Terrorist groups plotting from safe havens on Afghanistan's borders are the greatest threat to our security. Yet the Bush administration let itself be distracted from Afghanistan: now the Taliban insurgency is growing stronger, and the weak government of Afghanistan is threatened. Failure in Afghanistan will again allow Al Qaeda to operate unchecked. The U.S. must redouble its efforts in Afghanistan: by hunting terrorists, by increasing troop levels, by reengaging allies, by increasing reconstruction efforts, and by protecting and supporting the people of Afghanistan.

Overview

Afghanistan is again under siege, almost seven years after a U.S. invasion removed the Taliban from power, displaced Al Qaeda training camps, and set the stage for a moderate Afghan democracy. Afghanistan is one of the poorest places on earth and has never had a strong central government. Its potential as a terrorist safe haven and center for drug trafficking poses a threat we will be managing for years to come. There are no easy solutions. The problem will require careful attention and hard choices – a change from the Bush administration’s inattention and lack of focus.

After toppling the Taliban and Al Qaeda in Afghanistan in the fall of 2001, and helping to set up an Afghan government led by Hamid Karzai, the Bush Administration took its eye off the ball, diverting attention, troops, and resources from Afghanistan to Iraq. The results have been disastrous. Al Qaeda and Afghanistan’s former Taliban rulers have reconstituted in the mountainous safe havens along the Afghan-Pakistan border. Together, they pose a grave threat to the U.S. and our allies and are leading a growing insurgency against the Afghan government. The Taliban now operates with impunity in large parts of the country. As the Taliban has gained strength, Afghan faith in the government has slipped, and support for U.S. and NATO forces has waned.

The security situation has grown worse every year since the 2003 invasion of Iraq. The deadliest year on record for U.S. forces in Afghanistan was 2007, with fatalities four times higher than in 2004. Civilian casualties have risen dramatically. Tactics previously seen in Iraq, such as suicide bombings and the use of IEDs (Improvised Explosive Devices), have migrated to Afghanistan. Assassinations are on the rise, as with the dramatic April 2008 attempt on President Karzai.

Despite the deteriorating security situation in Afghanistan, the U.S. capacity for taking action is limited because of its engagement in Iraq. The U.S. military is overstretched, and our ground forces are near the breaking point. It is impossible to provide the necessary troop levels in Afghanistan – and repair the overstretched Army and Marine Corps – without a significant drawdown in Iraq.

The NATO coalition that provides about 28,000 additional troops to ease the strain on U.S. forces is weakening, as this Administration’s behavior has encouraged Europeans and Canadians to view the fighting in Afghanistan much as they view the fighting in Iraq – as a U.S. war generally, and Bush’s war in particular. This makes their citizens reluctant to bare the burdens of combat: Canada, for example, considered withdrawing after troop losses in southern Afghanistan, while French and German forces refuse to enter the most dangerous areas.

The government of Afghanistan remains exceptionally weak – it is barely able to exert authority outside of the capital in Kabul. Corruption and basic lawlessness present a real obstacle to U.S. and NATO efforts to confront the Taliban and maintain the support of the Afghan people. Lack of security and insufficient commitment to helping civilians has slowed or halted progress on vital infrastructure projects that would provide roads, schools and clean water. We have spent less on development and reconstruction funds per capita in Afghanistan than on post-conflict operations in Bosnia, Kosovo, or Haiti.
Opium production has again become a fixture of Afghan life. Afghanistan provides more than 93 percent of the world’s opium. The drug trade corrupts the government and funds terrorism and the Taliban insurgency.

However, Afghanistan is not Iraq. The people of Afghanistan, having experienced the rule of the Taliban during the 1990s, have rejected extremism and largely support the international troop presence and the more moderate government of President Karzai. Though the Afghan government has very limited capacity, and corruption remains a serious problem, there is a functioning parliament and political system. Most importantly, unlike Iraq, Afghanistan's various ethnic groups generally share a vision of how Afghanistan should be governed. Finally, our mission in Afghanistan still retains military and political support from a broad NATO-led coalition of 39 countries, and more than 50 countries have pledged financial assistance to the government of Afghanistan.

Policy Recommendations

It’s time for a new strategy: One that sets priorities, matches tools to ends, and takes a comprehensive approach. One that restores our credibility, serves our interests, and respects our values.

We must develop a comprehensive and effective counterterrorism strategy that eliminates long-term support for Al Qaeda and its supporters. The Bush Administration has taken its eye off the ball in fighting Al Qaeda and other violent extremists, and has allowed them to reconstitute. The U.S. needs a new and comprehensive approach for fighting those who attacked us on 9/11. In the short term, the U.S. should increase its troop presence in Afghanistan and work to strengthen the NATO coalition there to more effectively combat the Taliban. The U.S. must find new ways to work with Pakistan’s security forces to eliminate Al Qaeda and the Taliban along the Afghan-Pakistan border. Over the long-term, the U.S. can best sap the appeal of extremist groups by empowering moderate forces within Afghanistan and Pakistan.

We must work to strengthen the capacity of the Afghan government. Crucial to the fight against the Taliban insurgency is the capacity of the Afghan state to function as an effective government in all areas of the country. The reach of the Afghan government remains very limited outside of the capital of Kabul. If the central government – especially the judiciary and the police – is not strengthened, it will be unable to independently secure the country, clamp down on the flourishing illicit drug trade, or address the concerns of its citizens.

