Press Call: Crimea in Crisis with Ambassador Michael McFaul

Posted March 7, 2014

Crimea in Crisis with Ambassador Michael McFaul

Friday, March 7, 2014
12:00 PM Eastern

As the crisis in the Crimean Peninsula continues and America and Europe wrestle with the proper response to Russia’s invasion into Ukraine, the National Security Network is hosting a press call with former U.S. Ambassador to Russia Michael McFaul on Friday, March 7th at 12:00 PM. Please join us as we assess the situation in Ukraine and examine what the appropriate next steps are in diffusing the volatile situation.

Speaker

Ambassador Michael McFaul

Ambassador McFaul was nominated by President Barack Obama on September 14, 2011, and confirmed by the Senate on December 17, 2011. He was sworn in as the United States Ambassador to the Russian Federation on January 10, 2012. Prior to becoming Ambassador, he served for three years as the Special Assistant to the President and Senior Director for Russia and Eurasian Affairs at the National Security Council. He is currently a professor of political science at Stanford University. At Stanford, he is also the Peter and Helen Bing Senior Fellow at the Hoover Institution, and a Senior Fellow at the Freeman Spogli Institute (FSI) for International Studies.

Moderator

John Bradshaw
Executive Director, National Security Network

Bradshaw previously served as the Executive Director of the Enough Project at the Center for American Progress, the Washington Director of Physicians for Human Rights, and the coordinator of the Human Rights Leadership Coalition. He is a former Foreign Service Officer and served in Venezuela, Brazil, and Burma, as well as in the State Department’s East Asia and Human Rights bureaus.

CALL DETAILS

To listen to the press call, click here.

Please note that the call starts at 00:17:59 and ends at 01:01:48 on the audio.

Transcript:

THIS IS A PRELIMINARY TRANSCRIPT. THIS COPY MAY NOT BE IN ITS FINAL FORM AND MAY BE UPDATED.

JOHN BRADSHAW: Welcome everyone, this is John Bradshaw, I am the executive director of the National Security Network, we’re hosting this call today. We are very pleased to have with us Ambassador Michael McFaul, who has just returned from Russia, where he served as the U.S. ambassador. Prior to that position, Ambassador McFaul was the senior director at the National Security Council for Russian and Eurasian affairs. I think most of you know his biography; previously he was a professor at Stanford University. Ambassador McFaul will give a few minutes of opening remarks, then after that we will turn to questions and answers. We have about 45 minutes for that. When you want to ask a question, please state your name and the outlet that you represent, and if you are not going to be asking a question, please keep your phones on mute. So, with that, I will turn it over to Ambassador Michael McFaul. Please go ahead, Ambassador.

AMBASSADOR MICHAEL MCFAUL: Yes, well, thank you for having me. Calling from Palo Alto here, and I did just step down just actually 8 days ago as a U.S. government official after 5 years in the Obama administration, so I am still going through diplomatic detox and government detox. But with that in mind, I wanted to make three general points and then get to your questions, two of which have been covered by a lot of analysts, but I want to focus particularly on the third one, about Obama’s foreign policy. So one, why did this happen? Two, what are the prospects for resolution? And three, what does this crisis say about President Obama’s foreign policy?

So, first, with respect to why did this happen, there are lots of interpretations out there about what this means, how did this fit in President [Vladimir] Putin’s worldview, was this planned for a long time? My view, having been involved in this very closely until 8 days ago, was that this was not some premeditated move by Putin to fulfill his grand strategy, dominating that part of the world. On the contrary, I think it’s important for people to remember that his grand strategy—in fact, I think it’s his most important foreign policy objective—is to create the Eurasian Economic Union, as a counter to the European Union. And critical, in fact I would say essential for the success of that agenda, for that objective, was to have Ukraine in that economic union. Not Crimea, but all of Ukraine. And I think President Putin was very pleased several months ago when [former Ukrainian President Viktor] Yanukovych did not sign the accession agreement with the EU. I was working in Moscow at the time, and I can tell you that Russian government officials saw that as a major foreign policy victory. They were then extremely disappointed with President Yanukovych and his inability to restore order in Ukraine, and his inability to remain in power. That was a major blow and a major frustration for the Kremlin and the Russian government in general. So the move into Crimea, I think, was a tactical counter-punch by President Putin to slow down what would have been, from his perspective, the inevitable victory of anti-Russian forces throughout all of Ukraine. So this was an impulsive move to stop that, and that is why what happened, happened, in my view.

