The National Security Network reviewed the benchmarks labeled by the Bush Administration as having achieved "satisfactory progress." These benchmarks were initially laid out by the Iraqi government and later taken up by the Bush Administration. The Administration claims that progress on 13 benchmarks has either been satisfactory or partial satisfactory. Unfortunately, on ten of these, progress has been substantively lacking and has failed to actually deliver on its intended purpose.

Benchmark: Forming a Constitutional Review Committee and then completing the constitutional review.

White House Assessment: The Government of Iraq has made satisfactory progress toward forming a Constitutional Review Committee (CRC) and then completing the constitutional review.

Response: The Committee continues to miss deadlines and even if it were to propose a complete package of draft amendments those would have to be approved by parliament and then make it through a national referendum.

The initial version of the constitution drafted in 2005 was viewed as unfair by the Sunnis, who only accepted it after a clause was added to allow them to amend it later. The key issues regarding the constitution are: federalism, or the right of provinces to attain “regional” status with more power than one province alone, the future of a referendum on the status of the oil-rich city of Kirkuk, whether Iraq should be considered an Arab country, and the reduction of the power of the Prime Minister while granting more power to the President. The way the Constitution is currently structured, Sunnis are put at a significant disadvantage on all of these fronts. [NY Times, 6/13/2007 . Iraq Slogger, 5/17/07 ]

The Constitutional Review Committee has been slow to show progress. The Committee was originally scheduled to complete its work by May 15. Instead, it delivered a draft that did not address many of the key issues, and tried to pass the responsibility off to the political leadership. The deadline has been extended multiple times because of a failure to come to an agreement. A new draft is due at the end of July. One of the leaders of the Committee, Sheik Humam Hamoudi, believes that it might take even longer, stating that “We have not committed to doing it by September... Maybe the American Congress has made such a commitment, but we have not.” [Washington Post, 6/27/07 . NY Times, 6/13/07 .]

Even if the Constitutional Committee came to an agreement on step one, actually getting the amendments passed would be extraordinarily complicated. The parliament must vote on the amendments after they make it out of committee. If they pass parliament, the amendments must then win a majority from the public in a nationwide referendum. As an additional hurdle, at least three of Iraq’s eighteen provinces would have to register two-thirds approval. [Council on Foreign Relations, 05/15/07 ]

The GAO found that this benchmark had not yet been met and that little progress had been made. “If agreement is reached on a package of constitutional amendments, the Iraqi legislature must vote on the package. The amendments will be considered approved if an absolute majority of the legislature votes for the package. One challenge is simply holding a vote. Despite Iraqi leaders signing a unity accord, as of August 29, 2007, several Iraqi parties were boycotting the government, including Iraq’s largest Sunni bloc. Although the other parties in the legislature could form an absolute majority to pass a package of amendments, it would defeat the purpose of trying to reach a broad political accommodation.” [GAO, 9/4/07 ]

Benchmark: Enacting and implementing legislation on de-Baathification.

White House Assessment: The Government of Iraq has made satisfactory progress toward enacting and implementing legislation on de-Ba’athification reform.

Response: The Administration claims that the agreement on draft legislation entered into at the end of August represents progress. However, draft legislation has been submitted in the past only to be thwarted in Parliament, and there is no sense that this case will be any different.

There is no indication that the draft de-Baathification agreement will be passed by Parliament. Sunni leaders remain skeptical and have refused to return to the Maliki Cabinet. The recent meeting did not convince the main Sunni Arab political bloc to take back the government posts they abandoned this month over differences with al-Maliki, a Shi’a. "Our position is that this meeting represents a new phase of procrastination and does not honestly aim at solving the problems quickly," said Khalaf al-Ilyan, a leader of the Sunni bloc, the Iraqi Accordance Front. "I think that no real or practical solution will come out of this." Another Front leader, Adnan al-Dulaimi, said the accord included "good decisions that would serve the whole Iraqi people. But we doubt that they will be implemented," he said. "All our experience with al-Maliki indicates that this is another new set of delaying measures. They give you a glimmer of hope, but at the end of the day you get nothing but promises." [AP, 8/28/07]