We must redeploy U.S. forces from Iraq to Afghanistan to combat Al Qaeda and the Taliban. Commanders on the ground as well as military leaders in Washington have argued for increased troop levels in Afghanistan. There is a serious need for more Special Operations forces, translators, trainers, and civil affairs experts. As the situation in Afghanistan deteriorates at an alarming rate, the U.S. is faced with a crucial choice: lose Afghanistan or stay in Iraq. It is past time for the U.S. to redeploy its troops from Iraq. While most of those troops should return home, some must be sent to bolster our forces presently in Afghanistan, understanding that our mission must be to empower the Afghan government and not to repeat the policy failures of Iraq.

We must reengage our international partners to work more effectively. Our allies – NATO, the UN, and the European Union – are all playing an important role in Afghanistan. While our NATO allies must send additional forces and should remove caveats on the use of those forces, their hesitation reflects the Bush Administration’s own wavering commitment to Afghanistan. We must ramp up our diplomatic efforts with our NATO allies and international partners and strengthen our own commitment to Afghanistan. For our allies to become more engaged, we must become more engaged as well.

We must provide increased support to the Afghan National Army. We cannot create long-term stability without the development of Afghanistan’s army. The Afghan National Army has shown its loyalty to the Afghan government; U.S. and NATO forces must incorporate the Afghan Army more effectively into its missions. U.S. and NATO forces must also enhance their efforts to train and vet the army, and they must provide more equipment in the form of armored vehicles, helicopters, and body armor. Additionally, Afghan soldiers must be paid more to discourage corruption.

The U.S. must effectively engage all of Afghanistan’s neighbors in the region. For too long, the Bush Administration has acted as if Afghanistan were an island. It is not. Its stability is tied up with that of Pakistan, its turbulent neighbor and with regional power India. Iran, Afghanistan’s neighbor to the west, has significant, and often overlooked, influence on Afghanistan – in the aftermath of 9/11, Iran provided key assistance on the ground there, and helped to create President Karzai’s government. Yet the Bush Administration squandered the opportunity to build a lasting regional consensus on the future of Afghanistan. As in Iraq, a regional diplomatic effort is needed to ensure Afghanistan’s stability.

The U.S. must focus on the Afghan people. The Taliban preys on fear, insecurity, and poverty. The U.S. needs a comprehensive counter-insurgency strategy to convince the people of Afghanistan that the government, not the Taliban, can bring a better future. That means protecting civilians and improving their quality of life.

We must develop an effective counter-narcotics effort with the Afghan government. The drug trade is undermining coalition efforts to bring stability to Afghanistan. The country's poppy cultivators need an effective alternative livelihood program, accompanied by adequate security. At the same time, effective law enforcement must target the traffickers and their drugs while tackling the widespread corruption in the police and government.

The Conservative Record

The Bush Administration has pursued a failed strategy in Afghanistan. As in Iraq, the Bush Administration incorrectly believed that a small number of U.S. forces would be able to stabilize Afghanistan. The Administration committed too few troops, failed to prevent Al Qaeda terrorists from escaping into Pakistan, failed initially to embrace military assistance from our allies, and empowered warlords because of the lack of ground troops. Instead, the Bush Administration has relied heavily on air power, which has resulted in significant civilian casualties. This has undermined support for U.S. and NATO efforts.

The Bush Administration was distracted from Afghanistan by Iraq and has committed too few troops to address the threat of a resurgent Taliban and Al Qaeda. More than 150,000 U.S. troops are deployed to Iraq, whose population is roughly 27 million, while just more than 32,000 are deployed to keep the peace for more than 31 million Afghans. Additionally, prior to the start of the war in Iraq, Special Forces units, intelligence assets, and equipment were transferred to Iraq. Since that time the Taliban and Al Qaeda insurgency in Iraq has steadily rebuilt, becoming stronger every year.

The Bush Administration is attempting to do state-building on the cheap. The U.S. has not devoted nearly enough resources to development and reconstruction in Afghanistan. As a result, support for the government and for U.S. and NATO forces is slipping. Education, critical to the future of Afghanistan, has also suffered greatly, with the Taliban forcing the closure of hundreds of schools. Afghanistan’s police force remains marred by corruption and intimidation, and is incapable of securing the public trust.

Because of the Bush Administration’s abrasive and dismissive treatment of our allies, support for the U.S. mission in Afghanistan is dwindling. The consequences of the Bush Administration’s dismissive attitude toward America’s allies in the run-up to the war in Iraq were made manifest in April 2008, when Secretary Gates pleaded for more allied troops in Afghanistan, and received support from only one country, France. Alienating world opinion has clear consequences – our troops are more vulnerable in Afghanistan because of it.

The Bush Administration has failed to deal with the Afghan drug trade. When allied forces arrived in Afghanistan, the Taliban had succeeded in eliminating most of the country’s poppy crop with a draconian counter-drug policy. Today, the country produces 93% of the world’s opium. This multi-billion dollar industry creates a huge slush fund that supports corruption and instability, and taints elements of the police force, the government, and even members of Karzai’s own family, thus undermining efforts to build government capacity and create a viable state. In addition, insurgents increasingly draw from Afghanistan’s thriving opium trade for financial support.