Separating Myths from Facts on Russia and Ukraine
As the crisis in Ukraine continues and the West begins to formulate a longer-term response, policymakers in Washington can ill afford anything less than a clear-eyed assessment. It is therefore troubling that politically motivated narratives continue to persist about the crisis in the Ukraine and broader issues surrounding American policy. Particularly troubling are the dangerously misguided notions that nuclear nonproliferation initiatives like New START have become a liability or should have never been pursued. That view ignores the facts and benefits of nuclear reductions, including a better understanding of Russian capabilities and the opportunity to invest resources in conventional capabilities in which the U.S. has a comparative advantage. Likewise, a narrative is developing that dramatically overestimates the effectiveness of the Russian armed forces which remain limited in capabilities – especially compared to their superior NATO counterparts. Finally, some conservatives continue to try to blame fictitious American weakness for Putin’s actions, signaling a naïve view of Russian strategy, interests and historical factors that precipitated the current crisis.
Myth: The crisis in Ukraine makes nuclear nonproliferation agreements with Russia like New START less important.
Fact: New START has been and remains in the national security interests of the United States. Former U.S. Ambassador to Ukraine and Director of the Arms Control and Non-Proliferation Initiative at the Brookings Institution Steven Pifer explains, “While current tensions make arms control more difficult to pursue, they also underscore the value of arms-control constraints. The New START caps the number of Russian strategic nuclear forces and provides a significant degree of transparency and predictability. The treaty’s data exchanges, notifications and on-site inspections—all of which have continued to be implemented in spite of the Ukraine crisis—offer assurance that the strategic-nuclear-arms relationship remains bounded, providing an important degree of stability. What if New START were not in place? The U.S. military and intelligence community would have significantly less information regarding Russian strategic forces. The Pentagon would have to begin making worst-case assumptions…New START means that the Defense Department, which must now weigh the implications of a more threatening Russian posture for U.S. conventional forces and their deployments, does not have to worry about an increase in Russian strategic nuclear numbers beyond New START’s limits. Instead of spending more on strategic forces—where Russia can build ICBMs more cheaply than the United States can—the Pentagon could fund high-tech conventional systems where the U.S. military has a comparative advantage.” [Steven Pifer, 4/10/14]
Myth: Russian military capabilities have advanced to the point of changing the balance of power in Europe in the face of a weak NATO and require increased Pentagon spending to counter.
Fact: While Russian military modernization has increased capabilities in some areas, Russia remains a regional power and NATO remains a superior military force. Vice Admiral Frank C. Pandolfe, Director for Strategic Plans and Policy at the Joint Staff, testified before Congress that “Today, Russia is a regional power that can project force into nearby states but has very limited global power projection capability. It has a military of uneven readiness. While some units are well trained, most are less so. It suffers from corruption and its logistical capabilities are limited. Aging equipment and infrastructure, fiscal challenges, and demographic and social problems will continue to hamper reform efforts. The United States, in contrast, employs a military of global reach and engagement. The readiness of our rotationally deployed forces is high and we are working to address readiness shortfalls at home. And we operate within alliances; the strongest of which is NATO. Composed of 28 nations, NATO is the most successful military alliance in history. Should Russia undertake an armed attack against any NATO state, it will find that our commitment to collective defense is immediate and unwavering.”
General Philip Breedlove, Commander of U.S. Forces in Europe, adds in his own testimony before Congress that “Europe and NATO remain the United States’ most reliable and competent contributors to exporting security globally – both militarily and diplomatically. Collectively, Europe spends $270 billon on defense annually, second only to the United States. Our European Allies possess peer or near-peer capabilities in several areas of joint warfare, including tactical fighter operations, surface warfare, and special operations. Nowhere else in the world does there exist a comparable pool of interoperable, proven, and combat-ready allies to deploy with U.S. forces.” [Frank C. Pandolfe, 4/8/14. Philip Breedlove, 4/1/14]
Myth: American and Western weakness somehow induced Putin’s invasion of Crimea.
Fact: The Russian invasion was a result of many factors, most immediately Russia’s own failure to maintain political influence in Ukraine. Fareed Zakaria summarizes Russia’s immediate interests at stake that prompted the invasion, “They took Crimea because they realized the situation was spiraling out of control. You remember what was happening in the Maidan – suddenly they found Ukraine moving very rapidly toward the West.”
Charles Kupchan of Georgetown University and the Council on Foreign Relations expounded on Russia’s interests at stake during an NSN event: “Putin’s decision to grab and annex Crimea is that it was a product primarily of the profound strategic blow that was dealt to him by Yanukovich’s fall and the degree to which that event was in some ways a very powerful rejection of Putin’s political program… And that, in many respects, was a kick in the gut of Putin, who since he’s come back to the Kremlin has attempted to craft a political narrative about Eurasianness, about Slavic unity, about a religious/cultural zone reconstituting Russia’s place in the world. And that doesn’t happen without Ukraine. It leaves a Eurasian Union consisting of Russia, Belarus and Kazakhstan. And so I think in many respects Putin lashed out in anger. He grabbed Crimea as a consolation prize for the broader Ukraine that had rejected his political platform…” [Fareed Zakaria, 4/8/14. Charles Kupchan, 4/2/14]