A new de-Baathification law introduced in March was derailed by Shi'a lawmakers. On March 26, a draft law titled the Reconciliation and Accountability Law was circulated by Prime Minister Maliki’s office. It put a three-month limit on the ability of people to bring lawsuits against former members of the regime after which they would be immune from prosecution, eligible for work in the public sector and would receive pension benefits. The law also weakened the power of the de-Baathification commission which had been used as a platform by the Shi’a government to exact revenge on Sunnis for past wrongs. The law was derailed by Muqtada Al Sadr’s block in parliament and by Ahmed Chalabi. [NY Times, 6/13/07 . United Nations ]

Ahmed Chalabi, the former American ally supported by the Neoconservatives, was the main force in derailing the law. “[T]he law was stymied by Ahmad Chalabi, who headed Iraq’s de-Baathification commission. Mr. Chalabi, the former Pentagon protégé, relies on the commission for an official role in Iraq’s government. Having just renovated a spacious office in the Green Zone, he has strongly opposed any effort to weaken his position or the country’s policy on former Baathists. According to a senior official with the commission, Mr. Chalabi and members of his organization sabotaged the American-backed plan by rallying opposition among Shi’a government officials in southern Iraq, then taking their complaints to Grand Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani, Iraq’s most powerful Shi’a cleric. On April 1, Mr. Chalabi visited the Ayatollah’s office in Najaf. He later appeared at a news conference, declaring that Ayatollah Sistani told him the law was incomplete and that ‘there would be other drafts.’” [NY Times, 6/13/07 . United Nations ]

The GAO found that the de-Baathification benchmark has not been met. “Although Iraqi leaders have drafted several pieces of legislation to reform de-Ba’athification, none has sufficient support among Iraq’s political factions to have a first reading in the Iraqi legislature, according to U.S. officials. No consensus exists on reforming the current de-Ba’athification policy and many Iraqis are concerned by the prospects of former Ba’athist tormenters returning to power. However, according to an August 2007 U.S. interagency report, Iraq’s senior Shi’a and Sunni Arab and Kurdish political leaders signed a Unity Accord, including consensus on draft legislation on de-Ba’thification reform. Such a law would need to be drafted, passed by the Council of Representatives, and implemented.” [GAO, 9/4/07 ]

Benchmark: Enacting and implementing legislation establishing an Independent High Electoral Commission, provincial elections law, provincial council authorities, and a date for provincial elections

White House Assessment: 1) Establishing the IHEC Commission: The Government of Iraq has made satisfactory progress toward establishing an IHEC Commission. 2) Elections Law: The Government of Iraq has not made satisfactory progress toward establishing a provincial elections law. 3) Provincial Council Authorities: The Government of Iraq has made satisfactory progress toward establishing provincial council authorities, which are encapsulated in the Provincial Powers law. 4) Provincial Elections Date: The Government of Iraq has not made satisfactory progress toward establishing a date for provincial elections.

Response: According to the GAO only one of the four parts of this benchmark has been met, and that is by far the easiest part of the process. Significant challenges in remain to holding provincial elections

New provincial elections are necessary to increase Sunni representation in the government. The Sunnis boycotted the provincial election. As a result, they are underrepresented in the local governments, which coordinate with national agencies to provide gasoline, health, education, sanitation, security and other local services. Without political influence, local Sunnis can’t get basic services, are discriminated against by the Shi’a, and are alienated by the government. The situation is especially severe in Baghdad, where 40% of the population is Sunni, but only one of the 51 members of the local provincial council is Sunni. [LA Times, 3/11/07 ]

There are four key milestones that need to be reached in order to facilitate provincial elections. To date, only one of them has been achieved. “Although the government of Iraq has enacted and implemented legislation establishing an Independent High Electoral Commission (IHEC), it has not enacted and implemented legislation establishing a provincial elections law, provincial council authorities, or a date for provincial elections.” [GAO, 9/4/07 ]

