America’s other security needs and the future of our military cannot be made hostage to the actions or inactions of the Iraqi government.
– Iraq Study Group, December 6, 2006

One year ago today the Iraq Study Group, led by former Secretary of State James Baker and former Congressman Lee Hamilton, and comprised of a bipartisan panel of experts and former senior government officials, presented their findings to the President. Importantly, the commission recognized the deteriorating situation on the ground, established political benchmarks for the Iraqi government, called for decreasing the U.S. military presence in Iraq, and urged the Bush administration to engage in intense regional diplomacy with all of Iraq’s neighbors. These sober and forward-looking proposals were astonishingly ignored by the Bush administration. While there has been a recent reduction in violence, a year later the political situation in Iraq is little changed, and the United States continue to struggle with many of the same difficulties.

NO PROGRESS IN ACHIEVING POLITICAL RECONCILIATION

The Iraq Study Group insisted that political reconciliation was required in order to achieve stability in Iraq. The report noted that “U.S. forces can help provide stability for a time to enable Iraqi leaders to negotiate political solutions, but they cannot stop the violence—or even contain it—if there is no underlying political agreement among Iraqis about the future of their country.” [ISG Report, 12/6/06 [1]]

One year later, there has been no progress in meeting the political benchmarks and the Bush administration has offered no strategy to facilitate political reconciliation. As a result, the Bush administration has significantly scaled backs its efforts and lowered its expectations “of quickly achieving major steps toward unifying the country, including passage of a long-stymied plan to share oil revenues and holding regional elections.” [NY Times, 11/25/07 [2]]

The oil law, which the Iraq Study Group considered essential to reconciliation, is stalled and Kurdish actions may make agreement on an oil law impossible. The Kurdish Regional Government has signed a flurry of oil contracts without consulting Baghdad, and Iraqi Oil Minister Hussein Shahristani has responded by stating that, “Any company that has signed contracts without the approval of the federal authority of Iraq will not have any chance of working with the government of Iraq.” The Kurdish Oil Minister retorted, “We don't need his approval... Every time we hear the word ‘illegal,’ we sign two more contracts.” These tensions did not keep Bush advisor Ray L. Hunt from signing an oil contract in Kurdistan, against the expressed wishes of the State Department. [AFP, 11/15/07 [3]. Washington Post, 11/28/07 [4]]

Sectarian loyalties continue to characterize the behavior of Iraq’s central government. The Iraqi government has thwarted greater Sunni integration into various departments. “The problem partly reflects the bureaucratic and often dysfunctional nature of the Iraqi government in Baghdad. But American and Iraqi officials note that it also stems from sectarian agendas in the Iraqi capital.” The Shi’a dominated government has opposed the US bottom-up approach, which has sought to organize local Sunni security forces. “So far about 70,000 such (Sunni) volunteers have been enrolled -- a trend that makes the Shiite-led central government nervous... Indeed, all the U.S. military officials interviewed said their most pressing concern is that Sunnis will sour if the Iraqi government doesn’t begin to reciprocate their peace overtures. ‘The Sunnis have shown great patience,’ said Campbell. ‘You don’t want the Sunnis that are working with you... to go back to the dark side.” [NY Times, 11/03/07 [5]. Washington Post, 11/15/07 [6]]

THE BUSH ADMINSTRATION HAS FAILED TO
ENGAGE IRAQ’S NEIGHBORS

The Iraq Study Group advised that the United States begin a “diplomatic offensive,” working with Iraq’s neighbors to help stabilize the country. Among their recommendations were that the United States should “Stop destabilizing interventions and actions by Iraq’s neighbors” and “prevent the expansion of instability and conflict beyond Iraq’s borders.” [ISG Report, 12/6/06 [7]]

One year later the Bush Administration has not kept Iraq’s neighbors from fueling the country’s sectarian divisions. Countries that could have been enlisted to help stabilize Iraq, presently support proxy groups that are tearing the country apart. According to Senator Jim Webb of Virginia, “the U.S. is neglecting diplomatic efforts that might build on recent gains against insurgents in Iraq to help end the conflict.” Webb, who recently completed a lengthy tour of the region, stated that, “the Bush administration has shown little interest in non- military attempts to engage Iraq's neighbors.” [Bloomberg, 12/01/07 [8]]

The Bush Administration has refused to open broad negotiations with Iran on the issue of stabilizing Iraq. Despite recent developments that indicate that Iran has become more cooperative, and that back-channel correspondence has been productive, the Bush administration has continued to refuse broader engagement. An Iraqi government spokesman, Ali al-Dabbagh, said that the Iranian government “had helped to persuade the Shiite cleric Moktada al-Sadr to ask his Mahdi militia to halt attacks.” These comments “echoed those of the American military here, who in recent days have gone out of their way to publicly acknowledge Iran’s role in helping to slow the flow of weapons into the country.” CENTCOM Commander, Adm. William J. Fallon has described the bellicose rhetoric on Iran from the Bush administration as “not particularly helpful.” [NY Times, 11/18/07 [9]. Los Angeles Times, 12/01/07 [10]]

The Bush administration has failed to engage Syria. The Bush administration has made no effort to change Syrian behavior in Iraq, despite the fact that “Syria is encouraging Sunni Arab insurgent groups and former Iraqi Baathists with ties to the leaders of Saddam Hussein’s government to organize here (in Damascus), diplomats and Syrian political analysts say. By building strong ties to those groups, they say, Syria hopes to gain influence in Iraq before what it sees as the inevitable waning of the American presence there.” The Iraq Study Group noted that, “Although the U.S.-Syrian relationship is at a low point, both countries have important interests in the region that could be enhanced if they were able to establish some common ground on how to move forward.” [IHT, 10/07/07 [11]. ISG Report, 12/06/06 [12].]

