Is General Petraeus's Data Misleading the American People?

 

Is General Petraeus's Data Misleading the American People?

For the past month, the Bush Administration and General Petraeus have asserted that a drop in violence is evidence that the "surge" is working. Unfortunately, the evidence is not publicly available and difficult to validate independently. The numbers have raised such alarm bells that a member of the Iraq Study Group, former ambassadors and leading academics have written to Congress asking them to look into the validity of U.S. government claims. General Petraeus and the Administration have selectively emphasized certain statistics to support their case. Just this week General Petraeus asserted that religious and ethnic killings are down 75% in Baghdad, without mentioning that according to other U.S. agencies and the Iraqi government, violence across Iraq appears to be relatively constant. The Pentagon's own reports in March and June differ in their measurement of "sectarian violence" excluding large swaths of the country and casualties from car bombs. In order to make good policy going forward, it is imperative to American policy makers, Iraqi government officials, and the American people to have an accurate understanding of the impact of the President’s “surge” on Iraq’s civil war and the civilian population.

GENERAL PETRAEUS AND THE MILITARY HAVE MADE A NUMBER OF OVERLY OPTIMISTIC STATEMENTS

General Petraeus told The Australian that there had been a 75 percent reduction in religious and ethnic killings in the capital between December and August. In a face-to-face at his Baghdad office Petraeus also emphasized "a doubling in the seizure of insurgents' weapons caches between January and August, a rise in the number of al-Qa'ida 'kills and captures' and a fall in the number of coalition deaths from roadside bombings. 'We say we have achieved progress, and we are obviously going to do everything we can to build on that progress and we believe al-Qa'ida is off balance at the very least,' he said." [The Australian, 8/31/07 ]

U.S. officials continue to claim that violence is down but the numbers cannot be verified. "Brig. Gen. Richard Sherlock, deputy director for operational planning for the Pentagon’s Joint Chiefs of Staff, said violence in Iraq 'has continued to decline and is at the lowest level since June 2006.' He offered no statistics to back his claim, but in a briefing with reporters at the Pentagon on Friday he warned insurgents might try to intensify attacks in Iraq to coincide with three milestones: the sixth anniversary of the Sept. 11 attacks in the U.S., the beginning of Ramadan and the report to Congress." [AP, 8/25/07 ]

THE GENERAL'S ASSESSMENTS ARE CONTRADICTED BY IRAQI GOVERNMENT DATA, INDEPENDENT MEDIA REPORTS, AND OTHER U.S. AGENCIES

A draft copy of a GAO report concludes that there are differing opinions within the U.S. government on whether sectarian violence is down. “The draft provides a stark assessment of the tactical effects of the current U.S.-led counteroffensive to secure Baghdad. ‘While the Baghdad security plan was intended to reduce sectarian violence, U.S. agencies differ on whether such violence has been reduced,’ it states. While there have been fewer attacks against U.S. forces, it notes, the number of attacks against Iraqi civilians remains unchanged. It also finds that ‘the capabilities of Iraqi security forces have not improved.’ [Washington Post, 8/30/07 ]

The military does not count car bombs as part of sectarian violence. “According to U.S. military figures, an average of 1,000 Iraqis have died each month since March in sectarian violence. That compares with about 1,200 a month at the start of the security plan, the military said in an e-mailed response to queries. This does not include deaths from car bombings, which the military said have numbered more than 2,600 this year.” [LA Times, 9/4/07 ]

There were significant revisions to the way the Pentagon’s reports measure sectarian violence between its March 2007 report and its June 2007 report. The original data for the five months before the surge began (September 2006 through January 2007) indicated approximately 5,500 sectarian killings. In the revised data in the June 2007 report, those numbers had been adjusted to roughly 7,400 killings – a 35% increase. These discrepancies have the impact of making the sectarian violence appear significantly worse during the fall and winter of 2006 before the President’s “surge” began. [DOD, 11/2006 . 3/2007 . 6/2007 ]

According to numbers released by the Iraqi government, since July civilian casualties have risen 20% across Iraq. The numbers fell significantly in Baghdad. The figures, provided by Iraqi Interior Ministry officials on Saturday, mirrored the geographic pattern of the troop increase, which is focused on Baghdad. The national rise in mortality is partly a result of more than 500 deaths, in an August truck bomb attack on a Yazidi community in August north of the capital, outside the areas directly affected by the additional troops. [NY Times, 9/2/07 ]

According to figures compiled by the Associated Press, Iraq is suffering approximately double the number of war-related deaths throughout the country compared to last year. The average daily toll has risen from 33 in 2006, to 62 so far this year. Nearly 1,000 more people have been killed in violence across Iraq in the first eight months of this year than in all of 2006. The AP tracking includes Iraqi civilians; government officials, police and security forces killed in attacks such as gunfights; and bombings, which are frequently blamed on Sunni suicide strikes. It also includes execution-style killings — largely the work of Shi’a death squads. These figures are considered a minimum and only based on AP reporting. The actual numbers are likely higher, as many killings go unreported or uncounted. That said, the AP notes that UN figures for 2006 are higher than the AP’s. [AP, 8/25/07 ]

The military data does not include Shi’a on Shi’a violence in the South or Sunni on Sunni violence in the Sunni Triangle. “The data on the drops in attacks are complex, and it must be stressed that they do not count clashes or violence at lower levels between the tribes and Al Qa’ida or some forms of intra-Sunni Islamist feuding and fighting… These figures also ignore growing Shi’a instability in the south, and particularly in the southeast, and a growing threat from Iran.” [CSIS, 8/6/07 ]

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