April 27, 2015

This week, Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe is in Washington to address a joint session of Congress. This is the first time any Japanese prime minister has addressed both chambers of Congress. The historic event stands as a stiff rebuke to conservatives who charge that the United States has allowed its system of global alliances to decay. On the contrary, the U.S.-Japan alliance – the cornerstone of America’s network of friends in the Asia-Pacific – is becoming stronger and more central to Tokyo and Washington’s mutual interest in a peaceful and prosperous Asia-Pacific region. During Abe’s trip, the United States and Japan are poised to finalize a long-negotiated upgrade to the military alliance between the two countries. President Obama and Prime Minister Abe will also discuss the Trans-Pacific Partnership trade deal after the latest round of negotiations produced progress but did not resolve outstanding differences between the United States and Japan, by far the two largest economies of the 12 nations negotiating the agreement.

Prime Minister Abe’s visit to Washington will cement a major upgrade to the U.S.-Japan military alliance. For over a year, the United States and Japan have been negotiating a new set of guidelines for shaping U.S.-Japan defense cooperation to make the alliance more agile and effective as the Asia-Pacific takes on greater importance in world affairs. The revised guidelines are expected to be finalized during Prime Minister Abe’s visit. James Schoff of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace explains the significance of the recently-concluded revision of the guidelines for U.S.-Japan defense cooperation: “Whereas the current alliance concept creates separate zones of [military] activity [for U.S. and Japanese forces] that require relatively little joint planning or training, the revised guidelines should enable more integrated operations especially in the areas of missile defense, surveillance and reconnaissance, antisubmarine warfare, counter proliferation and more direct logistical support of each other, depending on the situation. These could apply to the defense of Japan or other situations around the world.” [James Schoff, 4/21/15]

Implementation of the upgraded U.S.-Japan alliance involves thorny political issues for Japan. Schoff continues, “Today, Abe’s government is preparing new security legislation that will expand the activities Japan can engage in, and the revised U.S.-Japan defense guidelines describe how bilateral cooperation might function in anticipation of the new laws…there will be political and legal limits to what Japan can do. Japan’s new security legislation will not allow the Self-Defense Forces to use force unless the country is directly threatened or attacked.” But managing this legal and strategic change for Japanese society is politically complex given the country’s historical legacy. The Wall Street Journal reports, “In a recent Pew Research poll, just 23% of Japanese said they felt their military should be more active ‘in helping to maintain peace and stability in the Asia-Pacific region,’ while 68% agreed that ‘given its history, Japan should limit its role.’” Meanwhile, 47% of Americans said they would like to see Japan play a more active military role in Asia and 43% said Japan should limit its military role. [James Schoff, 4/21/15. Wall Street Journal, 4/26/15]

U.S.-Japan economic statecraft on the agenda: Despite progress, hurdles remain for the United States and Japan to successfully negotiate the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) trade deal.

U.S.-Japan negotiation on TPP crucial to the prospective trade deal: The TPP appears to be high on the agenda for Abe’s visit. The Japan Times reports, “Obama and Prime Minister Shinzo Abe are expected to discuss trade issue [sic] in their summit on Tuesday. The U.S. and Japanese economies account for a combined 80 percent of the envisioned TPP area.”

Recent U.S.-Japan TPP negotiations mix progress with challenges: The Wall Street Journal reports, “U.S. and Japanese negotiators have been working for 21 months on lowering or eliminating barriers to trade. Those include concrete barriers such as duties protecting Japanese farms and Detroit auto makers, as well as the regulatory red tape blamed for keeping Detroit’s cars out of Japan, among other complications.” Despite these challenges, recent talks have yielded progress: “Before the two countries even sat down to talk formally in the TPP, officials agreed that Japan would lower barriers to U.S. beef and insurance, while the U.S. agreed it would cut its 2.5% tariff on cars and a big tariff on trucks but only over an unspecified length of time.”

Japan, other nations paying close attention to fast-track authority: The press in Japan has focused on the importance of Congress granting fast-track trade promotion authority, which would produce an up-or-down vote on any final trade deal and avoid members of Congress offering amendments to the agreement. The Japan Times notes, “Enacting the trade promotion authority bill would likely help the negotiations, which date back a number of years, as participating countries would no longer need to worry as much about whether their make-or-break proposals to Washington could be rejected by lawmakers there.” [Wall Street Journal, 4/26/15. Japan Times, 4/27/15]

Photo Credit: Secretary of State John Kerry, Defense Secretary Ash Carter, and Permanent Representative to the United Nations Samantha Power meet with Japan Defense Minister Gen Nakatani and Japan Foreign Minister Fumio Kishida before they hold a 2+2 meeting to discuss foreign policy and defense issues in New York on April 27, 2015. [State Department, 4/27/15]

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April 14, 2015

Sen. Marco Rubio (R-FL) punted on foreign policy and national security issues in his speech  announcing his candidacy for president,  limiting his discussion of these issues to a single paragraph. Still, his positions are as clear as they are familiar: Sen. Rubio espouses the same Cold War mentality that made Sen. John McCain such a troubling candidate for commander-in-chief in 2008. He is quick to criticize what he sees as American weakness, from the nuclear negotiations with Iran to U.S. policies toward Russia and China, but he fails to present credible alternatives. As he builds his platform in the months to come, he will need to make a compelling case for not just what’s wrong with U.S. foreign policy, but how he hopes to improve it.