Second, what are the prospects for resolution? I do applaud President Obama, Secretary Kerry, and the rest of the European countries seeking to de-escalate, and to find a diplomatic solution before it’s too late. Just from my own personal point of view now, because I am not involved in these negotiations anymore, though I obviously have many friends who I still talk to in the Obama administration, but I do think the idea of trying to put together a compromise package is correct. There is no way that President Putin is just going to, as a result of statements from Western leaders, have his soldiers go back to the barracks. It will have to be something whereby he can show he achieved a better outcome from Russia’s national interest point of view, as a result of his actions. The contours of that would be, I think, some return to some aspect, not maybe the whole thing, but to the February 21^st agreement, some guarantees for the protections of Russians, including perhaps international monitors that would be based on a quasi-permanent basis in parts of Ukraine, and perhaps some agreement to amend the Ukrainian constitution, to make it a federal constitution, as opposed to the current unitary form of government they have right now. When I hear Secretary Kerry saying that we have creative ideas that we’ve asked the Russians to consider, my guess is that those are some of the elements on there, and I think it is right to pursue that, full steam ahead, including presidential phone calls to be engaged with the one person that will make this decision in Russia. My analyst hat though, now that I am back at Stanford University, tells me that I think the chances are slim that that will work, and in particular, with the news yesterday of this referendum, going forward in this very accelerated way. I think once that happens—and we all know what the results of that will be—that will create some very sticky facts on the ground, by which President Putin will start to say ‘I would like to talk to you about these compromises, but we have to respect the will of the people.’ And I fear, unfortunately, that will create an ambiguous sovereignty in Crimea that could last for a long time.

Now, finally, third, I should try and be briefer on this, but I do have a lot to say on it, which is what does this all say about Obama’s foreign policy, the resets, and this discussion I’ve been watching about weak and strong leaders in the White House. I will just say a couple of quick things, and then will get to your questions. First, was Obama right to pursue a reset in the first few years of his administration with Russia? My answer is yes. I want to remind you what the reset was, from our perspective, because I see a lot of cartoonizations of it in the press right now, and believe me, I know every intimate piece of the strategy. It started, the formation of it, before President Obama became president. It was very simple: we are going to engage with Russia, with Russian leaders, to seek agreement on common interests.

The idea was the lack of engagement does not allow us to realize what our common interests are. In parallel, we are going to do that without compromising relations with other partners and allies in Europe or elsewhere and without compromising our values and our commitment to democracy and human rights. That is the reset. That is what it was, articulated first publicly by Vice President Biden at the Munich Security Conference, but when the documents are eventually released, that is what they will look like.

And what did we get done? I think we did a lot that made the United States better off. Are we better off to have a new START treaty than not, my answer is yes. Are we better off to have the Northern Distribution Network developed that goes through the North to supply our troops in Afghanistan, now to about 50%, my answer is yes, especially if you remember what happened to the Southern routes [through Pakistan] after the operation against Osama bin Laden. Are we better off to have UN Security Council Resolution 1929, the most comprehensive set of sanctions against Iran ever? My answer is yes. Are we better off to have Russia in the World Trade Organization? My answer is yes. Are we better off to have UN Security Council Resolutions 1970 and [19]73, which created legal basis for military action against Gaddaffi? My answer is yes.

