A recent high-profile piece in The New Yorker by Seymour Hersh has brought renewed attention to Iran's nuclear ambitions. Policymakers face complexity and few clear facts.  Iran's refusal to answer questions and clarify the nature of its nuclear program raises serious questions, as does a recent report by the International Atomic Energy Agency, which points to new information regarding "possible military dimensions" of Iran's nuclear program. Yet as the 2011 National Intelligence Estimate concludes, "We do not know... if Iran will eventually decide to build nuclear weapons."

As regional dynamics continue to shift in the Middle East and Iran undergoes an internal political battle among hardliners, negotiations are unlikely to lead to a solution any time soon. A forthcoming Atlantic Council Task Force report sums up the situation with its title:  "Iran Sanctions:  Preferable to War But no Silver Bullet."  As the Center for a New American Security's Marc Lynch recently concluded, "The region's transformation is changing the security and political calculations of all actors, shifting the strategic focus and creating new opportunities and challenges. The goal of U.S. strategy must be to prevent Iran from taking advantage of these regional changes, while constructing a new regional architecture that protects core American interests."

New IAEA report raises concerns about Iran's weaponization activities and highlights technical difficulties.  A May report by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) presented several important findings on Iran's nuclear program. The New York Times reports, "The International Atomic Energy Agency last week presented a report to its board that laid out new information on what it calls ‘possible military dimensions' of Iran's nuclear program, clarifying the central issue in the long clash between Tehran and the West over nuclear technology... The report cites concerns about undisclosed nuclear activities ‘past or current,' implying that the agency believes the Iranian arms program may still be moving ahead despite reports of its onetime suspension."

David Albright, nuclear weapons expert and president of the Institute for Science and International Security (ISIS) explained, "The IAEA reports that Iran has still refused to clarify and the Agency remains concerned about ‘the possible existence in Iran of past or current undisclosed nuclear related activities involving military related organizations, including activities related to the development of a nuclear payload for a missile.' The IAEA notes, moreover, that since its last report in February, it has ‘received further information' related to these undisclosed nuclear related activities, which it is currently assessing." Albright states that the report shows "clearer statements about Iran not meeting its obligations under its safeguards agreement and United Nations Security Council resolutions" and that "the IAEA has more new evidence about Iran's weaponization activities." However, the report also finds that "the average monthly rate of low enriched uranium (LEU) production increased significantly from the last reporting period, and the number of centrifuges slightly increased, which raises the possibility of ongoing problems in its centrifuge modules." [New York Times, 5/30/11. David Albright, 5/24/11]

Core intelligence assessment:  Iran appears to be "keeping open the option," but  it is not clear that a decision has been made to pursue a weapons capability. Director of National Intelligence James Clapper testified before the Senate Armed Services Committee in March: "We continue to assess Iran is keeping open the option to develop nuclear weapons in part by developing various nuclear capabilities that better position it to produce such weapons, should it choose to do so.  We do not know, however, if Iran will eventually decide to build nuclear weapons." DNI Clapper further noted that this makes "the central issue its political will to do so." Peter Crail of the Arms Control Association summed up Clapper's briefing by saying, "Iran is keeping open the option of developing nuclear weapons eventually, but it is not clear that Tehran will decide to do so." [James Clapper, 3/10/11. Peter Crail, ACA, 3/11]

We have time:  Assessments regarding the status of Iran's nuclear program have varied widely over the years. Salon's Justin Elliot pointed out last December, "According to various Israeli government predictions over the years, Iran was going to have a bomb by the mid-90s -- or 1998, 1999, 2000, 2004, 2005, and finally 2010. More recent Israeli predictions have put that date at 2011 or 2014."  Israel's former Mossad chief, Meir Dagan, said this January that he believed that the Iranians would not be able to make a bomb until 2015, at the earliest. The Atlantic's Jeffrey Goldberg has also noted a shift among Israeli defense officials: "I spoke with one of the Israeli officials I quoted in my article last year about the coming confrontation between Israel and Iran, and he put the chances of an Israeli strike on Iran in the next year at less than 20 percent -- and he was one of the Israelis who felt, in the spring of last year, that it would be necessary for Israel to attack Iran's nuclear facilities by the end of 2011. ‘People have very different opinions inside the defense establishment,' he said, when I reached him, ‘but it's clear to all analysts that the virus and the sanctions are working better than we thought.'" [Justin Elliot via Salon, 12/5/10. New York Times, 1/10/11. Jeffrey Goldberg, 1/10/11]

