Iran Nuclear Negotiations in the Home Stretch

The latest round of the P5+1 negotiations on Iran’s nuclear program concluded last Friday. Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs Wendy Sherman said on Friday that “conversations this week have been very tough but constructive,” and stressed that “we are at a very crucial moment in these negotiations.” The negotiations have made significant progress since beginning in February, but with a month remaining before the July 20 deadline, some issues, particularly Iran’s centrifuge capacity, remain points of contention. Talks will resume in Vienna on July 2. Here’s where things stand today and some important considerations as the negotiations enter the home stretch before the July 20 deadline.

Iran has shown a commitment to the negotiations and the Joint Plan of Action, but challenges remain.

Iran is redesigning its controversial Arak reactor and reducing stockpiles of enriched uranium in compliance with the Joint Plan of Action: Earlier this month, an Iranian official announced that Iran was redesigning the controversial Arak research reactor to reduce its planned output of plutonium that could be repurposed for use in a nuclear weapon. In its most recent update on Iran’s compliance with the Joint Plan of Action, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) reported on June 20 that Iran has continued to reduce its stockpile of 20% enriched uranium in accordance with the agreement and has commissioned a facility to convert uranium with potential military applications to an oxide powder.

The number of centrifuges Iran will keep in operation remains the largest issue of contention, but there is an opportunity to reach a compromise: As negotiations enter their final month, the most significant outstanding issue remains Iran’s centrifuge capacity. Some U.S. nuclear experts have proposed Iran should cut the number of centrifuges from 18,000 total (10,000 of which are in operation) to 4,000, but Iranian negotiators have balked at this proposal. “We will not retreat from our [positions],” Iranian Foreign Minister Mohammad Javad Zarif told reporters in Vienna on Friday, as reported by Al-Monitor. “We insist on our stances.”

There are opportunities for compromise on the issue of centrifuges, though. Scholars at the Program on Science and Global Security at Princeton University proposed a compromise agreement earlier this month that would allow Iran to gradually modernize its centrifuges for the production of a limited amount of low-enriched uranium for research purposes under a strict monitoring regime. The plan, the authors state, “would not shorten Iran’s breakout time, but would enable Iran to prepare in a timely way to meet its possible needs for enriched-uranium fuel for its nuclear research and power reactors. Such a strategy also could create a window of time to devise a multinational arrangement that could provide a long-term solution to the proliferation concerns raised by national enrichment plants in the Middle East and elsewhere.” [Mohammad Javad Zarif, 6/20/14. Princeton Proposal, 6/9/14]

Bringing other issues into the negotiations could derail a deal. Some critics of the negotiations, such as Rep. Buck McKeon (R-CA), have raised concerns that an agreement will not address other concerns, such as Iran’s support for terrorism, its development of ballistic missiles, or the possible historical military dimensions of its nuclear program. But these issues, while still of concern to the United States, are not fundamental to reaching a deal that would prevent a nuclear-armed Iran. The possible military dimensions of Iran’s nuclear program are currently under investigation by the IAEA, but “not all aspects of Iran’s past work are relevant to whether they can build a nuclear weapon in the future,” Jon Wolfsthal, Deputy Director of the James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies, wrote last month, suggesting that the IAEA allow Iran to save face through a private investigation. “This does not mean Iran should be let off the hook for its nuclear past, however,” he wrote. “It is essential that in private, the IAEA is able to obtain information about the key parts of Iran’s past needed to quickly identify any future effort to recreate its nuclear weapons work.” Greg Thielmann of the Arms Control Association addresses the ballistic missiles issue, stating, “The best way to address Iran’s potential to exploit nuclear-capable missiles is to ensure that Iran’s nuclear program is sufficiently limited and transparent that missile limits become unnecessary.” [Jon Wolfsthal, 5/24/14. Greg Thielmann, 05/07/14]

There are opportunities for the United States and Iran to cooperate in responding to the crisis in Iraq, but it shouldn’t be allowed to affect a nuclear deal. The United States and Iran have a shared interest in countering the aggressive gains made by the Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham (ISIS) in Iraq. Though this shouldn’t extend to military cooperation or intelligence sharing, both U.S. and Iranian diplomats recognize that the Iraqi government will have to make significant reforms to regain its popular legitimacy. But the United States and other negotiating nations should be wary of Iran trying to leverage the situation in Iraq for a better deal. “Any discussion about Iraq with Iran will be entirely separate” from nuclear discussions, said Marie Harf, State Department Deputy Spokesperson. “And any effort to link the two – or any other regional issue – is a nonstarter.” [Marie Harf, 6/18/14]