Now, over time, it obviously became more difficult to realize common interests with the Kremlin. My own interpretation of that, and maybe we can get into that with questions in more detail, is that it had almost everything to do with internal changes in Russia and very little to do with the Obama administration’s policy, that really did not change. So the Obama administration adjusted, they took different actions, most dramatically cancelling a planned summit last fall, and being very critical of the rollback of democracy and constraints on human rights inside Russia. So that was in reaction to what happened in Russia. That doesn’t mean that the list of things—and believe me, I could go on for the entire 45 minutes if you wanted to—but that does not mean that the other things we accomplished in the early part of the administration were not good for American national interests.

Finally, on the weakness and strongness debate, I would just say three things quickly. First of all, if you listen closely to President Putin, he is not describing the world in a way that he sees President Obama and his administration as weak. On the contrary, he has a theory about American power that is quite paranoid, about how powerful the United States is, and how allegedly, from his point of view, of fomenting revolution and political instability in the Middle East, in Russia, and now in Ukraine. That does not sound like somebody that thinks he is strong and that the United States is weak, when he talks about American power—in my opinion, exaggerating American power around the world, but that is Putin’s view.

Second, I just remind you of the historical context of other Kremlin decisions to use military force in police actions in Eastern Europe. And here, unfortunately, I think we have not a great record of success for American presidents, Democrat or Republican. President Bush, in 2008, was unable to stop Russian intervention into Georgia. Ronald Reagan, who I don’t think anybody would accuse of being weak or somehow starry-eyed about the communist regime in Moscow, was unable to prevent martial law in Poland in 1981, sponsored and supported by Leonid Brezhnev. Lyndon Johnson, in 1968, could not stop Soviet intervention there in Czechoslovakia, and President Eisenhower, in 1956, was unable, despite the rhetoric of rollback that they had had in the administration before, was unable to stop Soviet intervention in Hungary in 1956.

So as a social scientist, looking at those, whether it’s Democrat or Republican, the outcome seems to be, unfortunately, tragically, the same. The one thing that I think is different today, that was not available to President Bush in 2008, is I actually think, over the long term, we have a better prospect of making this occupation, if it stays, more costly to President Putin and his government, than the options available to the Bush administration in 2008, for two reasons. For one, we have greater unity with our European allies right now over the causes of this intervention. Unfortunately, I think it’s a historical statement that there was not that kind of unity in August of 2008. I see much more unity today—and in particular, just to remind everybody, we’re now having a serious conversation about economic sanctions here in the United States, and in Europe. That was never discussed in the summer of 2008; it was not even part of the agenda because people knew that it was not going to be politically viable. So I think, over time, there are options available to make this costly for President Putin and his government. The question, of course, is, will we have the political will here in the United States and in Europe to do so? And I don’t want to get ahead of my skis, I want to be careful here. I do think now is moment for diplomacy to try and get this rolled back, to try and get back to the status quo ante. But if it does not succeed, and I’m not optimistic it won’t, I do think there is a prospect to make this costly, and ultimately, to change attitudes inside Russia about the wisdom of this current occupation of Crimea. And with that, I will stop and take your questions. Thanks.

BRADSHAW: Thank you Ambassador McFaul. We are going to open the floor for questions. We have a very large number of reporters on the call, so I’ll ask you all to be orderly in asking your questions and also to keep your phones on mute when you’re not asking a question. There will be a recording of this call available after the call is finished. You can contact Kate Brown of the National Security Network to figure out how to access that.

So with that, I’ll open the floor for questions, then go ahead and ask and identify yourself and your outlet please.

JONATHAN BRODER (CONGRESSIONAL QUARTERLY): This is Jonathan Broder with Congressional Quarterly. Ambassador McFaul, I was wondering if you could put on your analyst cap for a second and answer a couple of questions. Do you see arms control and missile defense returning as problems in the U.S./Russia relationship? How concerned is Russia over the prospect of U.S. LNG [liquefied natural gas] exports to the Baltic and Eastern European and Scandinavian countries, where Moscow currently is the main supplier of energy?

