As Iran Nuclear Deal Takes Shape, Congress Must Act Carefully
As Iran Nuclear Deal Takes Shape, Congress Must Act Carefully
February 23, 2015
The P5+1 nuclear negotiations with Iran may be nearing an agreement, according to reports this morning from Vienna. While the details are still unclear, the early speculation is that the deal would effectively lengthen the time it would take Iran to build a nuclear weapon to a point that it could not do so without being detected and stopped by the international community. This would be a huge diplomatic success for the United States. As the talks enter this crucial stage, it is more critical than ever that Congress not pass new legislation that would call into question whether the United States can uphold its commitments under a final deal and potentially cause the Iranians to walk away from the negotiating table. Advocates of proposals like Sen. Bob Corker’s (R-TN) plan to force a congressional vote on an Iran nuclear agreement are unrealistic about what is possible from these negotiations and rely on misleading analogies for their legislation. Instead, Congress needs to reckon with the consequences of derailing the talks now: If the negotiations collapse, so could the international sanctions regime, and the United States could be set on a course to war with Iran.
A good deal is taking shape that would lengthen Iran’s breakout time and prevent it from obtaining a nuclear weapon. As Ilan Goldenberg, Director of the Middle East Program at the Center for a New American Security, wrote today for War on the Rocks, “the purpose of a good deal is to create a situation where the risk of pursuing a nuclear weapon is so high and the window of vulnerability is so long, the Iranians would never dare try it.” There are two ways Iran could violate an agreement: either a “dash” for a bomb using existing facilities or a “sneak out” at locations hidden from the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). In either case, Goldenberg explains, the constraints and monitoring of an agreement would make this take at least a year and would ensure that Iran’s efforts are detected and halted by the international community. Because many factors affect Iran’s breakout time, Goldenberg warns analysts not to focus too much on any one aspect of a deal. “The objective for the United States in the negotiations should not be focused on any one component (e.g. centrifuge numbers),” he wrote, “but instead on obtaining an agreement that creates the conditions that will deter Iran from ever trying an overt or covert breakout to a nuclear weapon.” The deal taking shape would effectively achieve that deterrence. [Ilan Goldenberg, 2/23/15]
As the negotiations enter this crucial stage, it’s more critical than ever that Congress doesn’t jeopardize the talks.
Critics of the negotiations are unrealistic about what a possible deal can achieve. Conservative critics of the negotiations have repeatedly expressed their frustration that they do not address the potential military dimensions (PMD) of Iran’s nuclear program, which evidence suggests was halted nearly a decade ago. The issue of PMD is being addressed by the IAEA, and “While it is vital that Iran cooperate with the investigation in a timely manner, the IAEA will need time to pursue leads, conduct a thorough review of the evidence, and assess whether activities with possible military dimensions took place and if they have been halted,” Kelsey Davenport, Director for Nonproliferation Policy at the Arms Control Association, wrote. “It would be unwise to rush the IAEA into a quick resolution of its investigation solely to meet negotiating deadlines or to hold up the conclusion of the talks in order to wait months, or even years, for the IAEA to wrap up its work.”
