Perhaps no theater is as important to NATO’s future – and the legacy of President Bush’s stewardship of the Atlantic Alliance – as Afghanistan. NATO allies have contributed more than 20,000 troops to the effort there, with Canada, the Netherlands and the UK carrying a substantial burden. Instability in Afghanistan, through terrorism and the opium trade, provides at least as great a threat to Europe as it does to the U.S. The case for close U.S.-NATO partnership in Afghanistan ought to be watertight.

But we have never reached a common understanding of what the mission in Afghanistan is. Our allies have scaled back their commitments and in some cases placed crippling restrictions on the deployment of their troops – and the mission is at risk as a result.

It did not have to be this way. Following the 9/11 attacks NATO stood united, for the first time in its history invoking article 5, which holds that an attack on one member is an attack on the entire alliance and engaging in its first military operation outside Europe. But bitter disagreement over the war in Iraq, as well as policy choices in Afghanistan, and the resulting backlash in European public opinion, has made it politically difficult for European leaders to increase their commitments. Moreover, our own neglect of Afghanistan in favor of Iraq has made our allies less willing to fight in a war that we ourselves do not prioritize.

Rebuilding our frayed alliances will not be easy, but to start the U.S. must lead by example and make a greater commitment to the Afghanistan mission. We must also take a greater leadership role in helping coordinate our allies. Only if we lead by example can we hope to get the support we need.

NATO Is Struggling in Afghanistan

The U.S. and its allies are divided over the basic mission in Afghanistan. An Atlantic Council report found that the joint US-ISAF mission is “disorganized, uncoordinated and at present insufficient.” The U.S. is at odds with the international community over the basic strategy for reclaiming the country from insurgents and the Taliban. Europeans have put greater emphasis on economic development and reconstruction, while the United States has focused more explicitly on security. These differences have handicapped the international mission severely. [The Atlantic Council, 1/28/08. Washington Post, 2/2/08. State Department Transcript of Interview with David Miliband & Condoleezza Rice, 2/07/08]

Despite rising violence, NATO troop commitments to Afghanistan have fallen well short of needs. At the 2008 NATO summit in Bucharest “A dozen NATO countries have pledged a total of about 2,000 troops, according to senior NATO officials…” But “senior alliance commanders in Afghanistan have said they need about 10,000 more troops.” [New York Times, 5/03/08]

2007 was the bloodiest year for the international coalition in Afghanistan. Last year, 117 U.S. soldiers were killed in Afghanistan – more deaths than any other year of the war and a 19% increase from 98 in 2006– and there were an additional 115 casualties among the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) –the NATO-led security mission – up 23% from 93 in 2006. Additionally, there were 8,000 conflict related deaths among Afghanis, with an estimated 566 violent incidents occurring every month, up 33% from 425 the previous year. The trends have continued in 2008 with Gen. Jeffrey Schloesser, NATO commander for Eastern Afghanistan, predicting increasing levels of violence. [iCasualties.org. Center for the Study of the Presidency: Jones-Pickering Report, 1/31/08. UN, 3/10/08. Reuters, 4/24/08]

The Presence of the NATO Alliance Matters in Afghanistan

Discord within NATO over Afghanistan has put the future of America’s most important alliance in doubt and greatly strained transatlantic relations. Following the recent summit in Bucharest, NATO expert Charles Kupchan expressed his concerns that two divergent perspectives on the alliance had emerged: “From Washington’s perspective, Afghanistan is a test of NATO’s ability to remain relevant in the 21st century,” but for some in Europe “NATO is looking less like a vehicle for common defense than one for dragging Europe into distant and unwanted conflicts.” [IHT, 4/09/08]

Threats emanating from an unstable Afghanistan affect Europe as well as the U.S. Last September, the Guardian found that “senior Islamic militant leaders based in Pakistan and eastern Afghanistan have decided to step up attacks in Europe,” with one source calling the lawless zone between Pakistan and Afghanistan the “Grand Central Station of jihad.” In July and September of last year, separate investigations in the UK, Germany and Denmark foiled plans for domestic attacks, plans that originated in the Afghan-Pakistan region. [The Guardian, 9/07/07]

The Afghan drug trade is harming the European people. “Afghanistan is the number one supplier of opium and heroin to Europe,” said Kurt Volker, U.S. Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for European and Eurasia Affairs. “As opium production has risen in Afghanistan, it increasingly impacts the young people of Europe, sowing addiction, disease, and death, and draining Europe’s economic resources.” [Voice of America, 2/08/08]

Lagging NATO support has forced the U.S. to further overburden its military. Our military was already stretched to the breaking point by repeated deployments to Iraq and was looking for our European allies to increase their presence in Afghanistan. But because there was no firm commitment from its NATO allies, the U.S. has had to deploy an extra 3,500 marines to Southern Afghanistan. The press has referred to this deployment as a “stop-gap effort.” [AP, 4/26/08. Bloomberg, 2/10/08]

