Featured Issue:
When the Obama Administration began a 60-day review of its Afghanistan strategy, a diverse group of progressive experts in development, counter-terrorism, regional politics and US politics came together to advise NSN on a set of principles that might guide both the Administration in building a new strategy and advocates in Congress, the media and the public in judging a proposed strategy. We begin from the premise that the situation in the United States, and the history and dynamics of the region, require a sharp differentiation between objectives that we might like to achieve and a baseline of what must be achieved for our national interests and our moral obligations – to our military, our citizens and the people of Afghanistan.
Report
6 January 2010
The last few weeks have highlighted significant obstacles to the Administration's efforts in Afghanistan and Pakistan. President Karzai, whose rule is already overshadowed by widespread allegations of corruption and vote-tampering, has encountered new difficulties in working with the Afghan Parliament. The President and his team must maintain focus, holding the Afghan government, and more importantly itself, accountable, creating the conditions for a transition away from a large-scale military presence, and resisting the calls for limitless commitment that Al Qaeda is happy to promote.
Report
11 December 2009
President Obama’s Afghanistan decision was met by support from both the military and the American people, and also found broad bipartisan support on Capitol Hill. During congressional testimony, our military commanders as well as our ambassador to Afghanistan made clear that they stood by the President’s strategy and decision. The decision by President Obama was undertaken with pragmatic care and methodical patience, and the next challenge is to address the tough questions related to the implementation of the plan. These issues were addressed in detail this week on Capitol Hill by General McChrystal, General Petraeus, and Ambassador Eikenberry.
Report
8 December 2009
With General Stanley McChrystal and U.S. Ambassador to Afghanistan Karl Eikenberry testifying before Congress on Afghanistan, and with Secretary Gates in Kabul on a surprise visit, it is worth remembering how the U.S. arrived at this juncture. An initial victory over the Taliban in 2001 was squandered, as the Bush administration, aided by the Rumsfeld Pentagon, drastically underestimated the commitment that would be needed to stabilize the country and lost al-Qaeda and Osama bin Laden in the mountains of Tora Bora. Now that the Obama administration has set out with a strategy that addresses this deterioration, it is vital that it learn from past missteps. Going forward, it must maintain focus on its core objectives, with an eye toward accountability and continuous evaluation.
