The Troops Have Done Their Job. It’s Time for the President and Iraqi Government to Do Theirs

One Year since the President Announced the “Surge:” No Clear Strategy and No End in Sight

One year ago, President Bush announced that he would send 30,000 additional troops to Iraq. As a result, he promised, “the government will have the breathing space it needs” to achieve political reconciliation. Unfortunately, according to the President’s own measure the surge has failed. The troops have performed bravely and violence in Iraq appears to be diminishing. But there is still no political plan to turn the recent tactical gains into lasting strategic success or a plan for bringing our troops home. There has been no progress on any of the key political benchmarks so critical to bringing Iraq together and producing last stability: the oil law, de-Baathification reform, the Constitution and provincial elections are all stalled. If anything, the political situation has gotten worse. The Administration’s regional diplomacy remains woefully inadequate as it has failed to constructively engage Iraq’s neighbors. Moreover, the President’s decision to fund and arm local Sunni militias will likely exacerbate sectarian strife as the Sunnis become increasingly frustrated with the Shi’a central government’s refusal to integrate them into the government and security forces.

Changes in military tactics can lead to short term gains, but only a comprehensive political strategy to bring Iraq’s warring factions together can lead to a permanent solution to the conflict. One year since the President announced the “surge,” it remains clear that he has no such strategy.

THERE HAS BEEN NO POLITICAL SURGE OR PROGRESS AT THE NATIONAL LEVEL

“I've made it clear to the Prime Minister and Iraq's other leaders that America's commitment is not open-ended. If the Iraqi government does not follow through on its promises, it will lose the support of the American people – and it will lose the support of the Iraqi people.” – President Bush, 1/10/07

“To give every Iraqi citizen a stake in the country's economy, Iraq will pass legislation to share oil revenues among all Iraqis.” – President Bush, 1/10/07

One year later a first draft of the oil law has yet to make it into the Iraqi Parliament. Agreement on sharing oil revenues is critical to building trust among Iraqi provinces and the stability that would allow investment. Yet “[T]he oil bill has not even had a first reading in parliament, a year after it was drafted. It would open up Iraq's long state-dominated oil and gas sector to foreign investment and stipulate that receipts be shared equally among Iraq's 18 provinces.” This is in spite of the fact that last month, “Deputy Treasury Secretary Robert Kimmitt, speaking to reporters during a trip to Iraq, said that until an oil law is enacted, both U.S. and international firms are unlikely to invest heavily in Iraq's industry.” [AFP, 12/25/07. AP, 12/04/07]

Kurdish actions may make agreement on an oil law impossible, and the Administration cannot agree on its response. The Kurdish Regional Government has signed a flurry of oil contracts without consulting Baghdad, and Iraqi Oil Minister Hussein Shahristani has responded by stating that, “[A]ny company that has signed contracts without the approval of the federal authority of Iraq will not have any chance of working with the government of Iraq.” The Kurdish Oil Minister retorted, “We don't need his approval... Every time we hear the word ‘illegal,’ we sign two more contracts.” But among those signing oil contracts in Kurdistan, against the expressed wishes of the State Department, were Bush advisor Ray L. Hunt. [AFP, 11/15/07. Washington Post, 11/28/07]

“To allow more Iraqis to re-enter their nation's political life, the government will reform de-Baathification laws, and establish a fair process for considering amendments to Iraq's constitution.” – President Bush, 1/10/07

De-Baathification reform – that would return more Sunnis to national life – is stuck in parliament. Last month, when the bill came up for discussion, it “was met with angry protests from Shiite lawmakers.” Opposition to the bill revealed the deep divides within Iraq’s own government, and how far from reconciliation Iraqis are. “‘We reject the return of Baathists to any executive position, not even a hospital manager,’ said Shiite lawmaker Liwa Smaysim, the head of Sadr's parliamentary bloc. ‘Our goal is to prosecute the Baath as a party and regime, not only as a regime.”’ [AFP, 12/23/07. Washington Post, 11/26/07]

The constitutional review has been delayed for the fourth time and is now running a year behind schedule. “Another major issue, the rewriting of Iraq's constitution, is also unlikely to be completed by a Dec. 31 deadline. The head of the parliament's constitutional review committee said yesterday he would request a three-month delay - the fourth time the target date for revision of the document, approved in a referendum in 2005, has been deferred as lawmakers haggle over such issues as provincial powers and religious and cultural freedoms. The constitutional revision delay could hinder progress on other issues the United States has cited as keys to Iraqi national reconciliation. Those include legislation to manage Iraq's oil industry and scheduling of provincial elections to ensure better distribution of power among Shia Muslims and Sunnis. Both these are tied to constitutional revisions that would spell out the powers of regional governments and establish power of provinces to manage their own affairs.” [LA Times, 12/27/07]