Rubio wants to scrap the international agreement to prevent Iran from obtaining a nuclear weapon, but he has no alternative. In his speech, Sen. Rubio cited “the administration’s dangerous concessions to Iran” as a sign of American weakness. He said in an interview with NPR that he would act unilaterally to scuttle an international agreement to prevent Iran from obtaining a nuclear weapon by reimposing sanctions, though he acknowledged “it wouldn’t be as effective” without international support. It’s unclear what Sen. Rubio hopes this will achieve. It took years of devastating international sanctions to bring Iran to the negotiating table and it has resulted in a framework for a sustainable, enforceable agreement that would ensure that Iran cannot build a bomb, but the window for their effectiveness is closing. As NSN Advisory Board Chair Sandy Berger wrote recently, “Enacting new, tough sanctions in an effort to force Iran toward a ‘better’ deal would mystify and alarm the rest of the world, isolating and weakening us…There is no second bite at this apple. This is a good deal. We should not be distracted by talk of a better one.” [Marco Rubio via NPR, 4/13/15. Sandy Berger via Politico, 4/5/15]

Sen. Rubio criticized American “hostility to Israel” that simply is not in evidence. Sen. Rubio echoed a point made by Sen. Cruz that the United States has abandoned its special relationship with Israel. But for a country supposedly “hostile” to Israel, the United States has shown an unwavering commitment to Israeli security. AIPAC writes, “On Feb. 2, President Obama submitted his budget for fiscal year 2016, including $3.1 billion in security assistance for Israel. U.S. security assistance to Israel in the annual foreign aid bill is the most tangible manifestation of American support, especially during a time of tremendous turmoil in the Middle East. American aid is a vital component of U.S. commitments to ensure that the Jewish state maintains its qualitative military edge over its adversaries.” This is nothing new for the United States or President Obama. The Congressional Research Service reports that in 2014, the United States provided “$504 million in funding for research, development, and production of Israel’s Iron Dome anti-rocket system ($235 million) and of the joint U.S.-Israel missile defense systems David’s Sling ($149.7 million), the Arrow improvement program (or Arrow II, $44.3 million), and Arrow III ($74.7 million).” Last year, the Administration requested nearly $180 million for Iron Dome. [AIPAC, accessed 3/23/15. CRS, accessed 3/23/15]

Sen. Rubio thinks the United States is “hollowing out…our military” and wants to boost Pentagon spending for wars we’re no longer fighting. Speaking on the Senate floor in March, Sen. Rubio proposed adjusting the proposed 2016 defense budget to projections made in 2012, running roughshod over the budget caps imposed by the Budget Control Act. While Sen. Rubio is right to suggest that defense spending has declined over the past several years, he neglects to note that “it’s relatively normal for spending to decrease this way as wars end,” notes PolitiFact. In fact, spending levels remain exorbitant. “If you go back historically, and not even that far, levels now are comparable to 2007,” Todd Harrison, Senior Fellow at the Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments explained to PolitiFact. “It’s still above the level of spending during the majority of the Bush years.” Sen. Rubio is “cherry picking a historic high” and “misrepresents the data, plain and simple,” said Steve Ellis, Vice President of Taxpayers for Common Sense. [PolitiFact, 3/30/15]

Sen. Rubio accused the United States of “being passive in the face of Chinese and Russian aggression,” but his hawkish rhetoric could have dangerous consequences. It is unclear what Sen. Rubio actually would do about China – though he cited American “passivity” in his announcement speech, he also noted the need to cooperate with China despite political differences when talking to NPR. By calling on the United States to provide arms to Ukraine, though, Sen. Rubio risks undermining U.S. and Ukrainian interests while not providing enough support to actually stem Russia’s actions. Gen. Philip Breedlove, Commander of U.S. European Command, has noted that the lethal aid that some people have proposed “might not be able to stop a Russian advance.” [Philip Breedlove via The Hill, 2/25/15]

Sen. Rubio said he will focus on democracy and human rights, but that requires engagement, not Cold War-style standoffs. Sen. Rubio is right that the United States must remain committed to democracy and human rights – as NSN Board Chairman Brian Katulis has suggested, the United States needs to implement a “progressive global values agenda.” Katulis has noted that this requires addressing “the tough issues of political change” and engagement and partnership, even if that entails some political and physical risks. “This means eschewing simplistic calls from some neoconservatives either to use military force or to threaten cuts in security collaboration with partners in the region as a tool to force democratic change,” Katulis wrote last year. But Sen. Rubio has a very different idea of how to promote democracy and human rights – for example, telling NPR that he would walk back the gradual opening of relations with Cuba. “I don’t believe this country should be diplomatically recognizing a nation of the nature of Cuba,” he said yesterday. “And I just think that we should have continued with the policy and perhaps looked for new ways of — continue with the policy of not recognizing that regime and not allowing them access to economic growth.” That Cold War policy has been in place for decades. It failed, and it’s time to try engagement. [Brian Katulis via Democracy, Spring 2014. Marco Rubio via NPR, 4/13/15]

Photo Credit: Senator Marco Rubio speaks at the 2015 Conservative Political Action Conference [Gage Skidmore, 2/27/2015] 

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April 13, 2015

Tomorrow, the Senate Foreign Relations Committee is expected to mark up the Iran Nuclear Agreement Review Act of 2015, a bill proposed by Sen. Bob Corker (R-TN) and Sen. Robert Menendez (D-NJ). The bill has been percolating in Congress for months and has been described as a reasonable alternative to sanctions legislation that would derail the P5+1 Iranian nuclear negotiations. However, Sen. Corker’s legislation contains a litany of provisions that would move the goalposts on an agreement and make any deal – even a good deal – almost impossible to implement. Some senators are expected to propose several amendments tomorrow to try to rectify some of these concerns, while Republican members plan on proposing more hardline amendments like requiring Iran to recognize Israel. The bottom line is that this proposal, unless dramatically altered, is simply a bad bill that’s beyond repair. The Corker bill is being rushed through Congress for no reason and would make a deal more difficult to achieve and enforce. Congress has a role to play in the Iranian nuclear negotiations, but the Corker bill is not the right way for Congress to weigh in.

The problems with the Corker bill go far beyond just the terrorism provision.

