By Ilan Goldenberg
 

Two months after General Petraeus and Ambassador Crocker testified before Congress, the President has still not articulated a clear strategy or explained why the U.S. continues to have approximately 165,000 troops in Iraq.  As a GAO report issued this week found, while there have been some tactical successes, “U.S. efforts lack strategies with clear purpose, scope, roles, and performance measures.” 

Iraq still does not have a functional central government.  Half of the cabinet has quit and the national government has essentially given up on reconciliation. Moreover, the Iraqi government opposes the Administration’s “bottom up” approach in Anbar and has been actively working to undermine it.  It is also not clear how the approach in Anbar, where American forces and Sunni tribes agreed to fight foreign extremist elements, translates to the rest of the country.  It does not explain how warring Shi’a factions who are fighting a civil war in the South might reconcile or how to overcome the conflict between Kurds and Arabs over Kirkuk.  In effect, while the central government is willing to work with the United States and the Sunni tribes are willing to work with the United States, there is no indication that they are willing to work with each other.  If these questions are not addressed, the situation in Iraq may deteriorate further and in the long run we may find that the arming, organizing, and training of various Sunni and Shi’a groups will only exacerbate the civil war.

There Is Still No Real Strategy or Functional Central Government

The non-partisan Government Accountability Office’s latest report found that the U.S. has no clear strategy for what to do in Iraq.  “U.S. efforts lack strategies with clear purpose, scope, roles, and performance measures. The U.S. strategy for victory in Iraq partially identifies the agencies responsible for implementing key aspects of the strategy and does not fully address how the United States would integrate its goals with those of the Iraqis and the international community. U.S. efforts to develop Iraqi ministry capability lack an overall strategy, no lead agency provides overall direction, and U.S. priorities have been subject to numerous changes. The weaknesses in U.S. strategic planning are compounded by the Iraqi government’s lack of integrated strategic planning in its critical energy sector.”  [GAO, 10/30/07]

Iraqi leaders have acknowledged that reconciliation is all but impossible.  The situation is so bad that nearly half the cabinet ministers have resigned while members of parliament have essentially stopped working towards reconciliation.  It is clear that the Maliki government is not inclined to share power.  “I don't think there is something called reconciliation, and there will be no reconciliation as such,” said Deputy Prime Minister Barham Salih, a Kurd. “To me, it is a very inaccurate term. This is a struggle about power.”  “There has been no significant progress for months,” said Tariq al-Hashimi, one of Iraq's two vice presidents and the most influential Sunni politician in the country. “There is a shortage of goodwill from those parties who are now in the driver's seat of the country.”  [Washington Post, 10/8/07]

The Iraqi Government continues to make little progress on any of legislative benchmarks which are so crucial for a political solution.  “The Iraqi government continues to make limited progress in meeting eight legislative benchmarks intended to promote national reconciliation.  As of October 25, 2007, the Iraqi government had met one legislative benchmark and partially met another.”  [GAO, 10/30/07]

The Central Government Is Opposed to the President’s “Bottom Up” Approach and Is Actively Working Against it

Prime Minister Maliki’s political bloc has demanded that the United States stop training Sunnis.  The United Iraqi Alliance (UIA) has stated that the Sunni forces being trained by the United States have participated in ethnic cleansing and sectarian violence against Shi’a.  The UIA stated that “We condemn and reject embracing those terrorist elements which committed the most hideous crimes against our people.” It also demanded that “the American administration stop this adventure, which is rejected by all the sons of the people and its national political powers.”  [Washington Post, 10/3/07]

The Iraqi national government is undermining the “bottom up” approach.  The Shi’a dominated government has gone out of its way to make it difficult to train Sunnis in Anbar and turn them into police officers.  “It was the American military that pressed to open the new Habbaniya Police Training Center where Sunni tribesmen and former insurgents are to be trained to serve as police officers in Anbar. While the Iraqi government has agreed to basic police instruction at the academy, it has balked at training more senior officers there. The government has also scaled back plans by Anbar officials to expand the provincial police force by almost 50 percent.”  [NY Times, 10/28/07]

The Ministry of the Interior in Baghdad continues to send Shi’a “police” into Sunni dominated and ethnically mixed areas.  More than 4,600 Sunnis were organized in Diyala Province and put on a list to become part of the Iraqi police force.  However, the Ministry of the Interior h as refused to take any action.  Instead it hired 548 Iraqis who were not on the list.  Most of them were Shi’a.  The Ministry of Interior deals with the Sunni provinces different than they deal with the other provinces,” said Brig. Gen. David D. Phillips.  [NY Times, 10/28/07.  Washington Post, 10/27/07]