Caveats placed on the use of some countries’ troops provide a real hindrance to Alliance efforts. Many NATO countries, such as Germany, France, and Italy, put caveats on NATO’s use of their forces in Afghanistan – restricting their movements and levels of engagement with enemy forces. Robert Hunter, former U.S. ambassador to NATO, commented that only the United States, Great Britain, Canada, the Netherlands, and Estonia operate without troop restrictions in Afghanistan. Secretary Gates explains that “At this time, many allies are unwilling to share the risks, commit the resources and follow through on collective commitments to this mission and to each other... As a result, we risk allowing what has been achieved in Afghanistan to slip away... restrictions placed on what a given nation’s forces can do and where they can go put this alliance at a sizable disadvantage.” [Armed Forces Press Service, 10/25/07. Voice of America, 11/16/07]

U.S. Failures Have Taken What Should Be a Common Cause and Turned it into a Burden

Secretary Gates acknowledged that linking wars in Iraq and Afghanistan has tainted European views of the Afghanistan mission. “‘I think that [Europeans] combine the two... Many of them, I think, have a problem with our involvement in Iraq and project that to Afghanistan...’ The comments were the first in which Mr. Gates had explicitly linked European antipathy to American policy in Iraq with the reason large segments of the public here[Europe] do not support the NATO operation in Afghanistan. Mr. Gates’s assessment was an unusually candid acknowledgment from a senior member of President Bush’s cabinet that the war in Iraq had exacted a direct and significant political cost, even among Washington’s closest allies.” [NY Times, 2/09/08]

While the Bush Administration has called on our allies to prioritize Afghanistan, the Bush Administration, as Chairman of the Joint Chiefs Admiral Mullen stated, has made Afghanistan a secondary priority. The U.S. has repeatedly argued to its allies in Europe that Afghanistan should be among their top priorities, even as the Bush Administration treats it as a 2nd tier problem. “The U.S. military's top officer acknowledged on Tuesday that for all the importance of preventing Afghanistan from again harboring Al Qaeda terrorists, Washington's first priority is Iraq. ‘In Afghanistan, we do what we can... In Iraq, we do what we must.’” [AP, 12/11/07]

The Congressional Research Service concludes that the war in Iraq has led to a collapse in European public support for the Bush Administration and operations in Afghanistan. “A highly respected German Marshall Fund poll has found a sharp decline in European public opinion towards U.S. leadership since 2002. In key European countries, the desirability of U.S. leadership in the world fell from 64% in 2002 to 36% in June 2007; the approval rating of President Bush in these same countries fell from 38% in 2002 to 17% in 2007. U.S. policy in the Iraq war is the principal cause of this decline. This decline is complicating the effort of allied governments to sustain support for the ISAF mission.” [Congressional Research Service, 1/8/08. German Marshall Fund, 06/07]

Troop levels have become a contentious political issue in many European countries. “The escalating violence in Afghanistan is becoming a political issue in Germany, where the Social Democratic Party... is beginning to question the continuing presence of the 3,200 German soldiers there... According to internal polls, over 50 percent of party members... want the German Army to be withdrawn from Afghanistan.” Peter Schmidt a security analyst at the German Institute for International and Security Affairs in Berlin, states that “Partners in an alliance have to also understand the domestic debates in a partner country like Germany.” He added: “The Americans quite often show up in Europe and the president tells us, ‘Look I’ll never get that through Congress.’ Something similar is happening here.” [IHT, 8/19/07. NY Times, 2/7/08]

Time to Shift Focus to Afghanistan and Redouble Our Efforts

The U.S. should lead by example and substantially increase its troop commitments in Afghanistan, and then encourage NATO allies to do the same. The U.S. must commit more troops to Afghanistan to set the right example for its reticent allies. “These forces will be available to be redeployed from Iraq to Afghanistan if the United States begins a strategic withdrawal from Iraq. These new troops should fall under a unified NATO-ISAF command, not Operation Enduring Freedom.” [Center for American Progress, 11/07]

“Strategic outreach” must take place to repair the damage done by the Bush Administration’s abrasive unilateralism. “The UN, NATO and the EU must intensify efforts at ‘strategic outreach,’ especially in Europe, to communicate more powerfully the importance of building a stable Afghanistan. Part of this outreach is to de-link Iraq and Afghanistan…American declarations must cease describing Iraq and Afghanistan as the two main fronts in the war on terror and instead focus on each as separate, unique actions with different goals and objectives.” [Atlantic Council, 1/28/08]

The U.S. should also empower and entrust the new high-level UN envoy Kai Eide to coordinate NATO, UN, and U.S. efforts in Afghanistan. The Bush Administration should ensure that Eide is provided with “the stature and authority necessary to command the respect of donor governments, including the U.S. In addition to coordinating and working with the Afghan government, he [Eide] would also need to be in a position to deal with neighboring governments, whose cooperation or lack thereof will make or break any international effort to stabilize Afghanistan.” [Jones-Pickering Report, 1/30/08]

Absent troop commitments, the U.S. and its NATO allies can take the immediate step of providing more equipment to the mission in Afghanistan. “Member countries should provide more equipment, especially helicopters (including medium- and heavy-lift and attack helicopters), to their forces that are part of the NATO contingent.” In addition, “members must contribute more equipment to ensure success, including armor protection, such as light armored vehicles to deal with IEDs and landmines; and interoperable command-and-control equipment and intelligence-sharing networks.” [Center for American Progress, 11/07]