Why the U.S. Should Not Arm Ukraine Right Now

Posted March 6, 2015

Why the U.S. Should Not Arm Ukraine Right Now

March 6, 2015

Today, members of Congress and outside voices are continuing the push to send lethal aid to Kiev. These calls are ill-timed, especially while a tenuous ceasefire seems to have taken hold pursuant to the Minsk II agreement reached last month between European powers, Ukraine, and Russia. While the future of the ceasefire remains very much in doubt, a decision to send arms to Kiev now would carry more cost than benefits, undermining rather than protecting U.S. and European interests. Top costs include inducing Russian escalation, giving Putin political cover to violate the ceasefire, and undermining transatlantic unity in confronting Moscow’s aggression. Despite these costs, American arms will not empower Kiev to successfully resist any renewed Russian aggression by force. A better course of action – though still less than optimal – is to continue coordination with European partners to prepare an as robust-as-possible economic response to potential future Russian violations of the ceasefire. Meanwhile, the United States can continue to use the presence of its military forces in Europe to reassure NATO allies and demonstrate to Moscow that Washington’s commitment to collective defense is rock solid.

Arms to Ukraine would not stop further Russian aggression and risks counterproductive results. Ultimately, Ukraine cannot match Russian military power with or without American arms and all sides recognize this fact. The Hill reports recent comments made just prior to the Minsk II agreement by Gen. Philip Breedlove, Commander of U.S. European Command, regarding sending arms to Kiev: “’It could cause positive results, it could cause negative results…I do not believe Ukrainian forces can stop a Russian advance in Eastern Ukraine,’ Breedlove said. He added that even with lethal aid, Ukrainian forces might not be able to stop a Russian advance.” [Philip Breedlove via The Hill, 2/25/15]

Sending arms to Ukraine right now would undermine the interests of the United States and Kiev more than it would help.

Russia could counter any arms sent to Ukraine and control the escalation to suit its needs. Deputy Secretary of State Antony Blinken said today that “it’s certainly true that, were any of us to provide weapons to Ukraine, Russia could match that and then double that and triple that and quadruple that.” Fiona Hill and Clifford Gaddy of the Brookings Institution explain, “In the jargon of geopolitics, Putin enjoys ‘escalation dominance’ in Ukraine: Whatever move we make, he can match it and go further. In August, when it looked as though Ukraine might rout the rebels, Putin increased the stakes and countered the Ukrainian military. Drawing on those lessons, some Russian security analysts [before the Minsk II deal were] pushing for a preemptive invasion of Ukraine, arguing that Russia should go all the way to Kiev before the West takes further action.” [Anthony Blinken via Reuters, 3/6/15. Fiona Hill and Clifford Gaddy, 2/5/15]

Sending arms to Kiev now risks giving Russia political cover to violate the ceasefire. So far, the ceasefire is tenuous but holding. But by sending arms to Kiev, the United States would strengthen Putin’s hand by making it easier for him to exploit anti-Americanism to justify his actions. Jeremy Shapiro of the Brookings Institution explains, “The Russian regime has defined the struggle in Ukraine as part of an existential battle against American imperialism, in which the United States eventually seeks to impose its will on Russia itself. American provision of arms would lend credence to that view and increase the Russian government’s freedom of action at home.” [Jeremy Shapiro, 2/3/15]

Sending arms could benefit Putin by undermining transatlantic unity. Fiona Hill and Clifford Gaddy of the Brookings Institution write, “We also must consider the effect that arming Ukraine would have on our European allies. The report [published last month by national security experts that advocated arming Kiev] has created an uproar in Berlin and other European capitals, stoking concern that the Obama administration will take steps others are not ready for. If Putin concludes that transatlantic unity can be shattered, with the United States facing the possibility of going it alone in Ukraine, why would he change course?” The costs of undermining transatlantic unity are difficult to overstate: a tight-knight U.S. and European Union coalition is essential to success on this issue. Moreover, it would disrupt European efforts to lead in providing for their own security vis-à-vis Russia’s actions in Ukraine that more severely and directly threaten their own interests rather than America’s. [Fiona Hill and Clifford Gaddy, 2/5/15]

Continued use of military power to reassure NATO allies of our commitment to collective defense without signaling escalatory intent to Russia is key to regional stability. As Gen. Breedlove recently outlined, American military presence is an important tool for demonstrating U.S. commitment to NATO: “U.S. rotational force to the Baltics began on March 6, 2014, when the United States deployed an additional six F-15Cs to augment the four already in Lithuania…At the end of April 2014, the U.S. Army’s 173rd Infantry Brigade Combat Team (Airborne) quickly deployed company-sized contingents of U.S. paratroopers to Poland, Latvia, Lithuania, and Estonia to begin expanding land forces training…Most recently, Soldiers from the 2nd Cavalry Regiment stationed in Germany have deployed to the Baltics and Poland, continuing our persistent reassurance to our NATO Allies.” Overall, Breedlove said, “EUCOM forces conducted 67 other significant military-to-military engagements with the Baltic States and Poland from April to October 2014.” Going forward, Breedlove explained, “NATO has adopted the Readiness Action Plan (RAP) designed to meet quickly emerging threats emanating from both NATO’s eastern and southern flanks…U.S. support to the RAP will be essential to its long-term success.” [Philip Breedlove, 2/25/15]

European leaders and the United States are coordinating on broader and deeper sanctions should Russia violate the Minsk II agreement.Undersecretary of Defense for Policy Christine Wormuth recently testified that, compared to sending arms to Kiev, stronger sanctions might “potentially be more effective and have fewer downsides.” While sanctions have not been effective in changing Russian behavior in the near term, neither would arming Ukraine – even as advocates admit. But, sanctions have a higher chance of long-term success and carry far fewer counterproductive risks than sending arms. American and European leaders are currently preparing a potential next round of sanctions as a contingency for if Russia violates the terms of the Minsk II deal.

But whether these sanctions would be sector-wide is unclear. Foreign Policy reports that the U.S and European powers “could ‘broaden and deepen’ the existing sanctions on Russia, which target the energy, financial, and defense sectors. Big energy firms such as Gazprom and Rosneft have seen their access to international capital markets strictly curtailed by the sanctions…One possibility for fresh sanctions would be to further tighten those restrictions; they could be extended to bar foreign subsidiaries of U.S. energy firms from doing business with Russia, for example, thus closing a loophole that today remains open. Another possibility for the next round of sanctions would be to extend existing restrictions to a wider universe of other Russian energy firms.” [Christine Wormuth via The Hill, 2/25/15. Foreign Policy, 3/4/15]