Four Unanswered Strategic Questions on the Islamic State Intervention
President Obama speaking at MacDill Air Force Base. White House, 9/17/14
Secretary of State John Kerry and Secretary of Defense Chuck Hagel appeared before Congress this week to present the President’s case for escalating the intervention against the Islamic State. But after multiple hearings, the Administration still has important questions to answer before Congress should authorize an escalation of the U.S. role in Iraq and Syria. What are the Administration’s objectives and are they realistically achievable with the means available? Can the Iraqi government restore its legitimacy? Does the United States have credible partners who can roll back and govern areas held by the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria? Can the United States manage the competing interests of the diverse coalition of countries it has assembled to fight the Islamic State? These questions demand answers before the United States escalates its intervention further.
Is the destruction of the Islamic State a realistically achievable end within the means available for the campaign? President Obama has announced that the objective of an escalated campaign against the Islamic State will be to “degrade and ultimately destroy” the organization. However, the United States has not been able to achieve the full destruction of core al-Qaeda, any of its affiliates, or the Taliban in over 13 years of war while using substantial military means, including ground forces in some cases. Against the Islamic State, the Administration has said it would not send regular combat troops to Iraq or Syria, and would rely on Iraqi, Kurdish, and moderate Syrian ground forces as partners. However, it is unclear how effective that strategy can be. “If I were head analyst, I don’t think I’d make a call yet,” a senior intelligence official told the Washington Post. “I haven’t fit together the contributions that each of the coalition members might make…This will be a new paradigm.” [Intelligence official via the Washington Post, 9/18/14]
Can Iraq govern inclusively and repair its legitimacy in the eyes of minorities? The Administration has rightly emphasized the need for the Iraqi government to repair its legitimacy, but the prospects of a successful outcome are unclear. The New York Times editorialized on Wednesday that the Iraqi government will “need to take substantive steps soon. Among them is to appoint new defense and interior ministers, critical posts that for years were held by Mr. Maliki, and to appoint military leaders who are competent and untainted by sectarian abuses of the past. Another priority is to rein in the country’s Shiite militias, which re-emerged from the shadows as Islamic State fighters appeared within reach of the capital….To regain any trust among Sunnis, the government must start releasing those rounded up in mass arrests during Mr. Maliki’s tenure.”
The legitimacy of the Iraqi government will also be significant for the military success of the Iraqi Security Forces. NSN Senior Advisor Maj. Gen. (Ret.) Paul Eaton explains, “An important reason to explain why the American soldier performs so brilliantly is his faith in his chain of command and in the American government. That faith has been missing in the Iraqi Security Forces. The Iraqi soldier must feel that he is a legitimate actor acting on behalf of a legitimate government, a fact that makes the political process in Baghdad vital to Iraq’s military capacity.” [New York Times, 9/17/14. Paul Eaton, 9/19/14]
Does the United States have viable partners to roll back the Islamic State in Syria and replace it with moderate governance? Speaking before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on Wednesday, Secretary Kerry told Sen. John McCain (R-AZ) that the “Syrian opposition has been viable enough to be able to survive under difficult circumstances.” But being viable enough to survive is not the same as being a viable force to roll back the Islamic State – especially when Syrian rebel groups see the defeat of the Assad regime, not the Islamic State, as their foremost priority. It is unclear to what extent U.S. assistance to moderate Syrian rebels will be directed against the Islamic State in practice. Furthermore, policymakers must accept the risk that any arms provided to vetted rebels may find their way into the hands of extremists, given the complicated battlespace and the moderate rebels’ history of coordinating with more radical elements.
The viability of the Syrian rebels as an effective partner in rolling back the Islamic State is in doubt, and the prospects of providing effective governance in cleared areas are even more dire. As NSN notes in our new policy brief, “The Western-backed Syrian National Coalition exists primarily as a government in exile with little actual capacity to govern in Syria. Though the United States has supported efforts to bolster the National Coalition’s legitimacy, it ‘suffers from a lack of stable leadership, a problem exacerbated by the competition for influence among regional actors,’ and has struggled in its relations with constituent local councils, according to a new report by the Center for American Progress… The United States will have to embark on an uncertain course to strengthen and stabilize the National Coalition while also building ties with local partners to ensure the Islamic State or another extremist organization does not fill any void in governance. Such efforts will not be sustainable without a resolution to the Syrian civil war; any governance established on a regional basis while the state of hostilities persists will be liable to collapse or shift with the tides of the war.” [John Kerry, 9/17/14. National Security Network, 9/18/14. Center for American Progress, 9/14]
Can the United States effectively manage the competing interests of the international coalition? The United States is coordinating an international effort to confront the Islamic State, with participation from NATO allies and the Arab world. The participation of Arab states – especially nations like Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, and Qatar – is needed to demonstrate that the Islamic State is opposed by both Shia and Sunnis alike; without their involvement, the United States risks being perceived as supporting an offensive compromised by sectarianism. But in order for the coalition to be credible, the actions must be public as well, as Sen. Tim Kaine (D-VA) noted on Wednesday, saying, “If this is a campaign of the West against ISIL or the U.S. against ISIL, in a bizarre way we will potentially legitimate ISIL even more….If it’s a public campaign by leaders in the region…this is not about Islam. The more public that is, the more ISIL is delegitimized.”
Though international support and participation are necessary to the success of any effort against the Islamic State, the United States will face extreme challenges in trying to manage the rival interests of this coalition. Many of the nations involved, especially regional partners, have feuded over which Syrian rebel groups to support and how. These partners will be operating alongside, but not in coordination with, Iranian forces already operating in Iraq and Syria; there is a strong chance that the Iran-Gulf rivalry will lead to peripheral conflicts that will distract from the purpose of defeating the Islamic State. As the de facto leader of this coalition, it is unclear that the United States will be able to manage the competing interests of these countries as they implement what will likely be their own sometimes conflicting policies to counter the Islamic State. [Tim Kaine, 9/17/14]