Diplomacy retains key role in maintaining international unity on Iran, even with dim prospects for short-term progress. Senior Fellow at the Center for a New American Security Marc Lynch recently wrote, "The time does not look ripe to move directly toward a grand bargain encompassing all the major outstanding regional and political issues dividing Iran from the United States and its allies. Indeed, the prospects for a deal look dimmer than ever... This does not mean that diplomacy should be abandoned, however. Talks are, at a minimum, needed to maintain international consensus regarding the existing sanctions regime. More productively, they are needed to open lines of communication and to shape the bargaining space for larger-scale diplomacy when the time is right. Talks that take place in the near term should focus on small steps that build confidence, not on make-or-break gambits that are likely to fail. A new fuel-swap deal is one possibility, but is not an end unto itself. Such small steps can create the time and space to exchange ideas, build relationships with interlocutors who may be influential in future Iranian governments, and give the opportunity to test new ideas or incentives. Technical working groups should be established for private discussions to begin making progress on achievable goals, such as countering drug trafficking. Talks could also provide a way to supplement the pressure track by offering, conditionally, positive incentives to Iran to change its behavior. This would be a way to change the dynamic by offering an end-state that serves the interests of both sides, beyond the immediate nuclear issues at stake, while also reassuring regional partners." The Atlantic Council's Iran Task Force, co-chaired by Senator Chuck Hagel and Ambassador Stuart Eizenstat, will release tomorrow a report on the sanctions and pressure track that sums up the situation this way:  "Iran Sanctions:  Preferable to War But No Silver Bullet." [Marc Lynch, 5/19/11.  Atlantic Council, 6/2/11]

What We're Reading

Fighting raged in Yemen's capital as government troops and opposition tribesmen battled for control of key positions including the Interior Ministry and the state-run television station.

Syrian opposition members have rejected an amnesty offer by President Bashar al Assad.

NATO has agreed to extend its Libyan air war by three months and dismissed charges by Col Muammar Gaddafi's regime that the bombing campaign has already killed 718 civilians.

Bosnian Serb genocide suspect Ratko Mladic is in the custody of a U.N. war crimes tribunal in The Hague after losing his fight against extradition from Serbia.

A key gauge of Chinese manufacturing growth edged lower but remained stronger than analysts had expected, suggesting that the world's second-largest economy was gliding towards a soft landing.

A preliminary report from the International Atomic Energy Agency says Japan miscalculated the tsunami hazard, leading to meltdowns at the Fukushima Daiichi plant, but the report praises the nation's response to the March disaster as 'exemplary.'

A well-known Pakistani journalist abducted last week has been found dead, after receiving repeated threats from Pakistan's premier intelligence agency.

Military prosecutors have refiled terrorism and murder charges against Khalid Shaikh Mohammed and four other men in the Sept. 11 attacks, using a revamped trial process at Guantánamo Bay.

Sudan has proposed that African peacekeepers patrol the disputed region of Abyei, along with northern and southern troops, and that a rotating administration be set up to run the area.

Bolivia has apologized to neighboring Argentina for inviting Iranian Defense Minister Ahmad Vahidi for a visit.

Commentary of the Day

John C. Danforth writes that the real question underlying the debate about UN reform is how we can best influence the institution to accelerate the adoption of reforms while not shutting down the organization's work, decreasing U.S. influence, and costing American taxpayers more money.

Sherard Cowper-Coles contends that talking to the Taliban is the only route to lasting peace.

John Hanrahan suggests that Bagram prison, bigger than Guantanamo, its prisoners in limbo, cries out for some news coverage.