Prime Minister Maliki has said that provincial Iraqi elections will be held in 2007. However, there is little reason to believe that he is capable or willing to follow through. Maliki affirmed in early July that the government is "…determined to hold the provincial elections this year." However, he gave no date for the elections. To date, Maliki’s leadership style and alliances have been focused almost exclusively on the Shi’a, despite the fact that the law is designed to ensure engagement with the Sunni community. It is unlikely that he would make a significant change and start aggressively supporting a measure that will give the Sunnis more power. [NPR, 7/01/07]

The refugee crisis has complicated the process of holding meaningful provincial elections. Over 4 million Iraqis have been displaced since April 2003. Maliki has asked the Independent Electoral Commission to find a way to make sure Iraqis can vote even if they have left the country or have moved to another part of the country. About half are living as refugees in neighboring countries, and the others have moved to communities that share their religious or sectarian background. All of this movement makes it extraordinarily difficult to assemble accurate voter rolls. [CAP 6/25/07 , Reuters, 7/01/07 ]

Benchmark: Providing three trained and ready Iraqi brigades to support Baghdad operations.

White House Assessment: The Government of Iraq has made satisfactory progress toward providing three trained and ready Iraqi brigades to support Baghdad operations.

Response: According to DOD only 5 of the 19 units deployed to Baghdad were effective while the others lacked personnel, equipment and vehicles.

The GAO found that only 5 of the 19 units deployed to Baghdad have performed well. “In commenting on this report, DOD stated that performance of the units currently supporting Baghdad operations has been varied. Some units had performed exceptionally well, proven themselves and raised their readiness ratings. Others had marked time and slowly regressed over their 90-day deployment. Of the 19 Iraqi units that had supported operations in Baghdad, 5 units had performed well while the remaining had proven to be problematic for several reasons: lack of personnel, lack of individual fighting equipment and lack of vehicles to conduct their assigned missions.” [GAO, 9/4/07 ]

The President’s escalation failed to meet some of its security targets partly due to a lack of Iraqi Security Forces. Three months after the start of the Baghdad Security Plan, American and Iraqi forces control fewer than one-third of the city’s neighborhoods, far short of the initial goal. Brig. Gen. Vincent K. Brooks said that while military planners had expected to make greater gains by now, that has not been possible in large part because Iraqi police and army units ― which were expected to handle basic security tasks like manning checkpoints and conducting patrols ― have not provided all the forces promised, and in some cases have performed poorly. [NY Times, 6/4/07 ]

Benchmark: Providing Iraqi commanders with all authorities to execute this plan and to make tactical and operational decisions in consultation with U.S. Commanders without political intervention to include the authority to pursue all extremists including Sunni insurgents and Shi’a militias.

White House Assessment: The Government of Iraq has made satisfactory progress toward providing Iraqi commanders with all authorities to execute this plan and to make tactical and operational decisions in consultation with U.S. Commanders, to include the authority to pursue all extremists. However, there has not been satisfactory progress towards eliminating political intervention by leaders throughout the chain of command.

Response: Members of the Iraqi Government continue to manipulate the security forces for their own sectarian purposes

GAO found that sectarian loyalties continue to trump national security concerns. “According to U.S. officials and other experts, sectarian and political interference in the conduct of military operations continues. Tribal and ethno-sectarian loyalties remain strong within many Iraqi military units, hindering efforts to take actions against militias. These loyalties are often the basis for relationships between key officers in units and higher-level authorities who are not always in the direct chain of command. For example, sectarian militias control many local police. Additionally, some army units sent to Baghdad have mixed loyalties, and some have had ties to Shi’a militias making it difficult to target Shi’a extremist networks.” [GAO, 9/4/07 ]

