Why New Sanctions Against Iran Would Backfire | John Bradshaw and Amb. John Limbert
By John Bradshaw, Executive Director of the National Security Network and Amb. John Limbert, former Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Iran and a former hostage in Iran 1979-81
January 28, 2015 | The Hill
Photo credit: U.S. Department of State Flickr, 1/14/15
Proposed legislation in the Senate that would impose additional “triggered” sanctions on Iran during ongoing nuclear talks relies on flawed logic and ignores Iranian history. The legislation would be more likely to blow up the negotiations than to achieve its stated goal of pushing Iran toward an agreement. Some proponents of the legislation are explicit in hoping new sanctions will derail the talks, but others appear to believe in good faith that threatened sanctions will strengthen the position of the U.S. and its negotiating partners. They claim that if sanctions brought Iran to the table, more sanctions will force them to agree to a nuclear deal. Yet a clear-eyed look at past Iranian actions and the dynamics of negotiations shows that this is mere wishful thinking not grounded in a realistic assessment of likely outcomes.
First, the assumption that additional sanctions or the threat of sanctions would force the Iranians to capitulate to P5 +1 proposals has no basis in fact. Such threats, which the Islamic Republic has faced for over three decades, are more likely to push the Iranians to toughen their positions, not make them more pliant. We should not dismiss Iran’s Foreign Minister statement that “a deal is dead” if expanded sanctions are passed, even if implementation is delayed. So far during the negotiations, the Iranians have been looking to identify possible compromises with P5+1 proposals and have continually expressed their commitment to the process. As that sensitive bargaining continues, a perception that the U.S. will not be able to bridge gaps and deliver on its promises of sanctions relief will not lead to surrender by the Iranians but to skepticism and rejection. Even if we image the unlikely scenario in which the threat of new sanctions forced the negotiations to a conclusion and Iran simply accepted the P5+1 view of a deal, would such a coerced agreement be worth anything? The Iranians would be likely to immediately seek a way out of this kind of coerced agreement. If any deal is expected to hold for 10 to 15 years, it needs to be reached willingly by partners who both have a stake in the deal, not enforced by one side that gets the upper hand in the short run by pressuring the other party.
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