AMB. MCFAUL: With respect to your first question, it’s already been a problem. Believe me. I’ve spent five years working on missile defense and it has been a problem, in my view, an exaggerated problem I do feel the Russians have a misreading, an intentional misreading of what the Obama administration and our allies are trying to do, vis-à-vis missile defense around the world, and so far we have been unsuccessful in convincing them of our intentions or our capabilities, by the way, right?

They assign, again, capabilities to our missile defense systems that simply don’t exist. So, you know, my overwhelming impression just leaving Moscow last week, is Putin still assigns more power to our administration and to our government, and to what we’re doing in the world than in fact I think we actually have.

I don’t think the activity will threaten the New START Treaty. I think Russia has an interest in that treaty being continually executed. I do think as we get towards later elements in the execution of our missile defense programs you’re going to see the Russians try to tie enforcement of the New START Treaty to that, but that’s for a later day; that’s not related to this current crisis in my view.

With respect to LNG exports and I would say, later, oil exports perhaps if that develops, absolutely. That will have a major impact and in my view, a positive impact on the balance of coercive power in Europe. Not only because Russia will be unable, over time—I want to emphasize this is not going to happen overnight, over years, if not decades, not in days and weeks—but over time if Europe is less dependent on Russia that creates less coercive power for Russia vis-à-vis European countries, and there are many European countries that are dependent on Russia. But second, as important, Russia is dependent on Europe for the sale of those gas exports. You know, it’s a major part of the Russian budget. So it puts pressure on the government inside Russia if suddenly they’re losing those markets. So that I think is an important new dimension in the U.S.-Europe-Russia equation to watch over time.

STEVEN HEARST (AP): Mr. Ambassador, Steven Hearst with the AP. I’m wondering if there is any concern in the administration, real concern that is, about the Russians cutting off the route out of Afghanistan given the deep need for that as the troop withdrawal continues.

AMB. MCFAUL: Yes. We’re always concerned about these kinds of linkages between issues that are unrelated. At least when I was in the government, I should say that and keep adding that caveat. Our view, our approach towards the Russian government, when I was in government, was to avoid linkage; to say very explicitly, okay, we can have a disagreement, for instance about Syria, but that doesn’t mean that we shouldn’t be talking and cooperating on trade and economic issues, for instance, right? And likewise, we have rejected Russian attempts in the past to force us to link issues. Early in the administration, for instance, Russian government officials would say, you know, you need to stop talking about human rights, you need to not meet with civil society leaders if you want our cooperation on, you know, security issue XYZ, and we said we’re not going to do that. We’re going to do these, and we’re going to cooperate when we can, disagree when we have to, but we’re not going to do this kind of linkage.
And so far, I would say that has been successful with a couple notable exceptions of course. In particular, when the Russians linked their response to the Magnitsky Act, they passed their own Magnitsky Act, right, where they said they were going to deny people visas, who had been gross human rights violators in their view, but then they linked it to something totally different which was to our agreement on adoptions. That was a big, you know, setback both because it was tragedy in terms of the families that could no longer adopt the children they had been interacting with, but that was a first sign of that linkage across issues. I think, you know, as an analyst now I would say anybody in the administration should be deeply concerned with attempts to link issues, like the one you just described.

KAREN DEYOUNG (WASHINGTON POST): Could I ask, you mentioned the calls between Putin and Obama and saying that that was a good step forward. Those calls were particularly long. I wonder if you, from your experience, can talk about what the tenor of those kinds of conversations is, and is this unusual to have had, in close succession, those unusually long conversations ?

AMB. MCFAUL: Well, you know, when I was in the government I participated in many calls like that and I think almost any meeting the president had with Putin, except for one, and I would say that the length is not unusual. These are two gentlemen, two presidents that engage pretty deeply on issues quickly, it’s all substance, it’s no kind of diplo-speak. You know the first meeting the two gentlemen had I was there in July 2009, I went for over three hours as I remember. So I don’t think that is unusual. If I can imagine, I’m sure they’re trying to explain their positions and so far I would say we haven’t seen a lot of movement, in either president’s position in terms of a compromise. At least, not from the readouts I’ve heard about and seen. But, I think if there’s a chance for an outcome it’s only going to happen in that channel. That’s something very important to understand about the nature of Russian decision-making, right now, the only person that can resolve this crisis in Russia is Vladimir Putin. So I applaud President Obama for making those calls. There’s nothing lost from engagement, from talk, at least if nothing more you have a better understanding of your interlocutor’s point of view. I think in the past there have been times where we didn’t have those lines of communication. This is good to engage, it doesn’t mean there’s going to be achievement but it’s right thing to do and I applaud President Obama for continuing to be engaged obviously at the highest level.