Turkey has threatened to invade Iraq because the United States failed to take action on the PKK. Inaction against the PKK in Kurdistan has put Iraq’s most secure region in jeopardy from the threat of Turkish invasion. The Turkish parliament authorized cross-border military incursion into Iraq to deal with the PKK, creating tremendous tension between Turkey, the United States, and Iraq. Most recently, Turkey “carried out an “intense intervention” against Kurdistan Workers Party Rebels (PKK)... after the cabinet authorized the army to carry out cross-border operations.” [Reuters, 12/2/07 [13]]

Iraqi refugees have created regional crisis. Instability in Iraq has spread to Jordan, in the form of 1 million refugees that pose a significant strain on Jordan’s overburdened economy. “Since the US invasion of Iraq four years ago as many as 1 million people - the official figure is 700,000 - have fled into Jordan, where they are widely accused of fuelling inflation, trebling property prices and overloading the infrastructure.” In Syria, “at least 500 cross into Syria daily — running from kidnappings, bombings or personal threats... In Damascus, more than 50,000 Iraqi refugees need food packages to survive and many come to a U.N. distribution center for help. Officials with the U.N. Food Program project the number will grow to 100,000 by the winter. ‘We need to help them, and it’s not become less, it’s becoming more,’ says Laurens Jolles, who heads the U.N. refugee office in Damascus.” [Sydney Morning Herald, 11/17/07 [14], NPR, 12/4/07 [15]]

NO PROGRESS ON SECURITY TRANSITION

The Iraq Study Group insisted that 2007 be a year of transition in which many U.S. forces would gradually redeploy out of Iraq. The report noted that, “by the first quarter of 2008, subject to unexpected developments in the security situation on the ground, all combat brigades not necessary for force protection could be out of Iraq.” Yet no transition occurred and instead U.S. forces on the ground were increased and 2007 was the most violent year for coalition forces since the war began despite the recent drop in violence. There are now more U.S. forces on the ground than there were one year ago. [ISG Report, 12/6/06 [16]]

There are clear warnings that recent security improvements may be fleeting, as deep-seeded hostilities and divisions remain. Officials attribute the relative calm to a huge increase in the number of Sunni Arab rebels who have turned their guns on jihadists instead of American troops; a six-month halt to military action by the militia of a top Shiite leader, Moktada al-Sadr; and the increased number of American troops on the streets. “All of these changes can be reversed, and on relatively short notice. The Americans have already started to reduce troop levels and Mr. Sadr, who has only three months to go on his pledge, has issued increasingly bellicose pronouncements recently. The Sunni insurgents who turned against the jihadists are now expecting to be rewarded with government jobs. Yet, so far, barely five percent of the 77,000 Sunni volunteers have been given jobs in the Iraqi security forces, and the bureaucratic wheels have moved excruciatingly slowly despite government pledges to bring more Sunnis in.” [NY Times, 12/5/07 [17]]

Iraq’s security forces are divided along sectarian lines. Military officials have begun to acknowledge that reconciliation between the central government and the Anbar tribes is not happening. “In more than a dozen interviews, U.S. military officials expressed growing concern over the Iraqi government's failure to capitalize on sharp declines in attacks against U.S. troops and Iraqi civilians. The year-long progress in fighting al-Qaeda in Iraq could carry a downside. Maj. Mark Brady, who works on reconciliation issues, noted that a Sunni leader told him: ‘As soon as we finish with al-Qaeda, we start with the Shiite extremists.’” [Washington Post, 11/15/07 [18]]

THE IRAQI GOVERNMENT REMAINS INCAPABLE OF STANDING ON ITS OWN

One year ago, the Iraq Study Group recommended that the United States provide comprehensive assistance so that the Iraqi government can build much-needed capacity. “Building the capacity of the Iraqi government should be at the heart of U.S. reconstruction efforts, and capacity building demands additional U.S. resources.” One year later Iraq’s government remains highly ineffective. [ISG Report, 12/6/06 [19]]

Corruption in Iraq has reached staggering heights. The Iraqi government is reeling from theft and bribery, and is incapable of providing goods and services. The New York Times reported that, “there is a growing sense that, even as security has improved, Iraq has slipped to new depths of lawlessness.” The article also concluded that, “the collective filching undermines Iraq’s ability to provide essential services, a key to sustaining recent security gains, according to American military commanders. It also sows a corrosive distrust of democracy and hinders reconciliation as entrenched groups in the Shiite-led government resist reforms that would cut into reliable cash flows.” [NY Times, 12/02/07 [20].]

The Iraqi government has no plan for re-integrating roughly 4 million refugees and internally displaced persons. “The Iraqi government lacks a mechanism to settle property disputes if former residents return to Baghdad only to find their homes occupied, the officials said. Nor has the Iraqi government come forward with a detailed plan to provide aid, shelter and other essential services to the thousands of Iraqis who might return. American commanders caution that if the return is not carefully managed, there is a risk of undermining the recent security gains.” [NY Times, 11/30/07 [21]]