Five Challenges for the Next Congress on Defense Policy

The results of tomorrow’s elections, of course, are uncertain – and the outcome of some races may not be known for months. But regardless of how the elections affect the balance of power between Republicans and Democrats, the next Congress will already face a host of defense policy challenges, although a conservative victory could hurt rather than help the chances of positive outcomes on a number of issues. The big picture item looming over the next class of legislators will be whether lawmakers try to increase Pentagon spending – which is already two to three times the size of the military budgets of potential adversaries combined, depending how it is calculated. The next Congress will also have to confront the continued abuse of Overseas Contingency Operations (OCO) accounts, which not only skirt the caps imposed by the Budget Control Act (BCA), but do so at the expense of sound strategic planning. Lawmakers will also face hurdles with providing effective oversight of major procurement programs like the SSBN(X) program to replace the Ohio-class ballistic missile submarine – which is showing signs of trouble at an exorbitant cost – and more effectively partnering with the Pentagon to achieve sizable and readily available efficiency savings. Finally, as the war against the Islamic State continues without congressional authorization, it is looking increasingly likely that the lame-duck session of Congress will leave the issue to be resolved by the new Congress, which would then have the opportunity to take up a responsible and limited authorization for debate and consideration.

1. Depending upon the outcome of the elections, Congress might take a run at increasing Pentagon spending – but the United States already outspends all global rivals combined. Drawing from the most recent data on global military expenditures, Winslow Wheeler of the Project on Government Oversight explains, “The [International Institute for Strategic Studies] IISS released its data in a publication titled The Military Balance earlier this year [which estimated $600 billion in total military spending for the U.S. last year]; the [Stockholm International Peace Research Institute] SIPRI just released its data base this week [which estimated $640 billion total military spending for the U.S. last year]. While the two differ (SIPRI’s estimates include spending outside official defense budgets) and some may disagree with one or the other methodology, the basic picture is the same: US defense spending is more than twice the size of all presumed threat nations’ [military spending] combined [considered to be China, Russia, Iran, Syria, and North Korea]. According to the IISS, the US spending is 2.9 times the [military budgets of] presumed threats; according to the SIPRI, the US is 2.1 times them all. Notably, the budget year displayed, 2013, is the first year that the sequestration process went into effect in the US.” [Winslow Wheeler, 4/18/14]
2. It’s time to reform Overseas Contingency Operations Spending (OCO) to stop abuse that carries risks for U.S. national security. As NSN has noted before, the OCO budget has effectively been turned into a slush fund and been used by Congress and the Pentagon to skirt the Budget Control Act (BCA) caps on the Department of Defense’s budget by transferring billions’ worth of base budget functions to OCO, which is not capped by the BCA. In a recent detailed report, Katherine Blakely and Lawrence Korb of the Center for American Progress explain the strategic risks of OCO abuse to U.S. national security: “Strategically, the abundance of war funding allows the Pentagon to pretend that the budget will remain effectively unlimited and to avoid the difficult conversations about our defense resources, commitments, investment priorities, and the necessary trade-offs. Using OCO funding to postpone these tough choices does our military—and our national security—a disservice. The use of existing OCO appropriations to pay for the current campaign against ISIS has allowed Congress and the public to sidestep important questions about the use and authorization of U.S. military force. The prospect of a permanent contingency fund risks further erosion of congressional prerogatives, as well as a de facto expansion of presidential war powers.” Republicans in the House Armed Services Committee have voiced similar but less detailed concerns. [Katherine Blakely and Lawrence Korb, 10/14]
3. Major procurement programs face severe technical challenges — threatening spiraling costs – as policymakers flirt with using budget gimmicks to fund them. The most recently reported example is the Navy’s SSBN(X) ballistic missile submarine intended to replace the Ohio-class SSBN. The Congressional Budget Office projects the costs of the program to be between $97 and $102 billion, including production, research, and development. To help pay for the program, Congress is considering establishing a “National Sea-Based Deterrence Fund” that would fund the program outside of the Navy’s regular shipbuilding budget. But Adm. John Richardson, who is responsible for the development of the submarine’s new nuclear propulsion system which aims to not need costly mid-life refueling (a key component to controlling the costs of the program over its lifetime), has warned about developing the technology that, “I’ve got to admit I see all the ingredients for failure, and I’ll tell you why[:] The program is on track, [but saying] ‘green’ as opposed to ‘yellow’ or ‘red’ [is] too optimistic, and it gives rise potentially to a complacency that’s poisonous.” Further highlighting the technical risk of the program, Adm. Richardson added, “If we in this room don’t have butterflies in our stomachs each day…we’re kidding ourselves.” [John Richardson via Breaking Defense, 10/23/14]
4. Congress and the Pentagon can – and should – partner effectively to realize part of the massive potential for efficiency savings; but fully doing so will require compromise and putting long-term national interests over near-term district interests. Finding savings inside the Pentagon generates room for greater investment in military capabilities. For example, the Pentagon’s Business Board concluded in a recent report that there is significant room for savings through efficiency reforms: “The US Defense Department could save $27 billion to $37 billion annually over the next four to five years by instituting business practices commonly adopted by major corporations in cash-strapped periods, an influential Pentagon advisory board said in a new report. The majority of the savings could come through a massive overhaul of DoD’s logistics and supply chain, including shuttering military supply depots and warehouses,” reports Defense News.  However, in other cases, like Base Realignment and Closure (BRAC), congressional cooperation is much more difficult. Despite political          complications in-district, the national benefits are clear: Lt. Gen. David Barno (Ret.), Nora Bensahel, Jake Stokes, and coauthors explain, “DOD currently saves $12 billion per year from previous rounds of BRAC —$4 billion for the 2005 round and $8 billion for the four rounds before that…Combined with savings from closing [unneeded] DOD schools in             the United States and reducing base support and facilities maintenancecosts, authorizing and conducting a BRAC round could save up to $17 billion over the decade, with much greater savings afterwards.” [DefenseNews, 1/27/14. David Barno, Nora Bensahel, Jake Stokes, et al, 6/6/13]
5. If the current Congress fails to authorize the war against the Islamic State during the lame-duck session, that task will be up to the next Congress, which should pass a reasonable and limited authorization. In a recent report, NSN explains, “If Congress is to authorize the armed conflict, lawmakers should use this opportunity to construct a narrow AUMF for the sole purpose of countering the Islamic State that would set a high standard in terms of scope and duration for authorizations against terrorist organizations in the future. Constructing such a high-standard AUMF is crucial to preventing a new era of legal problems and uncertainty in executing major counterterrorism operations, like those that have plagued the 2001 AUMF over the past decade with respect to al-Qaeda…any AUMF against the Islamic State should be constructed to take into account American interests relevant to the appropriate scope of the conflict. This would mean constructing an AUMF to include precise objectives, specific limits on the use of force, and regular reporting requirements. Such a high-standard approach is especially appropriate given the likelihood that the campaign against the Islamic State will continue into the tenure of the next president. Key limitations can help ensure Congress and the American people retain a strong check on the next president’s war policy so that he or she does not enter office free to fundamentally change the nature or scope of the conflict.” [NSN, 9/18/14]

Fall Foliage at the U.S. Capitol.  U.S. Capitol Flickr, 11/03/11.