JOHNATHAN MARCUS (BBC): Two quick questions if I may. One, do you see the outcome of the Crimea referendum as a foregone conclusion, because certainly opinion poll data over recent years has shown a subsiding desire for unity with Russia although there is the current crisis which may have inflamed the mood. Secondly, you were very positive about the cooperation between the U.S. and Europe this time around compared to 2008. How concerned are you that there are many divisions in Europe, within the EU about taking tough action and there’s a lot of rhetoric but, it seems to me from London, very little enthusiasm for actually taking tough action.

AMB. MCFAUL: So with respect to the referendum it’s a very important point and the last major public opinion poll,done by a Ukrainian organization that I know well—I used to write about the Ukraine, if fact I wrote a book about the Orange Revolution just for background, so I used to go there before joining the administration—which shows that there was not majority support, you’re absolutely right. Just to remind everybody, it’s 60% Russian, 40% other, so it’s not a large majority and just to assume that every Russian wants to join Russia is incorrect, but I think in the context of right now this is not going to be a free and fair election. There’s not going to be any voices making the argument for why this is a bad idea, right? They just turned off the Ukrainian television stations and now you’re only getting Russian television stations. There won’t be any monitors, this will not be, I think, a legitimate vote and therefore I expect it to go—and it may have that way anyway though, given the anxieties there—but I will certainly be surprised the result is not the one that Putin is expecting.

With respect to Europe I’ll leave it to you, you know Europe better. I was just making a historical comparison because I working on the campaign at the time for then-Senator Obama, and I remember very vividly in our conversations what we should be recommending, watching what the Bush Administration was trying to do. The issue of economic sanctions was not even discussed. In fact, Steve Hadley, you know the National Security Advisor just said that yesterday, I believe. At least it is being discussed here. As to whether the enthusiasm , I take your point and others are more expert than I to talk about the mood in London, or elsewhere in Europe.

BRADSHAW: Next question from Rachel Oswald at National Journal, go ahead.

RACHEL OSWALD (NATIONAL JOURNAL): Do you see any possibility the situation in the Ukraine could lead Russia to withdraw from the IMF Treaty as it has previously indicated it might, or to continue to address U.S. concerns about perceived treaty violations?

AMB. MCFAUL: Is it a possibility? Yes. I’m not good at predicting the future, and by the way I don’t think anyone is. I know there have been discussions about that in press too, about why we didn’t predict this, but should the administration and the world be concerned about those kinds of action/reaction processes later? Absolutely, of course, I think one should be concerned.

OSWALD: If I could ask a follow on question, I think it might help for the reporters covering this. Now that you’re out of the administration could you let us know exactly what kind of missile has been the source of these reports in the U.S.? It’s been said that it’s the new cruise missile, ground launched missile but we haven’t had confirmation on what it is.

AMB. MCFAUL: Yeah, just because I’m out of the administration doesn’t mean I can talk about classified information and so I’ll confer with my handlers back in the government to see if I’m allowed to talk about that.

OSWALD: Alright, had to try.

HAYES BROWN (THINKPROGRESS): Two quick things. One, a lot of what we’ve been hearing is talking about medium and long term repercussions for the Russian Federation in light of their moves in Crimea. Do you believe, in your analysis as a person formerly in government, that we have run out of possible short term repercussions for Russia to make them back away from their stance?

And second, what is your sense of the view of Russia’s neighbors about their actions? They don’t seem to be taking it very well. So I was wondering how you’re seeing this.

