Why you should be deeply, deeply suspicious when John McCain talks about the importance of alliance-building.

On March 26^th, John McCain gave a much-hyped foreign policy speech at the World Affairs Council in Los Angeles. It was his way of signaling both his commitment to restoring America's alliances and his desire to separate himself from the diplomatic blunders of the Bush administration. And it went over like gangbusters. David Broder, dean of the Washington pundit class, gushingly
proclaimed the speech was "an implicit rebuke to the mind-set of the
current White House" and went so far as to equate it with Barack
Obama's speech on race.

"We need to listen
to the views and respect the collective will of our democratic allies,"
McCain said, in an echo of George Bush's 2000 campaign promise to play
nice with our friends. "If we're an arrogant nation," Bush said at the
time, "they'll resent us; if we're a humble nation, but strong, they'll
welcome us." And we all know how that turned out.

Only
a press corps so enamored with McCain could imagine that one of the
staunchest supporters of the Iraq War would be capable of breaking with
the current administration's unilateral adventurism. Despite his
conciliatory rhetoric, McCain's hawkish views, and his long history of
castigating allies who do not agree with him, leave little reason to
believe that when it comes to restoring America's
image, credibility, and alliances, he would be much different than
George W. Bush. A brief look at these four crucial policy areas
explains why.

1. NATO and our democratic allies. Perhaps the greatest window into McCain's ability to deal with America's
allies comes from his handling of the rupture that occurred within NATO
prior to the start of the Iraq War. The debate over whether to invade
was, after all, the greatest diplomatic crisis that America's most critical alliance had faced in its 60 years.

On
this front, his record is not good. In fact, some of McCain's
statements made those from Donald "Old Europe" Rumsfeld seem tame by
comparison. Speaking at an international security conference in Germany
a month before the war, a frustrated McCain lashed out at our European
allies, calling them "vacuous and posturing." Later that year, in an
interview, he referred to the French and Germans as "our adversaries."
He said that former German Chancellor Gerhard Schroeder "looks little
like the ally that anchored our presence in Europe
throughout the Cold War. ... A German Rip Van Winkle from the 1960s
would not understand the lack of political courage and cooperation with
its allies on the question of Iraq exhibited in Berlin today." McCain also unleashed on two other critical players, accusing France and Russia
of putting their "commercial interests above international law, world
peace, and the political ideals of Western civilization."

Moreover, creating a "League of Democracies," McCain's signature proposal for how the U.S.
should relate to its democratic allies, is likely dead on arrival.
Similar ideas have been suggested many times in the past by both
liberal and conservative foreign policy intellectuals. (The first
presidential candidate to propose it was Pat Robertson in 1988.) When
liberals propose it, they generally hope to strengthen the multilateral
architecture that already exists by adding a new international
institution. But when conservatives like McCain do, it is rightly
perceived as an end run around the U.N. Security Council--little more
than another way of giving multilateral legitimacy to the use of force
when the others fail. Many Europeans would likely interpret the League
of Democracies this way and would resist it out of fear of undercutting
the U.N. and supplanting NATO. Even the British and the French, who
both sit on the U.N. Security Council, would likely object to the
creation of an organization that gives them such a privileged
international position. Additionally, many emerging democracies, such
as Brazil,
would probably see it as a U.S.-dominated organization that is merely
an attempt to further institutionalize the idea of "a coalition of the
willing."

2. Russia. McCain's hard-line stance toward Russia
has already raised eyebrows. He frequently says of Vladimir Putin,
"I've looked into his eyes, and I saw three letters--K.G.B." Couple
that saber-rattling with his desire to kick Russia
out of the G-8--a provocative and perhaps reckless action that would
signal to the world's second greatest nuclear power that the United States views it as an enemy--and the U.S.
would likely have a massive diplomatic crisis on its hands. Plus,
European countries, such as Germany, that are dependent on Russian gas,
are seriously concerned about redrawing Cold War lines and once again
having a hostile nuclear armed power in their backyard.

3. Iran. McCain's approach to Iran is no more comforting. He recently said that Iran was "obviously pursuing nuclear weapons," directly contradicting
the National Intelligence Estimate released in December, which
concluded that Iran had suspended its nuclear weapons program and is
significantly further away than previously thought from being able to
develop the bomb (although it continues to enrich uranium). At a
campaign stop last year, McCain joked about bomb, bomb, bombing Iran, and in 2006 he introduced a resolution in the Senate calling on FIFA to ban Iran
from the World Cup--a silly little stunt meant to score cheap political
points, but not one befitting of a presidential candidate. Perhaps most
worryingly, McCain has surrounded himself with advisors--like Bill
Kristol and James Woolsey--who have been staunch advocates of striking Iran, and his Iran
policy has been endorsed by none other than Vice President Dick Cheney.
"I would guess that John McCain and I are pretty close to agreement [on
Iran]," Cheney said last February.

If McCain were to follow through on one of his many threats to bomb Iran's nuclear facilities, it would likely cause a diplomatic crisis as grave as the one that preceded the war in Iraq.
Our European allies--especially the Germans, French, and British, who
have worked hard to both pressure and negotiate with Iran--would likely
balk at military action. And it is unlikely that our Arab allies in the
Persian Gulf would relish the idea of an escalation of violence in
their neighborhood, particularly if it could lead to a naval conflict
in the Persian Gulf, further choking off the world's oil supplies. In the end, a U.S. attack would probably be just that--a unilateral attack. (This to say nothing of the fact that bombing Iran's
nuclear facilities would likely: fail to eliminate its nuclear program
in the long-term; result in a massive Iranian retaliation against U.S. forces in Iraq; and leave us more isolated in the world.)

4. North Korea. In 1994 McCain attacked Bill Clinton's agreement with North Korea, arguing, "I know what they understand, and that is the threat of extinction." He hasn't dropped his hawkish line toward the Hermit Kingdom since: He supported President Bush's decision in 2001 to cut off discussions with North Korea, and when six years of failure led to a North Korean nuclear test in 2007, his response was to lead the charge in blaming the Clinton Administration.

While
Kim Jong Il certainly isn't worthy of our coddling, this type of saber
rattling will find little audience with two important partners: South Korea and China. China has played a central role in the negotiations surrounding North Korea's
nuclear weapons, but some of McCain's past comments over his
frustration with its role cast doubts over his ability to engage
effectively. In 2006, McCain called China "immature" over its lack of effort in addressing North Korea and threatened, "If [China]
continue[s] to vacillate as they have all last week in the United
Nations, then there are consequences in our relationship." Meanwhile,
the new South Korean government has actively sought to improve diplomatic ties with its northern neighbor and would seem an unlikely supporter of McCain-style "diplomacy."

Try as he might to distance himself from George Bush's abrasive foreign policy, John McCain has too long of a record to outrun. On Russia, Iran, and North Korea,
he will have a policy of confrontation and escalation. His dismissive
approach towards international institutions (and at times our closest
allies), as well as his long history of verbally belittling other
countries, cast real doubt on his ability to handle delicate diplomatic
situations. In short, John McCain's claim that he is the right man to
break with the Bush administration and build a "global coalition for
peace and freedom" simply strains credulity.

Ilan Goldenberg is the Policy Director and Max Bergmann is the Deputy Policy Director of the National Security Network.