Shi’a supporters of Muqtada al Sadr have appointed Mahdi militia members to leadership positions in the Iraqi army. “In one of the more troubling examples of the relationship between the militia and Iraqi government, the Defense Ministry in January authorized lawmaker Baha Araji, a Sadr loyalist, to form a plainclothes army unit to patrol the Shiite district of Kadhimiya… The Baha Araji Company was a 300-man element of plainclothes Jaish al Mahdi operatives... that have subsequently been put in Iraqi army uniforms," said Lt. Col. Steven Miska of the 1st Infantry Division. ‘Nobody in the Iraqi army chain of command wanted those guys in uniform. It was a political decision…’ The Defense Ministry disbanded the unit in May. The commander became the head of a new battalion that included many of his former troops. [LA Times, 8/16/07]

The Prime Minister’s office has played a leading role in the arrest and removal of senior army and national police officers. At least 16 Iraqi Army and National Police commanders – nine of whom are Sunni Arab – have been either fired, detained, or pressured to resign; according to Iraq Assistance Group commander Brig. Gen. Dana Pittard, “Their only crimes or offenses were [that] they were successful.” For example, two high-ranking National Police officers described as “professional, non-sectarian, and focused on gaining [the] support of the populace” and “assessed as combating militia influences” were respectively detained and replaced. Col. Ehrich Rose, the chief advisor of the 4th Iraqi Army Division and veteran of previous advisory efforts, remarked, “the politicization of [the Iraqi Army’s] officer corps is the worst I’ve ever seen.” [Washington Post, 4/30/07 ]

Beyond the conduct of Prime Minister Maliki and his associates is the problem of sectarian control of various ministries, most notably the Interior Ministry. Under previous Interior Minister Bayan Jabr, the Badr Organization – the militia of the then-Supreme Council for the Islamic Revolution in Iraq – was allowed to heavily infiltrate the Interior Ministry. This dynamic was especially prevalent in the National Police, which have been widely suspected of perpetrating sectarian violence against Sunni Arabs. Recently, new Interior Minister Jawad al-Bolani has begun an attempt to convert the National Police into more a police and less a paramilitary organization and purge Shiite sectarianism from its ranks. An entire brigade of National Police was removed from duty and its officers arrested in October 2006, while several National Police leaders were removed in January 2007. However, it is far from certain whether these measures will have an effect on the National Police or Interior Ministry writ large. [USIP, 2/07 . Time, 3/20/07 . USA Today, 1/9/07 ]

The Facilities Protection Service has served as a protection racket for the parties controlling particular ministries, especially those previously controlled by Muqtada al Sadr’s parliamentary bloc. Unlike Ministry of Interior and Defense forces, the FPS does not receive American advice or equipment. According to U.S. Institute of Peace analyst Robert Perito, the Facilities Protection Service “became the private armies and a source of patronage jobs and funding,” for Sadr in particular. As a result, the FPS is widely acknowledged to be responsible for death squad activity. A recent effort has been made to remove the FPS from the control of the various ministries and consolidate it in the Interior Ministry; however, this has not yet occurred due to a lack of funding for the program from the Iraqi government. [USIP, 2/07 ]

Benchmark: Ensuring that the Iraqi Security Forces are providing even handed enforcement of the law.

White House Assessment: The Government of Iraq has made satisfactory progress in ensuring that the Iraqi Army is providing even-handed enforcement of the law, though much remains to be done in this area. However the Iraqi Police has not made satisfactory progress, as some elements still act with a sectarian bias.

Response: Iraqi forces are infiltrated by militias that attack American troops and participate in sectarian violence.

GAO found that officials inside the U.S. government still believe that sectarian security forces continue to be a major problem. “In mid-August 2007, Department of State officials stated that the Iraqi government and security forces continue to engage in sectarian-based abuses. State’s March 2007 human rights report cited widely reported incidents of unauthorized government agent involvement in extrajudicial killings throughout the country. These incidents included Shi’a militia members wearing police uniforms and driving police cars in carrying out killings and kidnapping in the southern city of Basra. In addition, death squads affiliated with the Ministry of Interior targeted Sunnis and conducted kidnapping raids in Baghdad and its environs, largely with impunity.” [GAO, 9/4/07 ]