AMB. MCFAUL: So it’s the threat of the medium and long-term actions that are designed to create pressure for a negotiated solution. And I think that is working, by the way. I can tell you that the specter of particularly banking sanctions, just in my interactions with Russians—and I am interacting with Russians every day, both government officials and people in the business community and just friends of mine—there’s not a lot of enthusiasm for not being able to have bank accounts, not being able to trade in dollars, having the worry that your assets might be frozen. That is creating a lot of anxiety in the business community in Russia. There is no doubt in my mind about that. And if you’re a multi-billion-dollar Russian corporation, who has major investments in the United States, this has got to look like a total distraction and not in your interests. I am thinking of Severstal, a very, I think, well-respected steel company that has lots of investments in the United States and all over the world. This can’t be great news for you. Sberbank, the number one bank in Russia, a state controlled bank—I don’t know where the sanctions are going, I want to be clear about that, I want to stipulate that. But if you think about what our administration and our allies in Europe did in terms of the Iranian banking sector, and the incredible success, I would say, that we had in isolating them and making it nearly impossible for them to do transactions with the world, if that were ever to come, if that set of sanctions were to ever be applied to Russia, that would have devastating economic consequences for the Russian economy. So that, in an immediate run, just having people think about that, I think, is important.

Rosneft, for instance, the largest oil company in Russia, has just signed up to what , if it goes all the way through, would be the biggest joint venture in the history of capitalism with Exxon Mobil. I am sure my colleagues who deal with Rosneft and ExxonMobil have got to be really nervous about all this talk of sanctions. And I think that, in the immediate run, is the conversation you want to have.
I also believe that at the end of the day Putin himself will be ready to make those economic sacrifices if he feels that he wants to go forward with this annexation strategy. But that is the immediate run. You want to raise the specter and make those people think about their interests and have them interact ultimately with the Kremlin.

BROWN: On the second part, what you think Russian’s neighbors think of the current situation?

AMB. MCFAUL: Oh yes, that is easy. Nobody likes this, everybody is scared. And no matter what they say publicly, like my colleagues in Kazakhstan, you know this is not good news. When I was at the White House Kazakhstan was one of the countries I was responsible for at the National Security Council, and they are very savvy in their diplomacy. But if you have millions of Russians living in your country on the border of Russia and you are witnessing this, it makes you very nervous. I think it also makes those countries that joined NATO, that have ethnic Russians living in their country, very happy and satisfied that they made that move. I do think that is an important distinction, that there is not the specter of this threat in a place like Latvia or Lithuania today. And that is a good thing.

JOSH KEATING (SLATE): In light of that, what do you think are the prospects of the future of the Eurasian Union project? Are countries going to keep wanting to sign on to this or are they going to get cold feet now?

AMB. MCFAUL: There is a big ‘if’ right? So I want to be careful, I don’t think it is a fait accompli that Crimea will be occupied forever. But if that is the case, this destroys their plan. There is no doubt about it. Most importantly, if this scenario plays out, this tragic scenario plays out, you will have made sure that the rest of Ukraine will never have any interest in a Eurasian economic union with Russia. That is just a fait accompli, right? Just how it changes the electoral politics within Ukraine, it will change it dramatically. Putin has made sure that the key stone in this whole project was supposed to be Ukraine. And I think this action has just ensured that that project is not going to work.

The only mechanisms he will have left are coercive powers. He’ll coerce countries into joining. But again I want to emphasize, I don’t have the numbers in front of me, but the size of the Ukrainian economy and population, 47-48 million people dwarfs if everybody else in the former Soviet Union joined the economic union. Ukraine has always been the big prize. And I think he has now guaranteed that that project is over.

STEPHEN COLLINSON (AFP): If the situation in Crimea evolves as you suspect, what kind of relationship with Russia is sustainable politically for the administration? How is it going to be possible to deal with issues like Iran, for example, while this elephant in the room? And what does Putin think of the same question? What does he seek in a relationship with the US? In the readout from the Kremlin last night of the call with the President, he supposedly said we shouldn’t let this issue, as important as it is, cloud everything. How do you think he sees this?