“To empower local leaders, Iraqis plan to hold provincial elections later this year.” – President Bush, 1/10/07

Today, provincial elections remain stalled in the Iraqi Parliament which has kept power from being shared more equally. “More Sunnis voted in the December 2005 parliamentary polls, which eased the imbalance at the national level, but new provincial elections have been postponed pending agreement on a law setting out the relationship between national and regional governments. That bill is one of several key power-sharing measures that have stalled in the fragmented parliament.” This tense situation has grown even more complicated with the rise of local Sunni actors, who demand “a stake in government for the Iraqi Awakening Conference Movement.” [LA Times, 1/03/08]

"To show that it is committed to delivering a better life, the Iraqi government will spend $10 billion of its own money on reconstruction and infrastructure projects that will create new jobs." – President Bush, 1/10/07

Today, reconstruction efforts continue to be grossly mismanaged. “More than $100 billion has been devoted to rebuilding Iraq, mainly thanks to American taxpayers and Iraqi oil revenues, but nearly five years into the conflict, output in critical areas like water and electricity remain below United States goals, federal oversight officials reported to Congress on Tuesday.” [NYTimes, 10/31/07. Washington Post, 12/14/07]

The government in Baghdad has shown little support for local reconstruction efforts in Sunni areas, an attitude which has heightened sectarian suspicions. Saleh Kashgul Saleh, leader of an awakening movement in Dora, warned that “The government also needs to demonstrate some interest in improving basic living conditions in Sunni-dominated areas, otherwise people will lose faith that the government cares about them.” [NYTimes, 12/23/07]

A recent Pentagon report concluded that security gains have not increased the capacity of the Iraq Central Government. Despite a “significant reduction in violence in Iraq over the past three months, the Iraqi government has made little headway in improving the delivery of electricity, health care and other essential services.” [NYTimes, 12/19/07]

THERE HAS BEEN NO DIPLOMATIC SURGE TO MATCH THE MILITARY COMMITMENT

“We will use America’s full diplomatic resources to rally support for Iraq from nations throughout the Middle East.” – President Bush, 1/10/07

The Bush Administration has refused to open broad negotiations with Iran on the issue of stabilizing Iraq. Despite recent developments that indicate that Iran has become more cooperative, and that back-channel correspondence has been productive, the Bush administration has continued to refuse broader engagement. An Iraqi government spokesman, Ali al-Dabbagh, said that the Iranian government “had helped to persuade the Shiite cleric Moktada al-Sadr to ask his Mahdi militia to halt attacks.” These comments “echoed those of the American military here, who in recent days have gone out of their way to publicly acknowledge Iran’s role in helping to slow the flow of weapons into the country.” CENTCOM Commander, Adm. William J. Fallon has described the bellicose rhetoric on Iran from the Bush administration as “not particularly helpful.” [NY Times, 11/18/07. Los Angeles Times, 12/01/07]

The Bush administration has failed to engage Syria. The Bush administration has made no effort to change Syrian behavior in Iraq, despite the fact that “Syria is encouraging Sunni Arab insurgent groups and former Iraqi Baathists with ties to the leaders of Saddam Hussein’s government to organize here (in Damascus), diplomats and Syrian political analysts say. By building strong ties to those groups, they say, Syria hopes to gain influence in Iraq before what it sees as the inevitable waning of the American presence there.” The Iraq Study Group noted that “Although the U.S.-Syrian relationship is at a low point, both countries have important interests in the region that could be enhanced if they were able to establish some common ground on how to move forward.” [IHT, 10/07/07. ISG Report, 12/06/06]

Turkey has threatened to invade Iraq because the United States failed to take action on Kurdish guerillas, the PKK, attacking our NATO ally from safe havens in Iraq. Inaction against the PKK in Kurdistan has put Iraq’s most secure region in jeopardy from the threat of Turkish invasion. The Turkish parliament authorized cross-border military incursion into Iraq to deal with the PKK, creating tremendous tension between Turkey, the United States, and Iraq. Most recently, Turkey “carried out an ‘intense intervention’ against Kurdistan Workers Party Rebels (PKK)... after the cabinet authorized the army to carry out cross-border operations.” Moreover, the envoy that the United States assigned to deal with this issue had “no constant office or staff directly reporting to him” and eventually resigned. [Reuters, 12/2/07. Turkish Daily News, 10/11/07]