Sunnis feel threatened by Iraqi police. In order to reach the main expressway skirting his neighborhood, Mahmoud Mekki, a Sunni, must pass checkpoints guarded by Iraqi police commandos who he says are really Shi’a militiamen trying to drive Sunnis out of the Amil neighborhood in Baghdad. So Mekki remains holed up in his home, dependent on sympathetic Shi’a neighbors to pick up his groceries and run other errands. [LA Times, 8/12/07 ]

U.S. general in charge of training Iraqis says the largest challenge is finding leaders free of sectarian loyalties. Lt. Gen. James M. Dubik said non-sectarianism was “much harder” to instill than teaching soldiers to fight. [NY Times, 7/29/07 ]

A recent Army investigation into a January attack in Karbala that killed five U.S. soldiers concluded that Iraqi police, working alongside American troops, colluded with insurgents. Gunmen knew exactly where to find and abduct U.S. officers, Iraqi vendors operating a PX and barbershop went home early and a back gate was left unlocked and unguarded. U.S. troops told investigators that “an inside assault force was pre-staged," that gunmen were allowed to blend in among Iraqi police inside the headquarters compound hours before the assault. Soldiers also said that, as the assault ended, they saw an Iraqi police commander in the complex talking on his cell phone and laughing. The infiltration of local police units by sectarian militias "remains a significant problem," according to a Pentagon status report on Iraq issued in June. [USA Today 7/11/07 ]

American forces videotaped Iraqi policemen helping plant an IED. Angered by the attacks on his soldiers, Colonel Patrick Frank ordered a video camera hidden near an area where patrols had been hit repeatedly. When the video was examined after another attack, it showed two Iraqi policemen talking with companions, who were heard off-camera, apparently laying an explosive device. Minutes after the policemen were seen driving away, the camera showed a powerful bomb detonating as an American Humvee came into view. [NY Times, 6/4/07 ]

Shi’a police officers have been implicated in sectarian killings. Shi’a policemen killed 70 Sunnis in Tal Afar as revenge for a bombing in a Shi’a neighborhood. In Diyala province, one Iraqi Army officer, a Shi’a, had been ridding the area of Sunnis, telling them, “If you don’t leave this area, we’ll come back and kill you.” [CNN, 3/29/07 . NY Times, 3/31/07 ]

Benchmark: Reducing the level of sectarian violence in Iraq and eliminating militia control of local security.

White House Assessment: The Government of Iraq has made satisfactory progress toward reducing sectarian violence. Where ISF and Coalition forces have conducted clear and hold operations, militia control has been significantly reduced. However, satisfactory progress has not been made toward eliminating militia control of local security, in other areas, as evidenced by continued militia influence of certain Baghdad neighborhoods and other areas across Iraq.

Response: There have been many questions raised about the validity of sectarian violence statistics, including by the GAO and experts in and out of government. No one knows for sure if violence is down.

The GAO stated that MNF-I’s measurements for sectarian violence are unclear because it is often impossible to measure intent. GAO cannot determine whether sectarian violence in Iraq has been reduced because measuring such violence requires understanding the perpetrator’s intent, which may not be known. The number of attacks targeting civilians and population displacement resulting from sectarian violence may serve as additional indicators. For example...the average number of daily attacks against civilians remained about the same over the last six months. [GAO, 9/4/07 ]

The Pentagon and Administration’s definition of “Ethno sectarian violence” excludes many types of violence that would indicate that the security situation in Iraq is not improving. Shi’a on Shi’a violence in the South is not included. Sunni on Sunni violence in the central part of the country is not included. “According to one senior intelligence official in Washington. ‘If a bullet went through the back of the head, it's sectarian,’ the official said. ‘If it went through the front, it's criminal.’" While, MNF-I has denied this claim, the overall point is that it is difficult to measure intent when finding unidentified bodies on the street. [Washington Post, 9/6/07 ]