The terrorism provision is a “poison pill” that would allow Iranian hardliners and terrorists to spoil a productive agreement. The Corker bill includes a “provision that requires the president to certify every 90 days that Iran has not been directly involved in any terrorist activity that has harmed U.S. interests,” notes Col. Richard Klass (Ret.), Board Member of the Center for Arms Control and Non-Proliferation. “Of course Iran’s support for terrorism is deplorable. But adding extraneous provisions, no matter how important, is a poison pill. This provision also gives Iranian-backed terror groups such as Hezbollah or hardliners in Tehran the power to derail this deal simply by ordering some kind of terror attack. If that happens, and even if Iran is in full compliance with the nuclear deal, the Corker bill allows Congress to re-impose sanctions already lifted. At that point, the agreement is dead.” [Richard Klass, 4/11/15]

But the problems with the Corker bill go well beyond just this one issue. As NSN Board Member Bruce Jentleson writes, “the Corker-Menendez bill weaves a procedural spider web for congressional review and includes a poison pill provision that hinders, rather than helps, getting a good deal. The procedural web starts with a five-day initial reporting requirement for the June comprehensive agreement, including full analysis of its components and a verification assessment. Even for less complex international agreements, it usually takes at least a month for all elements to be analyzed and the reliability of verification to be assessed by State Department, intelligence community and other experts. Quick turnaround is even harder when negotiations go up to deadlines and indeed into overtime, as did the first two rounds and as this final round almost certainly will. If Congress truly wants quality information to work with on this issue, the five-day turnaround is self-defeating.” Jentleson also points to the 60-day review period and congressional resolution of disapproval as provisions that could derail an agreement even if they’re never implemented. [Bruce Jentleson, 4/13/15]

The bill’s advocates have been relying on misleading analogies to advocate for the bill. Sen. Corker has argued that the potential nuclear agreement is analogous to “123 agreements” that the United States has signed with other nations that have been subject to congressional approval. Those agreements “are designed to ensure that U.S. cooperation with foreign nuclear programs, including the transfer of U.S. nuclear material, equipment, or technology, conforms to U.S. export control laws, meets Nuclear Regulatory Commission licensing requirements, and is used exclusively for peaceful purposes and not for the development of nuclear weapons,” write Kelsey Davenport and Daryl Kimball of the Arms Control Association. “A nuclear deal with Iran, however, will not involve the transfer of proliferation sensitive material, technology, or information from the United States. Instead, the P5+1 and Iran nuclear agreement will require Iran to meet specific requirements that effectively limit its capability to produce material that can be used for nuclear weapons and will put in place additional monitoring requirements to guard against any dash for nuclear weapons in the future. Subjecting the P5+1 and Iran agreement to the same legislative requirements as a bilateral civil nuclear cooperation agreement is unnecessary, and it carries enormous risks for the success of a good P5+1 nuclear agreement with Iran.” [Kelsey Davenport and Daryl Kimball, 2/11/15]

Congress has more productive ways of weighing in on the Iran deal than bad legislation that would kill an agreement before it’s ever reached. “Congress doesn’t need Corker-Menendez to have a significant say on an Iran deal,” writes Jentleson. “Congressional hearings over the next few months, if conducted by all sides more as policy deliberation than political contestation, can provide a useful forum for engaging the American public, and focusing in on key issues like verification. As to sanctions, Congress already has its hand on the sanctions lever since many of the sanctions are based on statutes and require congressional action to be lifted. New sanctions could be imposed if Iran is noncompliant. Congress also has inherent oversight authority. All presidents and their executive branch teams do need this accountability, checking the natural temptation to want something you say is going to work to be seen as doing so.” [Bruce Jentleson, 4/13/15]

There is no reason for Congress to rush to pass this legislation. As Col. Klass notes, “Congress doesn’t actually need legislation authorizing a vote on this agreement. Congress has that power right now and can pass a bill defunding its implementation whenever it wants.” If Congress wants to weigh in on an agreement down the road, when the negotiations have concluded, they are within their rights to do that. But the Corker bill prejudges the outcome of the negotiations and prevents the Administration from implementing even a good deal. As Ilan Goldenberg and Robert Kaplan wrote earlier this year, “Congress should think long and hard before it tries to subvert the Iran nuclear talks…Let’s wait a bit longer to see what kind of a deal, if any, the Administration manages to strike with Iran. There will be enough time then for Congress and others to act in order to avoid a sell-out of our principles.” [Richard Klass, 4/11/15. Ilan Goldenberg and Robert Kaplan, 2/13/15]

Photo Credit: Senator Menendez and Senator Corker meet with IAEA Director General Yukiya Amano [IAEA Imagebank, 10/13/2013]

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March 27, 2015

With Yemeni President Abdu Rabbu Mansour Hadi facing a Houthi offensive against his refuge in Aden earlier this week, Saudi Arabia and a coalition of Sunni-majority nations launched a military intervention to push back the Houthis’ gains and restore Hadi’s government to Sanaa. Though the United States is not responsible for Yemen’s recent decline, it has for too long emphasized counterterrorism at the expense of political and economic concerns. Going forward, it should look to deescalate the conflict and restart the country’s political transition – the best way to bring Yemen the stability it needs to confront its many challenges. There are ways the United States can do that within the Saudi-led coalition, to which the United States is providing intelligence and logistical support. Several U.S. politicians have praised the intervention and much has been made of Iran’s connection to the Shia revivalist Houthi movement, but experts say the Houthis’ ties to Tehran are overstated and worry that the Saudi intervention could further destabilize not only Yemen, but the broader Gulf. Yemen is now poised at what threatens to be the start of a long and bloody civil war. The fighting will divide the country into many factions forging alliances of convenience, including the Houthis, Iran, ousted President Ali Abdullah Saleh, Hadi, and the Gulf nations – all taking pressure off al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula and giving it greater freedom to operate.

U.S. policy in Yemen has focused on counterterrorism at the expense of addressing the political grievances destabilizing the country. “If you look at U.S. policy towards Yemen,” Brian Katulis, Chair of NSN’s Board of Directors, said this morning, “it’s been a series of efforts that have not succeeded in its goal. It succeeded in containing al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP, the al-Qaeda affiliate) in preventing an attack on the U.S. homeland, but it has not succeeded in helping back and stand up the Yemeni government…The key question is, will this response actually produce any long-term stability, because the record of aerial bombing campaigns in defeating terrorist networks and establishing security is not strong.” As Amb. Barbara Bodine, who was the U.S. representative in Sanaa from 1997 to 2001, told NPR after the Houthis seized Sanaa in January, “We have been using the wrong tools by and large…If you don’t get at the economic drivers and you just go after the extremists’ symptoms, you’re never going to get ahead of the game.” [Brian Katulis, 3/27/15. Barbara Bodine via NPR, 1/22/15]

The Saudis have reason for concern in Yemen, but their concerns about Iran are exaggerated.