There is No Clear Plan for How Local Engagement Works in Other Provinces or How it Leads to Reconciliation

America’s 16 intelligence agencies believe that the Sunnis are incapable of delivering on national reconciliation.  “The Sunni Arab community remains politically fragmented, and we see no prospective leaders that might engage in meaningful dialogue and deliver on national agreements.”  [National Intelligence Estimate, 8/23/07]

In the South, the Badr Brigades and Jaish Al Mahdi (JAM) are engaged in a Shi’a on Shi’a civil war that is not about ideology, but about power.  For example, 50 people were killed in late August in a clash between these two groups during a pilgrimage to the holy Shi’a city of Karbala.  Moreover, the British have recently left Basra, the largest city in the south, leaving these two factions to battle it out.  [BBC, 8/29/07]

The tribal approach does little to address the issue of sectarian strife and civil war between Sunnis and Shi’a.  Baghdad has been almost completely ethnically cleansed.  A city that used to be 65% Sunni has now become 75% Shi’a, as Sunnis have been forced from their homes.  Overall violence inside of Iraq is up 20%, even though Sunni-Shi’a violence has dropped inside Baghdad.  [NY Times, 9/2/07]

The conflict between Kurds and Iraqi Arabs over the status of Kirkuk is about oil, money and power.  There is still no agreement on a referendum over who should control the city and in the meantime the Kurds have been displacing Arabs and “Kurdifying” the city.  An estimated 350,000 Kurds have transplanted themselves to Kirkuk since April 2003, while roughly 150,000 Arabs have fled because of intimidation or violence. “They’ve complained about being Arabized… Well, now they’re Kurdifying the area” says Judith Yaphe of the National Defense University.  [Council on Foreign Relations, 4/23/07]

Funding the Sunni Tribes May Lead to Greater Sectarian War

The U.S. trained tribal groups could worsen the civil war.  The new tribal groups being trained by the United States are divided along sectarian lines and could serve to ferment a civil war.  Colonel Wayne W. Grigsby, commander of the 3rd Heavy Brigade Combat Team, 3rd Infantry Division stationed just south of Baghdad stated that of the 16 so called “Concerned Local Citizens” brigades in his area of operations only one consists of both Shi’a and Sunni Iraqis (eight were exclusively Sunni, seven were exclusively Shi’a and only one was considered “mixed”). Instead of promoting bottom up reconciliation, these vigilantes are reinforcing inter-sectarian divisions and ensuring long-term strategic complications for the U.S. in Iraq.  [Democracy Arsenal, 10/17/07] 

The U.S. may be arming both sides in a civil war.  By arming Sunni tribal groups and at the same time arming security forces that are primarily Shi’a, the U.S is arming both sides in a civil war.  Maj. Gen. Rick Lynch said commanders would face hard decisions in choosing which groups to support. ''This isn't a black and white place,'' he said. ''There are good guys and bad guys and there are groups in between,'' and separating them was a major challenge. According to Lynch, ''[the Sunnis] say, 'We hate you because you are occupiers…but we hate Al Qaeda worse, and we hate [Iraq’s Shi’a] even more.' '' [NY Times, 6/11/07]

American officers acknowledge that providing support to rebel groups is not new in counterinsurgency warfare and has backfired in the past with these elements turning against the United States.  In Afghanistan, the U.S. government armed the Mujahedeen and Osama Bin Laden to fight the Soviets.  They later formed Al Qaeda.  This tactic has been tried before in the French colonial war in Algeria, the British-led fight against insurgents in Malaya in the early 1950s, and in Vietnam.  The effort often backfired, with weapons given to the rebels being turned against the forces providing them.  [NY Times, 6/11/07]

Arming Sunnis who oppose the Iraqi national government undermines national reconciliation efforts and further weakens the national government.  The U.S. policy of enlisting Sunni militants as allies in the fight against al Qaeda has drawn sharp criticism from Prime Minister Maliki who has threatened to start arming Shi’a militias in response.  Sami al-Askari, a key aide to al-Maliki and a member of the prime minister's Dawa Party, said the policy of incorporating one-time Sunni insurgents into the security forces shows Gen. David Petraeus has a “real bias and it bothers the Shi’a.” A lawmaker from the al-Sadr bloc, speaking on the condition of anonymity, said al-Maliki has complained to President Bush about the policy of arming Sunnis.  “He told Bush that if Petraeus continues doing that, he would arm Shi’a militias. Bush told al-Maliki to calm down,” according to this parliament member, who said he was told of the exchange by al-Maliki.  [Washington Post, 7/28/07]