There were significant revisions to the way the Pentagon’s reports measure sectarian violence between its March 2007 report and its June 2007 report. The original data for the five months before the surge began (September 2006 through January 2007) indicated approximately 5,500 sectarian killings. In the revised data in the June 2007 report, those numbers had been adjusted to roughly 7,400 killings – a 35% increase. These discrepancies have the impact of making the sectarian violence appear significantly worse during the fall and winter of 2006 before the President’s “surge” began. [DOD, 11/2006 . 3/2007 . 6/2007 ]

According to numbers released by the Iraqi government, since July civilian casualties have risen 20% across Iraq. The numbers fell significantly in Baghdad. The figures, provided by Iraqi Interior Ministry officials on Saturday, mirrored the geographic pattern of the troop increase, which is focused on Baghdad. The national rise in mortality is partly a result of more than 500 deaths, in an August truck bomb attack on a Yazidi community in August north of the capital, outside the areas directly affected by the additional troops. [NY Times, 9/2/07 ]

According to figures compiled by the Associated Press, Iraq is suffering approximately double the number of war-related deaths throughout the country compared to last year. The average daily toll has risen from 33 in 2006, to 62 so far this year. Nearly 1,000 more people have been killed in violence across Iraq in the first eight months of this year than in all of 2006. The AP tracking includes Iraqi civilians; government officials, police and security forces killed in attacks such as gunfights; and bombings, which are frequently blamed on Sunni suicide strikes. It also includes execution-style killings — largely the work of Shi’a death squads. These figures are considered a minimum and only based on AP reporting. The actual numbers are likely higher, as many killings go unreported or uncounted. That said, the AP notes that UN figures for 2006 are higher than the AP’s. [AP, 8/25/07 ]

Benchmark: Establishing all of the planned joint security stations across Baghdad.

White House Assessment: The Government of Iraq has made satisfactory progress toward establishing the planned Joint Security Stations in Baghdad neighborhoods.

Response: The real measure is whether or not establishing these outposts in the middle of Baghdad neighborhoods actually increases security. In reality, the JSS often act as a magnet for attacks, making an area less secure.

Joint Security Stations were created in order to make Iraqis feel more secure, but 70% of them don't feel that the surge has made them safer. About 70% of Iraqis believe security has deteriorated in the area covered by the US military "surge" of the past six months, an opinion poll suggests. The survey for the BBC, ABC News and NHK of more than 2,000 people across Iraq also suggests that nearly 60% see attacks on US-led forces as justified. [BBC, 9/10/07 ]

US neighborhood outposts in Baghdad are supposed to put more American patrols on the streets and make residents feel safer - but instead they often serve as magnets for violence. The outposts, along with joint U.S.-Iraqi security stations, form a cornerstone of the current Iraq strategy. Iraqis who live nearby say they feel less safe now, because many of the bases have quickly become magnets for rocket and mortar attacks. When attacks miss the troops, they often hit Iraqi civilians. [The LA Times, 7/08/07]

Joint Security Stations were established to engage Iraqis, but the heavily fortified outposts in Baghdad dissuade Iraqi civilian cooperation. “To guard against bombs, mortar fire and other threats, U.S. commanders are adding fortifications to the outposts, setting them farther back from traffic and arming them with antitank weapons capable of stopping suicide bombers driving armored vehicles. U.S. troops maintain the advantage of living in the neighborhoods they are asked to protect, but the need to safeguard themselves from attack means more walls between them and civilians.” One officer acknowledged, “It almost looks like we are pushing people away, and that is not what we want to do.” [Washington Post, 5/8/07 . LA Times, 7/8/07.]

American troops are spending more time near Iraqis, but they aren’t necessarily doing enough patrolling or improving security. “They say we are spending more time 'in sector,' which we are doing — we live here,” said Spc. Tyrone Richardson, 24, a member of Charlie Company, 1st Battalion, 8th Cavalry, that operates in the east Baghdad neighborhood of Ubaidi, outside Sadr City. “But we aren't spending the time patrolling.” “The Mahdi Army [A Shi’a militia group] goes around to the houses more than we do,” said Pfc. John Evans, 21, a member of 1-8 Cavalry's Alpha Company. [LA Times, 7/8/07]

Benchmark: Ensuring that the rights of minority political parties in the Iraqi legislature are protected.