The Houthis are first and foremost a Yemeni organization, and their ties to Iran are tenuous at best. There is little evidence to justify the claims made by some people that the Houthis are an Iranian proxy. Iran has been a vocal supporter of the Houthis, partially on the basis of their shared Shia identity, but its direct support – which is rumored to include shipments of weapons and bags of money – has been difficult to verify. At its core, the Houthis are a distinctly Yemeni movement, rooted in the country’s religious and political history – their relationship with Iran is more a matter of convenience than affinity. After being marginalized for years, the Houthis’ recent success has much less to do with Iran or their sectarian identity than it does with their ability to capitalize on grievances felt by a broad swath of the Yemeni public. The Houthis “have gained support among various tribes over the past couple of years,” Laura Kasinof, a journalist who reported from Yemen for the New York Times, said yesterday. “They consolidated power and took over territory more so than before and part of the population in Sanaa supported them before these strikes.” [Laura Kasinof, 3/27/15]

But the Saudi intervention is likely to increase, not decrease, Iran’s involvement. The Houthis swept to power in Sanaa without any clear capacity to govern and the conflict between them and the government they forced out of the capital has further enfeebled the state and its ability to project power within its territory. Saudi Arabia should be more concerned about getting Yemen on a sound political footing so it can better focus on the political and economic grievances that continue to make Yemen’s undergoverned hinterlands a haven for al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula. But Riyadh seems much more concerned by Iran’s influence on the Houthis. That misses the point, writes Kenneth Pollack, a Senior Fellow at the Brookings Institution, who notes that “the Iranian role has been greatly exaggerated in what is first and foremost a Yemeni civil war.” Ironically, though, the Saudi intervention could make the Houthis more reliant on Iran and draw Iran further into Yemen’s war. Iranian Foreign Minister Javad Zarif responded to the Saudi intervention yesterday by saying that Iran will “make all efforts to control the crisis in Yemen.” [Kenneth Pollack, 3/26/15. Javad Zarif, 3/26/15]

The United States should be supporting opportunities to deescalate the conflict in Yemen and negotiate a new political transition. As the intervention inches Yemen toward what could become a long and complicated civil war, the United States should be supporting ways to bring the conflict to a swift diplomatic resolution. Oman is uniquely poised to broker an agreement: It is on cordial terms with Iran, Saudi Arabia, and Yemen, and is the only GCC country to refrain from participating in the Saudi-led intervention.  EU High Representative for Foreign Affairs Federica Mogherini has reached out to Oman’s Foreign Minister to discuss “the way forward,” according to a press report. Though there are many challenges, the crisis in Yemen presents an opportunity to restart the country’s stalled constitutional reform and political transition process and could allow the country and the international community to rectify some of the mistakes made in the 2011 GCC agreement. The United States should be working with European diplomats and encouraging Oman to work towards a diplomatic process that addresses the domestic causes of this conflict.

The United States should be urging Saudi Arabia to exercise restraint, not encouraging them to escalate. Escalating the U.S. role would likely draw the United States deeper into a quagmire that not only could make the situation in Yemen worse, but poses threats to the entire Gulf. “The big question is what is the coalition going to achieve by military action?” Yemeni political analyst Abdel-Ghani Iryani said yesterday. “If they want to flex their muscles, a few days is enough. If they want to destroy the Houthi movement, they will fail.” Iryani and others warn that the Saudi strikes run the risk of rallying Yemeni support back to the Houthis’ cause. Pollack writes that “the only good reason for the United States to support the Saudi/GCC/Arab intervention in Yemen is to gain situational awareness into their operations and leverage to prevent them from getting more deeply involved. This is one of those situations where the United States needs to restrain its allies for their own good. The long and well-examined history of civil wars offers a clear warning that greater Saudi intervention in Yemen is unlikely to improve the situation and could easily undermine the Kingdom’s own security and stability over the medium to longer term.” [Abdel-Ghani Iryani, 3/27/15. Kenneth Pollack, 3/26/15]

Photo Credit: A Saudi Arabian EF-2000 Typhoon on a runway [Clement Alloing, 9/5/2014]

The post Understanding the Crisis in Yemen appeared first on National Security Network.

As Russia’s support for separatist forces in Eastern Ukraine and direct involvement in the conflict there continues to escalate, French President François Hollande and German Chancellor Angela Merkel are in Moscow in an effort to negotiate a ceasefire and diplomatic solution with their Russian counterparts. Meanwhile, with Vice President Joe Biden and Secretary of State John Kerry in Europe, there are reports that the United States is considering the provision of defensive arms to Ukraine should diplomacy not be immediately successful. Taking the step of providing arms to Ukraine has garnered increasing support from members of Congress and outside experts. While it is clear that the United States and Europe need to reinforce their response to Russia, policymakers need to be  rigorous in considering the costs and benefits of providing lethal aid to Kiev, which would make the United States a co-belligerent in the conflict. While providing arms to Ukraine could help Kiev resist Russian aggression, it also carries serious risks and limitations. Any final decision by Washington should include ways of mitigating or avoiding these risks altogether. Finally, any change in policy should be accompanied by new steps to support Ukraine’s ailing economy to ensure its ability to comprehensively resist Russian aggression.

In responding to greater Russian involvement in Ukraine, the task of formulating a reinforced response that could include the provision of defensive arms to Kiev is a challenging one, calling for careful cost-benefit analysis. Supreme Allied Commander for Europe Gen. Philip Breedlove – who supports providing defensive arms to Ukraine – has made clear the need to consider the Russian response in calibrating any policy, saying “all manner of aid has to be taken in light of what we anticipate would be the Russian reaction” and “could trigger a more strident reaction from Russia.” NSN Board Member Julianne Smith, also of the Center for a New American Security, explains, “We don’t want a new cold war. This isn’t about puffing up our chests and pushing back on Putin…It’s extremely delicate, dangerous, and risky – but for all those reasons people feel like we’ve got to come up with some new play. We’ve got to walk him back to the negotiating table.” [Philip Breedlove via AP, 2/5/15. Julianne Smith viaChristian Science Monitor, 2/3/15]

Providing defensive arms to Ukraine carries a number of risks and limitations that policymakers need to carefully consider in crafting a reinvigorated U.S.-European response to Russia:

Providing arms to Ukraine risks Russian escalation that could complicate the situation for Kiev, Europe, and the United States. Jeremy Shapiro of the Brookings Institution explains how varied levels of interests would play a role in any escalatory cycle: “Ukraine is clearly much more important to Russia than it is to [the] United States. Ukraine is also, unfortunately, located much closer to Russia than to the United States. Russia would appear to have many escalation options and a clear incentive to exercise them.” He adds, “to meet a Russian counter-escalation in Ukraine, the United States would have to either escalate the conflict beyond where it was originally willing to go or be forced into a humiliating retreat. Neither is a very attractive or credibility-enhancing option. U.S. policy should work very hard to avoid confronting that unpalatable choice.” [Jeremy Shapiro, 2/3/15]

Providing arms to Ukraine risks fraying the U.S.-European coalition at a time when transatlantic unity is crucial to countering Russian aggression. Tim Boersma of the Brookings Institution notes “The rather stiff reaction of German Chancellor Angela Merkel to the idea” of arming the Ukrainians and that “The French defense minister dismissed the idea of sending lethal weapons too.” He goes on to explain that, so far, the U.S.-European response to the crisis has “been hailed as a model of transatlantic cooperation and unity. Europe and America have moved together in lock-step on sanctions and not succumbed to the many efforts of the Russian regime to drive a wedge between them. If one would have asked American policymakers in February 2013 whether they would have deemed this possible, the response would most likely have been negative. Transatlantic unity has been the core element of the response thus far and it is broadly acknowledged that continued unity is the ‘conditio sine qua non’ for effectively coercing the Russians.” [Tim Boersma, 2/4/15]

It’s not clear that providing arms to Ukraine would compel Russia to more seriously negotiate – and could induce Russia to harden its position. Sean Kay of Ohio Wesleyan University points out that “Advancing weapons into Ukraine is precisely the kind of evidence that Putin wrongly says justifies his illegal actions.” A more fundamental problem, according to Jeremy Shapiro, is that advocates of sending defensive arms to Ukraine “assert that the secret to getting Russia to back down is to increase Russian ‘costs,’ by which they mean Ukraine could take advantage of Russia’s sensitivity to casualties…The government supposedly fears the ire of Russian mothers whose devotion to the well-being of their soldier-sons can move political mountains even in authoritarian Russia. Rather than face a growing number of aroused and organized Russian mothers, the thinking goes, President Vladimir Putin will avoid escalation in Ukraine. Unfortunately, one of the few more powerful forces than mothers in Russian politics is anti-Americanism. The Russian regime has defined the struggle in Ukraine as part of an existential battle against American imperialism, in which the United States eventually seeks to impose its will on Russia itself. American provision of arms would lend credence to that view and increase the Russian government’s freedom of action at home.” [Sean Kay,2/3/15. Jeremy Shapiro, 2/3/15]

Providing arms to Ukraine may end up providing limited benefits to Kiev without significant operational impact. Michael Kofman of the Wilson Center explains Ukraine’s military disadvantage in the conflict “is not due to technical deficits, although those exist across the board in its armed forces, but because its army as a whole is not a capable force. It lacks logistics, training, commanders with experience at maneuvering brigade- or battalion-sized elements, any coordination between volunteer battalions and regular forces, along with independent military analysis of the problems. There is no intelligence, no mobile reserves, no unified command and a political leadership that often seems disconnected from the facts on the ground. Dumping weapons into this operating environment is unlikely to prove a solution to the problems, all of which are fundamental and structural. The only thing clear in this conflict is that Ukraine stands no chance of defeating Russian forces, or the separatists, and that military escalation is a disproportionately losing proposition for Kyiv.” [Michael Kofman, 2/5/15]

Providing arms to Ukraine could cause fallout in other areas of the U.S.-Russian relationship. The Washington Post reports, “Any move toward arming Ukraine would almost certainly invite a reaction from Moscow, which is otherwise aligned with Washington on such issues as the Iran nuclear talks and the need to stop Islamic State militants in Syria and Iraq. ‘Even if we try to do this covertly, there’s a risk that it will boomerang in other areas of the U.S.-Russia relationship,’ said Andrew C. Kuchins, director of the Russia and Eurasia program at the Center for Strategic and International Studies.” [Washington Post, 2/5/15]

Regardless of the decision on defensive arms to Ukraine, what Kiev needs most is financial assistance. Sean Kay explains, “Fundamentally, none of these proposals for military escalation address what Ukraine truly needs – tens of billions of dollars of guaranteed loans to cushion destabilizing but necessary economic reforms. No one, it seems, is lining up to write that check.” The Economist summarized Ukraine’s economic situation, “Ukraine needs all the help it can get. In 2014 GDP shrank by nearly a tenth. The currency, the hryvnia, fell by more than 50%. As the cost of imports rose, inflation jumped, from 1% a year ago to 25%. In a desperate attempt to prop up the hryvnia, the central bank has been throwing cash at the markets: Ukraine’s foreign-exchange reserves have fallen from more than $16 billion in the middle of 2014 to less than $7 billion. Ukraine will probably need $20 billion in external support to survive 2015.” [Sean Kay, 2/3/15. Economist, 2/4/15]

Photo Credit: Ukrainian forces assemble outside the city of Slovyansk [Sasha Maksymenko, 7/8/14​]

The post Lethal Aid for Ukraine: Assessing Costs and Benefits appeared first on National Security Network.

President Obama met with Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi this weekend, their second bilateral summit since September 2014, when the two leaders announced a “renewed U.S.-India partnership for the 21^st century.” Now, the United States and India are following up on that commitment with additional action to strengthen the foundation of the strategic relationship. That effort is meeting significant success, with Prime Minister Modi announcing that “Our relationship stands at a new level today” following the unprecedented invitation and attendance of President Obama at India’s 66^th Republic Day. Already, agreements have been reached on a wide range of mutual interests between the two nations, including trade and investment, security, nuclear energy, and climate change. While much work remains to build on this foundation, effective follow up holds the potential to deepen a bilateral relationship that may form a new cornerstone for comprehensive global security and stability in the 21^st century.