PMD was never feasible as part of the nuclear negotiations and both sides have had to make compromises. As President Hassan Rouhani noted recently, “negotiations mean reaching a common point…This means that one side would not end up getting all it wants.” As Daryl Kimball, Executive Director of the Arms Control Association, wrote recently, the deal that’s taking shape would dramatically extend Iran’s breakout time, allowing the international community to stop Iran from building a nuclear weapon if it violates a deal. “In the final analysis,” Kimball wrote, “serious policymakers in Washington and other capitals must consider whether their country is better off with an effective comprehensive nuclear agreement – or the continued pursuit of an effective deal – than without one.” Under these circumstances, Iran would face no constraints on its enrichment and the international community would have little ability to monitor and gauge its progress. [Kelsey Davenport, 10/17/14. Daryl Kimball, 2/9/15]
A final deal with Iran would be a political agreement, not a civil nuclear cooperation agreement, and does not need congressional approval. Sen. Corker has argued that the potential nuclear agreement is analogous to “123 agreements” that the United States has signed with other nations that have been subject to congressional approval. Those agreements “are designed to ensure that U.S. cooperation with foreign nuclear programs, including the transfer of U.S. nuclear material, equipment, or technology, conforms to U.S. export control laws, meets Nuclear Regulatory Commission licensing requirements, and is used exclusively for peaceful purposes and not for the development of nuclear weapons,” write Kelsey Davenport and Daryl Kimball of the Arms Control Association. “A nuclear deal with Iran, however, will not involve the transfer of proliferation sensitive material, technology, or information from the United States. Instead, the P5+1 and Iran nuclear agreement will require Iran to meet specific requirements that effectively limit its capability to produce material that can be used for nuclear weapons and will put in place additional monitoring requirements to guard against any dash for nuclear weapons in the future. Subjecting the P5+1 and Iran agreement to the same legislative requirements as a bilateral civil nuclear cooperation agreement is unnecessary, and it carries enormous risks for the success of a good P5+1 nuclear agreement with Iran.” [Kelsey Davenport and Daryl Kimball, 2/11/15]
Congress has a role to play in the nuclear negotiations, but it should focus on constructive proposals instead of proposals that undermine U.S. and other P5+1 negotiators. Members of Congress have pressed for a greater role in the Iranian nuclear negotiations, and they will have a critical role to play if a deal is reached and sanctions must be repealed. Legislation like Sen. Corker’s, though, would undermine U.S. negotiators’ efforts and send a message to Iran’s hardliners that the U.S. government will not be able to follow through on the commitments it makes in the nuclear talks. As Deputy Secretary of State Antony Blinken said in Senate testimony last month, “Anything we do that reinforces the hand of those who absolutely don’t want a deal under any circumstances is going to weaken [the negotiators’] hand and make it less likely that we will get to an agreement.” Instead, Congress should focus on more constructive approaches, like the proposal by Sens. Dianne Feinstein (D-CA) and Chris Murphy (D-CT) that “states that the Senate is prepared to enact additional sanctions against Iran if current diplomatic efforts fail, but refuses to prejudge the outcome.” Another proposal being worked on by Sens. Barbara Boxer (D-CA) and Rand Paul (R-KY) would tie renewed sanctions to verified violations of Iran’s commitments under the Joint Plan of Action (JPOA) and under any final nuclear settlement. (The IAEA has consistently reported that Iran has abided by its JPOA obligations.) This would unequivocally be an enforcement measure, not a threat to the ongoing negotiations, and comes from “a concern that reaches across party lines that some colleagues are pushing to enact new sanctions while our negotiators are still at the table,” Sen. Boxer said. [Antony Blinken, 1/28/15. Barbara Boxer, 1/21/15]
The consequences of derailing the negotiations with legislation now could include unraveling the international sanctions regime and even war. The consequences of the talks collapsing are dire. Ilan Goldenberg and Robert Kaplan of the Center for a New American Security write that they “believe the results might be more dangerous for Iran, the United States, and the Middle East than an imperfect deal that keeps Iran a healthy distance from a bomb and gives the United States reasonable confidence that it could catch an Iranian attempt to dash to a weapon, without eliminating Iran’s nuclear program.” They outline how the collapse of the talks could escalate tensions in the Middle East to a region-wide hot war, fought by conventional forces and terrorist proxies. “Congress should think long and hard before it tries to subvert the Iran nuclear talks,” they conclude. “Let’s wait a bit longer to see what kind of a deal, if any, the Administration manages to strike with Iran. There will be enough time then for Congress and others to act in order to avoid a sell-out of our principles.” [Ilan Goldenberg and Robert Kaplan, 2/13/15]