White House Assessment: The Government of Iraq has made satisfactory progress toward ensuring that the rights of minority political parties in the Iraqi legislature are protected.

Response: While this benchmark has been achieved on the surface, the Sunnis are still marginalized in the national government while other minority groups face brutal persecution

According to Minority Rights Group International, Iraq is the second most dangerous country in the world for minorities. The group analyzed all the countries in the world and found that only Somalia was more dangerous for minorities. “The impact of the conflict on some minority groups has been so acute that they are in danger of being driven out entirely from a territory they have called home for hundreds – in some cases, thousands – of years. They are `targeted on sectarian and/or ethnic grounds, and face added danger from the perception that they cooperate with American-led forces.” [Minority Rights Group]

Iraq's largest Sunni political bloc has quit the national unity government and spent more time this summer boycotting government then participating. The Iraqi Accordance front ended its participation in the national government after the prime minister refused to comply with a list of demands that included: the release of thousands of detainees, the removal militia members from the Iraqi police, the return of displaced families to their homes and investigation into mass kidnappings and bombings of Sunni shrines. The Accordance Front will continue to participate in parliament, but only two of Iraq’s forty cabinet ministers are now Sunni. [Washington Post, 7/26/07 ]

The initial version of the constitution, drafted in 2005, was viewed as unfair by the Sunnis, who only accepted it after a clause was added to allow them to amend it later. Two year later, there is still no progress on the constitution. The key issues regarding the constitution are: federalism, or the right of provinces to attain “regional” status with more power than one province alone; the future of a referendum on the status of the oil-rich city of Kirkuk; whether Iraq should be considered an Arab country; and the reduction of the power of the Prime Minister, while granting more power to the President. The way the Constitution is currently structured, Sunnis are put at a significant disadvantage on all of these fronts. [NY Times, 6/13/2007 . Iraq Slogger, 5/17/07 ]

Outside of Sunnis and Kurds, Christian ChaldoAssyrians make up the largest ethnic minority in Iraq. No one knows exactly how many have been forced to flee the country but the highest estimates are that nearly half of them have left Iraq. Some United Nations estimates state that 40% of 2.2 million Iraqi refugees are Assyrian Christians. This is an upper end estimate but would account for about half of all the Christians who lived in Iraq before the war started. Christian clergy have consistently been the targets of sectarian killings and intimidation. Churches have been targeted by Sunni extremists and Christian neighborhoods that have been part of Baghdad for hundreds of years have been ethnically cleansed. [United States Commission on International Religious Freedom, 7/25/07 . U.S. State Department . LA Times, 6/27/07.]

Benchmark: Allocating and spending $10 billion in Iraq Revenues for reconstruction projects, including delivery of essential services, on an equitable basis

White House Assessment: The Government of Iraq is making satisfactory progress in allocating funds to ministries and provinces.

Response: Allocating money means nothing if it isn’t spent, and spending means little if it doesn’t lead to the delivery of government goods and services. The reality is that mismanagement and corruption combined with security operations dominate much of the Iraqi budget. Reconstruction has taken a back seat.

Iraq's national government is refusing to take possession of thousands of American-financed reconstruction projects, forcing the United States to hand them over to local Iraqis, who often lack the proper training and resources to keep the projects running. An official with SIGIR said in many cases the US is "finding someone at the local level to handle the project, handing them the keys and saying, 'Operate and maintain it.'" The Iraqi government has taken over only 15% of the 2,797 projects completed by the U.S. These projects cost American taxpayers $5.8 billion. [International Herald Tribune, 7/28/07 ]