The developing partnership between the United States and India is crucial to securing the mutual interests of both nations in addressing regional and global challenges. Vikram Singh Mehta and Waheguru Pal Singh Sidhu of the Brookings Institution put the developing partnership between the United States in India in strategic and political context: “With the upheaval wrought by state and non-state actors to its west and inter-state tensions to its east, India sits at the epicenter of the unfolding geopolitical uncertainty; New Delhi might have no choice but to help manage the chaos and restore order regionally and globally for its own interest. There is growing recognition in the Modi government that the United States is probably the best partner to address these challenges and help India’s rise—despite the differences that persist between the two countries and the questions about reliability. The Obama administration, on its part, has repeatedly stated that even if India and the United States will not always be on the same page, India’s rise is in U.S. interest—not least because a strong, prosperous, inclusive India could help manage global and regional disorder.” [Vikram Singh Mehta and Waheguru Pal Singh Sidhu, 1/15]

U.S.-India diplomacy made progress this weekend on a range of mutual interests that strengthen the foundation for strategic partnership:

Growing trade and investment: The United States and India have just agreed to resume talks over a Bilateral Investment Treaty (BIT). “The treaty has been discussed only sporadically since 2008 and is stalled over differences on a range of prickly issues,” reports the Hindustan Times. According to the latest data available from the U.S. Trade Representative, U.S. foreign direct investment (FDI) in India was $28.4 billion and Indian FDI in the United States was $5.2 billion. While the way forward on the BIT is likely long, the United States is taking action on trade right now. The Hillreports, “President Obama unveiled $4 billion in new federal initiatives designed to boost trade between the U.S. and India during a summit with top business leaders Monday in New Delhi….the Export-Import bank would dedicate $1 billion in financing to support U.S. exports to India. That’s of particular significance because although India represents a sixth of the world’s population, just 1 percent of U.S. exports go to India — and just 2 percent of U.S. imports come from the country… an additional $1 billion would be earmarked for lending to small and medium businesses in India located in rural and underserved markets.” [Hindustan Times, 1/26/14. The Hill, 1/26/15]

Increasing security collaboration: President Obama and Prime Minister Modi agreed to renew the New Framework for the U.S.-India Defense Relationship – the foundation of U.S.-India security ties, first signed in 2006 – increasing security cooperation. The Times of India reports, “The two nations agreed to step up joint combat exercises, maritime security endeavours, intelligence-sharing mechanisms, military exchanges and the like through the framework.” The agreement also includes the Defense Trade and Technology Initiative (DTTI) for co-development and production of military hardware. The Times of India continues,  “The DTTI will be launched with four aptly-called ‘pathfinder projects’…The four products to be co-produced are the next-generation Raven unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs), ‘roll-on, roll-off’ intelligence-gathering and reconnaissance modules for C-130J Super Hercules aircraft, mobile electric hybrid power sources and ‘uniform integrated protection ensemble increment-2 (chemical, biological warfare protection gear for soldiers).’”[Times of India, 1/26/15]

Deepening cooperation on climate change: President Obama and Prime Minister Modi reached an agreement regarding a number of climate change initiatives and “plan to cooperate closely this year to achieve a successful and ambitious agreement in Paris,” the White House noted. Carol M. Browner of the Center for American Progress explains, “President Barack Obama and Prime Minister Narendra Modi have made admirable progress on energy and climate change today. They established a new leader-to-leader channel for communication to work through issues in climate negotiations, affirmed ambitious solar energy goals for India, launched a new air quality initiative focusing on India’s major cities, catalyzed new clean energy investment opportunities, and more.” Additionally, The Hill reported that the President announced today “plans to invest $2 billion in helping India build new renewable energy sources.” [U.S.-India Climate Change Fact Sheet, 1/25/15. Carol M. Browner, 1/25/15. The Hill, 1/26/15]

Progress on nuclear impasse but key questions remain: The development of U.S.-India relations have been impeded by a stalled 2008 nuclear agreement on civil nuclear cooperation between the two countries, which would enable American firms to work with or invest in the development of Indian nuclear power plants. TheWashington Post reports that President Obama and Prime Minister Modi have made progress towards overcoming two of the main hurdles towards: first, an Indian law that “holds suppliers, designers and builders of plants liable in case of an accident making companies reluctant to invest in the plants,” and second,  disagreements “on how to track nuclear material” to ensure no material is used for military purposes in accordance with U.S. domestic law regulating nuclear cooperation with India.

Details are scarce, but the agreement on the nuclear liability issues reportedly involves “the provision of insurance pools and an assurance that reducing liability would be within the framework of the 2008 agreement. It will now be up to companies to decide whether to do business in India.” Details on tracking nuclear materials are far less clear. While the National Security Council says “information exchanges and a consultative mechanism” will be in place, Daryl G. Kimball, Executive Director of the Arms Control Association, expressed skepticism. “India, which has nuclear weapons and is building up its nuclear weapons program outside of international safeguards/monitoring, is a special case,” Kimball told the Post. “It means that additional safeguards are necessary to ensure that U.S. nuclear cooperation does not directly or indirectly assist its nuclear weapons program.” [Washington Post, 1/25/15. Daryl G. Kimball via the Washington Post, 1/25/15]

Prioritizing leader-to-leader engagement is key to present and future progress on the U.S-India partnership. The Washington Post reports, “Obama is the first president to visit India twice while in office, after receiving an unprecedented invitation to attend the country’s annual Republic Day parade, which celebrates the adoption of the Indian constitution. Modi broke with tradition and met Obama at the airport here, giving the president a bear hug after he bounded down from Air Force One…‘Barack and I have forged a friendship,’ Modi said earlier through an interpreter. He made a statement in English and answered questions in Hindi. ‘There is openness when we talk, and we even joke and share a lot together,’ he said. ‘I think this is a chemistry which has not only brought Washington and Delhi, Barack and I, closer, but also the two peoples of the two countries closer.’” Building on the developing relationship of the two leaders will now be the challenge of the new U.S. Ambassador to India and former NSN Advisory Board Member Richard Verma.  [Washington Post, 1/25/15]

Photo Credit: The White House, 1/26/15

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Diplomatic normalization with Cuba removes obstacles to U.S. interests across the region and internationally.

 Improving the U.S. position vis-à-vis Venezuela: Daniel Lansberg-Rodriguez of the Comparative Constitutions Project explains in Foreign Policy that the regime in Venezuela will find it harder to use anti-Americanism to prop itself up, writing “this is a particularly awkward   moment for his country’s closest regional ally to be making nice with his country’s greatest foe, the much-maligned ‘Northern Empire.’ The United States serves as his perennial bogeyman, blamed for everything from Venezuela’s poor credit rating and the collapsing price of international crude to his own recent cold and the death of his hallowed predecessor Hugo Chávez from cancer last year.”