Iraqi refugees have created a regional crisis. Instability in Iraq has spread to Jordan, in the form of 1 million refugees that pose a significant strain on Jordan’s overburdened economy. “Since the US invasion of Iraq four years ago as many as 1 million people - the official figure is 700,000 — have fled into Jordan, where they are widely accused of fuelling inflation, trebling property prices and overloading the infrastructure.” In Syria, “at least 500 cross into Syria daily — running from kidnappings, bombings or personal threats... In Damascus, more than 50,000 Iraqi refugees need food packages to survive and many come to a U.N. distribution center for help. Officials with the U.N. Food Program project the number will grow to 100,000 by the winter. ‘We need to help them, and it’s not become less, it’s becoming more,’ says Laurens Jolles, who heads the U.N. refugee office in Damascus.” Now some of these refugees have started to return only to find that the Iraqi government is ill-equipped to reabsorb them into society, further aggravating the situation. [Sydney Morning Herald, 11/17/07, NPR, 12/4/07]

WITHOUT A POLITICAL AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE SHI’A AND SUNNIS, THE ANBAR AWAKENING IS LIKELY TO BACKFIRE

Six months before the surge began, Sunni tribal leaders, alienated by Al Qaeda in Iraq and fearful of growing Shi’a influence, chose to begin cooperating with the United States. In the short-term, this movement, known as the Anbar Awakening, has been effective in fighting Al Qaeda in Iraq. However, there has been no strategy for integrating these militias into the Shi’a central government, which now feels threatened by the growing power of the Sunnis. In the long run, this approach threatens to further split Iraq and exacerbate sectarian tensions.

Iraq Security Forces, which are primarily Shi’a, are still fighting with Sunni “Awakening” Militias. “Iraqi security forces remain distrustful of the former insurgents, and last week staged a raid with American forces against one of their headquarters in the town of Buhruz… An Iraqi police brigadier, Kudhair Tamimi, acknowledged that many Sunni tribesmen had sacrificed their lives fighting the insurgents in Diyala, but said he still doubted their loyalty and questioned the wisdom of allowing them to serve in the Iraqi security forces…Brigadier Tamimi said that some Awakening Council members continued to occupy dozens of Shiite family homes and were still involved in the kidnappings and murders of Shiites in Diyala. But Abu Talib, an Awakening Council leader in southern Baquba, the capital of Diyala, said that continued insurgent attacks and lukewarm support from the Iraqi security forces were alienating his followers and could potentially push them back into the insurgency. ‘We have had many martyrs, but nobody cares about them,’ he said. ‘There is no recruitment of the Awakening Councils into the Iraqi security forces, and this will destroy the security situation in Baquba, because we now protect most of the neighborhoods.’” [NY Times, 1/3/08]

The fighting between Al Qaeda in Iraq and the “Awakening” forces has been replaced by a new intra-Sunni power struggle in Anbar. “As violence has faded, an argument has been raging over who really speaks for Iraq's Sunni Arab minority: the province's largely secular and fiercely independent tribal leaders, who resisted the U.S. invasion, or the main Sunni political party, an Islamist group led by former exiles who cooperated with the Americans from the start... Now, the sheiks say, it's payback time. They want more schools, better healthcare, clean water and reliable electricity for their war-ravaged province. They want jobs for their followers. And above all, they want a stake in government for their Iraqi Awakening Conference movement...Saleh Mutlak, who heads a rival Sunni political group that has joined forces with the Islamic Party in parliament, said the sheiks asked him to convey a message to his allies. ‘Unless there is a solution... then we will use our guns to displace the Islamic Party from Anbar,’ he quoted the sheiks as telling him.” [LA Times, 1/3/08]

The Shi’a central government has refused to integrate the Sunni forces into the security forces because they view the Sunni Awakening as a threat. Iraq's Shi’a government plans to disband the Sunni militias and bring only twelve to twenty thousand of the Awakening members into the security forces, while providing job training for the rest. The Iraqi Defense Minister has stated that “We completely, absolutely reject [the militias] becoming a third military organization” and emphasized that the groups would not have any permanent infrastructure. [AP, 12/23/07]