The Iraqi Finance Minister, who has previously been accused of running Shi’a death squads out of the Interior Ministry, is in charge of releasing funds to the Iraqi government so that it can run new projects. He has not delivered. Stuart W. Bowen Jr., head of the SIGIR said that Iraqi Finance Minister, Bayan Jabr, is to blame for the slow handover of projects. In his current position he has developed a reputation as being slow to release budget money to Iraqi government entities, which would have to run the new projects at substantial expense. [International Herald Tribune, 7/28/07 ]

The most recent SIGIR report outlines significant mismanagement and corruption issues stating that they are equivalent to "a second insurgency" and "an enemy of democracy.” According to the report, 99 percent of funds allocated for salaries of government employees were paid out. However, on capital sending for critical oil, electricity, water and education projects, only 22 percent of allocations were spent. For example, the Ministry of Oil, was budgeted $3.5 billion for capital expenses last year but spent only $90 million. [Washington Post, 8/6/07 . BBC, 7/30/07 ]

Iraq’s national power grid is on the brink of collapse. A spokesman for the electricity ministry said Iraq’s power grid was only meeting half of the demand and that there had been four nationwide blackouts last week. The ministry blamed poor maintenance, fuel shortages, sabotage by insurgents and rising demand for the energy problems. Baghdad’s water supply has also been affected, as purification plants and pumping stations are hindered by failing power supplies. The United States has spent more than $4.6 billion on the Iraqi power sector with little to show for it. [BBC, 8/7/07 . SIGIR, 7/2007 ]

The electrical failures are also causing water pumping stations to breakdown, leaving most of Baghdad without water. With temperatures hitting a 120˚F, much of the Iraqi capital was without running water last week. Residents and city officials said large sections in Western Baghdad had been virtually dry for six days because the strained electricity grid cannot provide sufficient power to run water purification and pumping stations. Jamil Hussein, a 52-year-old retired army officer who lives in Baghdad, said his house has been without water for two weeks, except for two hours at night. He says the water that does flow has made his children sick- even though he boils it before drinking. Noah Miller, spokesman for the U.S. reconstruction program in Baghdad, said that water treatment plants were working "as far as we know." According to the International Red Cross, “both the quantity and quality of drinking water in Iraq remain insufficient despite limited improvement…water is often contaminated, owing to the poor repair of sewage and water-supply networks and the discharge of untreated sewage into rivers, which are the main source of drinking water.” The United States has spent more than $2.38 billion on Iraqi water projects. [AP, 8/2/07. SIGIR, 7/2007 ]

Oxfam International released a new report indicating that living conditions in Iraq have deteriorated significantly since the U.S.-led invasion in 2003, leaving nearly one-third of the population in need of emergency aid. The government is failing to provide basic services such as food and shelter for eight million Iraqis. The report suggests 70% of Iraq’s population is without adequate water supply, compared to 50% prior to the invasion and that only 20% have access to effective sanitation. Yet funding for humanitarian assistance in Iraq has declined precipitously, from $453 million in 2005 to $95 million in 2006. [BBC, 7/30/07 . Washington Post, 7/31/07 ]

Sectarianism Impacts Resource Allocation

Sunnis believe that the Iraqi government is purposefully withholding services because of sectarian biases. Lt. Colonel Gian Gentile, who was the American commander in charge in Amiriyah, a Sunni district of Baghdad, learned from his post that, "Many if not most Iraqi Sunnis think that the Iraqi government is not legitimate but sectarian and out to crush them." According to Lt. Col. Gentile, "The Sunnis in Amiriyah believed that the government was using its institutional powers to deprive them of essential services such as electricity, trash pickup, banking facilities, health care and, most important, and security. People I spoke with said that Iraqi security forces, especially the local and national police, were determined to kill them because they were Sunni." [Washington Post, 8/7/07 ]

Sectarian militias are seizing control of Iraq’s electricity grid. According to Iraq’s electricity minister, armed groups increasingly control the antiquated switching stations that channel electricity around Iraq. The groups are dividing the national grid into fiefs that often refuse to share electricity generated locally with Baghdad and other power-starved areas in the center of Iraq. [NY Times, 8/22/07 ]