 Stratfor adds, “With Cuba openly engaging the United States, [President of Venezuela] Maduro may have an additional incentive to seek his own rapprochement with the United States. In fact, several hours after the          U.S.-Cuba prisoner swap was announced, Maduro publicly said Venezuela would be willing to improve its stagnant political ties with the United States.” [Daniel Lansberg-Rodriguez, 12/18/14/. Stratfor,          12/17/14]

Removing an obstacle to U.S. leadership across Latin America: Dan Drezner of Tufts University explains, “U.S. policy on Cuba has been, literally, isolationist — as in, it isolates the United States…Improving ties with Havana ameliorates a long-standing source of friction between the United States and Latin America. That’s called      ‘good diplomacy.’” The New York Times reports that U.S. efforts at         diplomatic engagement across the region were often side-tracked by lengthy discussions about America’s unpopular Cuba policy and that  already a number of leaders across Latin America have praised            President Obama and the United States for its mature decision,   including the leaders of Brazil, Venezuela, and Nicaragua. Andrés Pastrana, a former president of Colombia, explained, “I think that to a large extent the anti-imperialist discourse that we have had in the region has ended. The Cold War is over.” [Dan Drezner, 12/18/14. Andrés   Pastrana via New York Times, 12/19/14]

Ending the international isolation of the United States on Cuba:     Erik Voeten of Georgetown University explains, “The United Nations   General Assembly has voted since 1992 on an annual resolution on the ‘necessity of ending the economic, commercial and financial embargo imposed by the United States of America against Cuba.’ In 1992, with the Cold War just ending, fewer than 50 percent of all member states voted in favor of the resolution (more than half       abstained)…In its latest iteration only Israel joined the Americans in voting against the resolution, although, to its credit, the United States did get the Marshall Islands, Micronesia, and Palau to abstain.” [Erik    Voeten, 12/17/14]

Eventually dropping sanctions on Cuba provides economic and national security benefits to the United States.

Economic and strategic resource benefits: The Harvard Political    Review explains: “The Cuban economy wouldn’t be the only one to benefit from opening up trade. The American losses from the embargo add up to as much as $1.2 billion annually. Many businesses favor an    end to the embargo; in fact, the U.S. Chamber of Commerce is one the strongest opponents of the embargo. Studies on the subject believe that ending the embargo could create 6,000 American jobs, predominantly in agriculture and telecommunications. Additionally, trade with Cuba could be lucrative to the United States for developmental reasons. Cuba has the 3^rd largest nickel reserves in the world that could be used in various technology products. The country is also estimated to have  expansive oil deposits in its territorial waters that are just beginning to be explored.” [Harvard Political Review, accessed 12/19/14]

Increasing U.S. leverage over Cuba: Dan Drezner of Tufts University explains, “If trade, tourism and investment takes off between the two countries, Cuba will quickly become the more asymmetrically dependent actor, no matter how hard the Cuban government tries to     resist. This won’t make it much easier for the United States to affect regime change — but it will nudge Cuba towards a less confrontational foreign policy.” [Dan Drezner, 12/18/14]

Normalizing diplomatic relations with Cuba can only increase the chances of further reforms in Havana. Dan Drezner explains, “By switching course, the United States reaps a few benefits…the odds of orderly liberalization and democratization in Cuba have increased. Not by a lot — maybe from 2 percent to 10 percent. But that’s still an improvement. Even if full-blown regime transition doesn’t happen, economic liberalization does make a society somewhat more free. Today’s Post editorial points to Vietnam as the worst-case outcome for the Cuba policy. But Vietnam now has a considerably more liberal climate than before the US opening, so I don’t think that’s the best example.” Moreover, as the Washington Post Reports, the U.S. move may benefit U.S. democracy promotion programs in Cuba, “Senior U.S. officials said Wednesday that the move will not end the democracy-promoting USAID programs that Gross was working for at the time of his arrest in December 2009. Instead, they will operate from within a future U.S. Embassy in Havana…” [Dan Drezner, 12/18/14. Washington Post, 12/18/14]

President Barack Obama talks with President Raúl Castro of Cuba from the Oval Office. White House Flickr, 12/16/14.

The post The Strategic Benefits of Ending the Cold War with Cuba appeared first on National Security Network.

FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE:
December 17, 2014 

Washington, DC — Along with the release of  USAID contractor Alan Gross and an unnamed U.S. intelligence asset, President Obama announced today sweeping changes in U.S. policy with Cuba, normalizing relations after half a century of Cold War isolation.

National Security Network’s Executive Director John Bradshaw today issued the following statement:

President Obama’s bold action in restoring relations with Cuba is more likely to lead to positive changes in the lives of the Cuban people than current policy. The new opening gets beyond rigid Cold War mindsets of the past and looks at the practical realities of the current situation, recognizing that our estrangement from Cuba is not changing the regime but is providing it with an excuse for its failures. Engagement with Cuba should emphasize the need for greater freedom, respect for human rights, and increased democratic participation. More travel to Cuba by Americans and the increased flows of information that should result from the new policies will gradually lead to a more pluralistic, open society in Cuba. Those in Congress who are already trying to block the President’s plans should listen to the voices of younger Cuban Americans who are able see that re-integrating Cuba into the life of the hemisphere is in America’s bests interests.    

For Media Requests
Contact: Kate Brown
202-213-7051
kbrown@nsnetwork.org 

Photo Credit: Alan Gross news conference after his release by Cuba, C-SPAN 12/17/14

The post NSN Statement: Plans to Normalize Relations with Cuba appeared first on National Security Network.

December 13, 2014 | Sputnik International

“The US administration should use every opportunity to negotiate a Syrian peace deal with Russia, retired Maj. Gen. Paul Eaton has told Sputnik.

‘Any opportunity that you can sit down and talk, and negotiate with your friends or opponents, the better off we are,’ Eaton said Friday when asked whether the Obama administration should take up the recent Russian offer to relaunch talks to settle the conflict in Syria.

‘Any opportunity you can to sit down with Russian negotiators should be taken [because] the outcome can always be a negotiated result,’ Eaton stressed, saying ‘it is better to jaw-jaw, than to war-war’, referring to a quote by former British prime minister Winston Churchill.

Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Mikhail Bogdanov said on Wednesday that if Syrian officials wanted to meet in Moscow, he would discuss the issue with the United States.

The US State Department responded on Thursday, saying that Washington was looking for more details from Moscow on the proposed meeting, including what the objective is for the talks.

Earlier in the week, Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov said that Washington should coordinate the fight against Islamic State (IS) militants in Syria through direct contacts with the Bashar Assad government, but Washington “stubbornly insists” that it cannot recognize the legitimacy of the regime.

The last attempt at international peace talks on Syria ended in a failed round of talks in Geneva in early 2014.”

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The NATO summit provides an opportunity to respond to Russian aggression and support U.S. and European interests in a stable Europe:

Reassure NATO member states with right-sized action, especially Baltic members. Reassuring NATO members requires right-sized adjustments in force structure and posture. Leading up to the summit, NATO has announced plans to “set up a ‘spearhead’ to the NATO rapid [reaction] force, led under a six-month country rotation and consisting of several thousand troops, with air, sea and special forces support…The plan would establish reception facilities, prepositioned equipment and supplies, command and control, and logistics exports,” reports Defense News. National Security Council Spokesperson Caitlin Hayden said the force would be “defensive” in posture. Separately, Britain has proposed creating an expeditionary force of up to 10,000 troops, which “would work with the Baltic nations of Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania, and with the Netherlands, Norway and Denmark. Britain would focus on operations and train small units, drawing on its experience with France in forming a joint expeditionary force.” Ensuring follow-through after the summit will be key to effective implementation. [Defense News, 9/1/14]

Prioritize preparedness to respond to unconventional operations. Russian activity in Ukraine – though not a NATO member – highlights Russian unconventional operations that NATO is underprepared to counter, including the integration of covert operations, subversion, special forces, propaganda, cyber operations and arming rebel forces. Such unconventional operations against a NATO member could blur the line of when an Article 5 response for collective defense is triggered, increasing the risk of miscalculation. NSN Board Member Julianne Smith, Jacob Stokes, David Barno, and Nora Bensahel of the Center for a New American Security recommend that NATO “develop a more effective response to aggression that falls below the Article 5 threshold. Across all domains, the new secretary general should launch a dialogue looking at what activities might trigger Article 4 consultations [to discuss a threat to security] or an Article 5 [immediate collective defense] response…Secretary General-designate Stoltenberg will need to ensure that NATO’s tasking to review contingency plans for non-linear threats produces real results and does not lose steam if the Ukraine crises falls off the front pages.” [Julianne Smith et al., 9/14]

Keep defense spending imbalances on the agenda while exploring other ways to increase combat power besides increased European spending. The Financial Times reports, “The pattern of NATO spending reflects Europe’s increasing reliance on the US. At the height of the cold war, America accounted for roughly half the military spending of the alliance, with the rest of NATO accounting for the other 50 per cent. Now, however, the US accounts for some 75 per cent of NATO spending. Last year, of the 28 NATO members, only the US, Britain, Greece and Estonia met the alliance’s target of spending at least 2 per cent of gross domestic product on defence.” Nonetheless, it is unlikely in the near future that European NATO members will sizably increase military spending. Julianne Smith et al. outline a complementary approach: “NATO’s goal of having all member states spend two percent of their GDP on defense focuses solely on inputs towards buying and fielding military capabilities. But when it comes time to fight, outputs matter most. Some member states allocate their defense budgets much more efficiently, resulting in more combat power that the alliance can call upon. NATO should explore alternate metrics to measure capability outputs.” [Financial Times, 9/1/14. Julianne Smith et al., 9/14]

Depending in part upon the fate of the apparent ceasefire, greater military assistance to Ukraine should be considered carefully.  NATO has ruled out lethal military assistance to Ukraine, but in June “set up funds to help modernize the Ukrainian army. These projects amount to a maximum of 14 million euros ($18.4 million), according to NATO figures. The money will be available over the next two to three years and is earmarked for the development of command structures, logistics and cyber protection,” reports Deutsche Welle. Following President Obama’s call for deeper NATO efforts to strengthen Ukraine’s military, increasing the size and scope of these programs could offer a practical way forward. While there are increasing calls in the United States to supply direct military aid to Ukraine for use in the present conflict, any consideration of doing so should be limited to “defensive weapons,” as Senator Robert Menendez (D-NJ) recently argued. Any armament program should also carefully consider the risks and other forms of direct assistance that could be of equal or greater use, such as sharing intelligence. [Deutsche Welle, 9/3/14. Robert Menendez via NPR, 9/2/14]

As the Russian economy continues to stumble, expanding U.S. and EU sanctions would impose further costs on Moscow in response to its escalated involvement in eastern Ukraine. The United States and European Union are coordinating a potential next round of sanctions against Russia. The EU is considering widening “limits on access to financial markets to Russian state-owned companies outside the banking sector and is likely to expand the ban on exports of dual-use goods to Russia,” according to the Wall Street Journal. While sanctions have been unable to compel President Putin to change course in Ukraine, they have imposed significant costs. CNN Money reports, “Russia’s currency has hit its lowest level ever against the U.S. dollar as the risk of new Western sanctions threatens more economic damage…The ruble slid 0.5% against the dollar Monday, taking its losses for the year to about 13%…The sliding currency will make life harder for Russians by raising the cost of imports, which could further fuel inflation that has already risen to about 7.5%.” In the second quarter, Russian economic growth was only 0.8 percent, the lowest in five quarters and below projections. [Wall Street Journal, 9/2/14. CNN Money, 9/1/14]

To support Ukraine’s future, additional economic assistance will be required from Western leaders and financial institutions – especially if fighting continues. Earlier in the year, the United States, European Union and IMF approved billions in multi-year loans to help Kiev stabilize its economy. But the IMF now warns that, “Ukraine could require as much as $19bn of additional international financing if the worsening conflict in the east of the country continues throughout 2015,” reports the Financial Times. In addition, “under its base case, which assumes the east Ukrainian conflict wanes in coming months, it forecast Ukraine’s economy would contract 6.5 per cent this year, rather than the 5 per cent previously assumed. Growth next year would be only 1 per cent, down from 2 per cent previously forecast.” [Financial Times, 9/2/14]

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