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The Middle East in Context
2/15/11
"Spring" in the broader Middle East took a violent turn yesterday, as Bahrain, Yemen and Iran experienced serious clashes in the streets. Attention has focused on Iran, where events in Egypt seem to have given new life to a pro-democracy movement that was brutally suppressed in 2009. As a new regional dynamic evolves, U.S. policymaking faces significant challenges - which will be unique in each place. But the core challenge will be the same everywhere - to combine principled support for the goals of democracy with clear realism about US interests and the limits of the tools we have available, all without counterproductive fear-mongering.
Demonstrations spread throughout Middle East, with different circumstances but a common inspiration in Egypt. Bloomberg reports that, "Demonstrators clashed with security forces in Bahrain, Yemen and Iran yesterday, emboldened to challenge ruling regimes by the success of Egypt's populist uprising against President Hosni Mubarak." The Washington Post points out, "The protests in Bahrain, as well as Yemen, have nonetheless been much smaller than those that forced Mubarak to resign." Each country presents unique issues and grievances:
Bahrain: The New York Times reports that, "After weeks of turmoil rolling through the Arab world, protesters in the Persian Gulf kingdom clashed for a second day with the police on Tuesday and a second demonstrator was killed by gunfire, spurring the largest Shiite bloc to suspend participation in the country's Parliament. The events came as mourners gathered for the funeral of a Shiite protester shot to death during what was called a ‘Day of Rage' protest on Monday, modeled on similar outbursts of discontent that have toppled autocratic regimes in Tunisia and Egypt since mid-January and spread on Monday to Iran.
"With only about a million residents, half of them foreign workers, Bahrain has long been among the most politically volatile in the region. The principal tension is between the royal family under King Hamad bin Isa al-Khalifa and the ruling elites, who are mostly Sunnis, on one side, and the approximately 70 percent of the local population that is Shiite on the other. Occupying mostly run-down villages with cinder block buildings and little else, many Shiites say they face systemic discrimination in employment, housing, education and government." [NY Times, 2/15/11]
Yemen. Christopher Boucek of the Carnegie Endowment explains the many complexities involved in Yemen: "Yemen faces multiple internal conflicts-an increasingly violent secessionist movement in the south, the seven-year Houthi rebellion in northern Sa'ada, and significant activity by a resurgent al-Qaeda. Even more threatening to the long-term future of Yemen are the serious economic problems-endemic poverty and chronically high levels of unemployment that are aggravated by rampant corruption and explosive population growth." [Christopher Boucek, 2/4/11]
The situations in Jordan and Algeria also bear continued watching, and the Guardian reported yesterday that, "The Palestinian Authority cabinet has resigned in a move seen by some as a response to calls for democratic reform echoing around the Middle East." [Bloomberg, 2/14/11. Washington Post, 2/15/11]
Iran opposition shares "fearless, non-ideological youth" but faces "fundamental differences" from Egypt. Much of the news attention is understandably on Iran. Both the Iranian regime and the Green Movement claim the Egyptian uprising as their own. Reza Aslan detailed last week, "On one side of the political spectrum are a group of conservative parliamentary members, Revolutionary Guard leaders, and even the Supreme Leader himself, who are trying to cast the Egyptian revolution as a part of a greater Islamic uprising across the region. In a sermon last Friday, the Ayatollah Ali Khamenei painted the events in Egypt as an ‘Islamic awakening' that signals an ‘irreversible defeat' for American hegemony in the Middle East... On the other side are Iran's youth and the leaders of the Green Movement, some of whom are even taking credit for the popular revolution that is now taking place in Egypt. Mir Hussein Mousavi, the man whose loss to Mahmoud Ahmadinejad in the 2009 presidential elections launched the largest and most sustained demonstrations in Iran since the 1979 revolution, voiced his confidence that ‘the starting point of what we are witnessing in the streets of Tunis, San'a, Cairo, Alexandria, and Suez stems from the demonstrations in the streets of Tehran, where millions of Iranians marched in June of 2009.'" RAND Corporation's Alireza Nader points out, "The protests in Iran definitely show that the Green Movement is not dead yet... There's still a lot of pent-up frustration and demands in Iran." Aslan notes Iran's economic hardships and explores whether this could lay the groundwork for another uprising: "After all, Iran is facing many of the same economic woes that plunged Tunisia, Algeria, and Egypt into revolt."
