by the International Crisis Group.

Take steps to ensure that the Sunnis feel included in the new government and that political reconciliation occurs.  The Sunnis, who boycotted the elections of 2005 and made up the bulk of the insurgency, have put down their arms and come back into the political fray.  The elections of the next year will test whether the Shia dominated government is able to accommodate them.  If it is not, then there is the possibility that Sunni-Shia violence could once again erupt.  After all,  this was the central conflict of the 2006-2007 sectarian war.  There are three issues that are most likely to alienate the Sunnis and reignite a conflagration: 1) The elections could be perceived as unfair or the results may not be implemented; 2) Sunni detainees in central government (i.e. Shi’a) jails are not released; and 3) The Sons of Iraq (Former Sunni insurgents who turned against al Qaeda in Iraq) are not sufficiently integrated into the Iraqi Security Forces.  The U.S. should put pressure on the Maliki government to ensure these three scenarios do not occur.  However, it’s also important to recognize, as is the case for all internal political issues in Iraq, that America’s ability to influence the final outcome is limited.

It’s time for a comprehensive diplomatic strategy to engage Iraq’s neighbors constructively.  Iraq’s neighbors including Iran, Turkey, Syria, Saudi Arabia and the Gulf States are the ones most directly impacted by the refugees, violence, crime, economic shocks and other consequences of Iraq’s instability.  All of Iraq's neighbors have an interest in maintaining stability, but they also fear that other neighbors will gain influence inside Iraq.  The only way to manage this is via a regional dialogue that includes all the neighbors.  Such a dialogue requires sustained engagement by the international community and the U.S., which must lay out a comprehensive diplomatic strategy for Iraq’s neighbors, and ensure that the strategy is integrated into a broader regional policy.