AMB. MCFAUL: So on the narrow issue of Iran, and I would add to that list the cooperation we have with Russia on destroying and removing Syrian chemical weapons, I think those will go forward in the way that they are moving forward. Not because Putin is doing us any favors, but because he sees those processes as in Russian’s national interest. By the way I would say that about everything. In my experience of five years in the government dealing with this particular government, I would generalize, it is rare that your allies do you any favors. The question is; how do you align those interests? The P5+1 process, I think there is a chance, I am optimistic that that process will go forward. Let’s have no illusions about how easy it will be to get a solution. But I don’t see Russia pulling out of that immediately.

To your bigger question, first about Obama then about Putin, I think there’s already well before this crisis, there was not an ambitious program coming out of Russia in terms of some great new set of initiatives with the Russian government. Instead you see cooperation on issues that we developed earlier in the Obama administration, but already last summer the President decided not to come to Moscow because there wasn’t an agenda that was worthy of a summit. And that is what he personally said. Obviously I don’t think that has changed now. So I think it will be, it is hard for me to see some new initiatives that will come from Washington over the course of the second term of the Administration. Which is not to say we are going to, that the President and the administration will stop cooperating when it’s in our interests. And I think that’s important to understand.

I think when it comes to Putin, what he said in the readout is exactly what he said last summer about Mr. Snowden. Get over it, we have bigger issues, we have to talk about trade and investment, this shouldn’t get in the way of that. And they misread that back then and were very surprised when the President canceled his trip. I can tell you that because I was deeply involved in those negotiations. And that is his rhetorical strategy. I think that they do understand that this is a major negative moment in terms of US-Russian relations.

And I would just remind you of the kind of dual impulses that President Putin has vis-à-vis the United States and the West because he, I think, kind of bounces back and forth about what he seeks and desires, it is not some clear-cut strategy. He does seek recognition and respect from the West. There is no doubt in my mind about that listening to him speak in varies meetings I have been a part of for the past five years. To say that he doesn’t care about what the West says, and what the West thinks about Russia—why did they spend 50 billion dollars, allegedly, on the Sochi Olympics? That was all designed to reintroduce the new Russia.

By the way my view was that they were rather successful in doing that. I was at the Olympics, and they did. And then this action of course, all of that effort is ruined by this move into Crimea. People have contradictory impulses and contradictory interests and they do things at times that undermines one of those objectives—that doesn’t mean Putin doesn’t have both objectives in mind. I think he does, and I think the readout of his call was a good illustration of that.

BRADSHAW: We have time for a couple more questions, and the Ambassador can stay on 10 more minutes to answer any additional questions. So please go ahead.

PETER BAUMGARTNER (RFE/RL): Ambassador McFaul, I would like to ask you, in your view, what is the possibility of other Ukrainian regions in eastern or southern Ukraine being invaded by Russian forces?

AMB. MCFAUL: I would say this, that historically in other moments like the one we are witnessing today, stuff happens, which is that somebody gets killed, something happens, some unintended moment of violence then precipitates another moment of violence. And these kinds of situations can move very quickly in unintended ways. Is Putin planning an invasion of eastern Ukraine? I don’t know. But I would be surprised if he were planning a military of eastern Ukraine. But can I put together a set of events that could happen over the next weeks or months that would lead to a Russian military intervention in eastern Ukraine? Of course. To say that it is not possible would be irresponsible. So yes, I am deeply worried about it, frankly. Even if the probability of it is low, the negative consequences of it are extremely high, so my answer would be yes.

BRADSHAW: If we don’t have any additional questions I would like to thank Ambassador McFaul for his very fresh perspective of events. Again, as I mentioned, the recording of the call will be available sometime this afternoon and you can contact Kate Brown with the National Security Network for that.

AMB. MCFAUL: Thank you.

[END OF CALL]

For press inquires or questions concerning this call, please contact Kate Brown at kbrown@nsnetwork.org