But Geneive Abdo, fellow at NSN and The Century Foundation, explains, "Unfortunately for the Iranian opposition, there are fundamental differences between the two uprisings - some historic and others related to the formation of the two states - which make another round of protest in Iran highly unlikely for the foreseeable future. The one common factor in both protest movements has been that they are both led by the fearless, non-ideological youth. But in Iran, unlike Egypt, this youth bulge as it is called, has limited resources to confront the security forces, in this case the basij, the Islamic militias, and the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps. Iran's reformist youth also face a generational divide, with older Iranians more inclined to try to reform the state from within rather than oust the regime for another form of governance." Additionally, Abdo notes, "The military, both IRGC and regular, as well as every conceivable security and paramilitary force, have multiple redundancies in their composition in the event that any units are overpowered by protesters or succumb to internal divisions. Iran's government, unlike Egypt's, rests upon multiple pillars that together diffuse the pressures upon the establishment and ensure stability even in times of extreme stress." [Reza Aslan, 2/9/11. Geneive Abdo, 2/9/11. Alireza Nader, via Bloomberg, 2/14/11]
In a changed Middle East, twin pillars of U.S. policy must be cool realism and support for democratic aspirations - neither of which is helped by fear-mongering. CNAS Senior Fellow Marc Lynch describes the Egypt policy: "No bombs, no shock and awe, no soaring declarations of American exceptionalism, and no taking credit for a tidal wave which was entirely of the making of the Egyptian people -- just the steadily mounting public and private pressure on the top of the regime which was necessary for the protestors to succeed." In the middle of the protests Council on Foreign Relations Senior Fellow Steven Cook said, "The Brothers have been Mubarak's bogeyman for three decades. The regime has played on the ghosts of the 1979 Islamic Revolution in Iran to stoke the fears of successive American administrations and, in turn, secure Washington's generous diplomatic, political, and financial support. Yet the Brotherhood has played a largely secondary role in the current uprising, which is broad-based, encompassing virtually all of Egypt's political tendencies. Indeed, it is the left and liberals who have been driving current events. And while the Brotherhood remains influential and will likely be a factor if Mubarak goes and there are efforts to establish a civilian coalition government, the Islamists are in some ways compromised. They came late to the demonstrations and have a long history of compromise and accommodation with the Mubarak regime, if only to ensure their survival."
A principled but realistic strategy will look different from state to state. But it will be clear about our shared aspirations, as Secretary Clinton said yesterday: "Let me, clearly and directly, support the aspirations of the people who are in the streets in Iran today." It will also be clear about our national interests and redlines, without succumbing to fear-mongering. [Marc Lynch, 2/11/11. Steve Cook, 1/30/11. Hillary Clinton, via Reuters, 2/14/11]
What We're Reading
Italy is seeking $84 million in aid from the European Union to handle the influx of thousands of Tunisians who have arrived on its shores following the January uprising.
Five rebels and three policemen were killed in a gun battle in Russia's Caucasus region.
In Oslo, formal talks restarted between Manila and Phillipine Maoist guerrillas who have led a forty-year insurgency, one of Asia's longest.
The U.S. government vowed to prove that an American citizen charged with killing two Pakistani men has diplomatic immunity.
Chevron pledged to fight an $8.6 billion fine levied against it by an Ecuadoran court for polluting the Amazon.
A top U.S. Naval commander said China's new "carrier killer" missile will not force the United States to change the way it operates in the Pacific.
A South Korean fishing vessel that had been captured by Somali pirates arrived safely back in Kenya.
A renegade band of soldiers in south Sudan's Jonglei oil state killed almost two hundred people according to the region's ruling party.
Members of Iran's parliament have called for opposition leaders Mir Hossein Mousavi and Mehdi Karroubi to be tried and executed.
Argentina has accused the United States military of trying to bring guns and surveillance equipment into the country under the cover of supplying a police training course, creating the latest diplomatic rift between the countries.
Commentary of the Day
Mikhail Gorbachev argues that while the prospect of democratic transition will be daunting for many Arab governments, power without accountability cannot last.
Eugene Robinson criticizes the GOP's negative responses- and lack of responses -to the peaceful revolution in Egypt.
Jeremy Warner argues that China's current economic position is similar to that of Japan's in the 1990s and that its current prominence could easily be followed by rapid decline.