Iraqi Security Forces

THE BENCHMARKS [H.R. 2206]

• Providing three trained and ready Iraqi brigades to support Baghdad operations.
• Ensuring that the Iraqi Security Forces are providing even handed enforcement of the law.

Incredibly, it has been 707 days since President Bush first declared that, “As Iraqis Stand Up, We Will Stand Down.” Now, almost two years later, the Administration is still making the training of Iraqi security forces a key component of its escalation plan. Unfortunately, Iraqi security forces are still incapable of providing security. In fact, because of their poor performance and lack of manpower, the President’s Baghdad Security Plan is already far behind schedule. Meanwhile, these forces cannot be trusted to enforce the law fairly. Numerous times, trained Iraqis have turned against American forces or taken part in sectarian violence. Put simply, on this front the Administration is failing to meet its benchmarks for success and there is little sign that progress is likely.

Providing Iraqi Security Forces to Support Baghdad Operations

The President’s escalation is failing to meet its security targets partly due to a lack of Iraqi Security Forces. Three months after the start of the Baghdad Security Plan, American and Iraqi forces control fewer than one-third of the city’s neighborhoods, far short of the initial goal. Brig. Gen. Vincent K. Brooks said that while military planners had expected to make greater gains by now, that has not been possible in large part because Iraqi police and army units ― which were expected to handle basic security tasks like manning checkpoints and conducting patrols ― have not provided all the forces promised, and in some cases have performed poorly. [NY Times, 6/4/07 [2] ]

The number of available-for-duty security forces (including police) is only about one-half to two-thirds of the 330,000 Iraqis that is cited by the military. The discrepancy is due to the fact that many troops have gone AWOL, quit the military, or are on leave. [DOD, 3/2/07 [3] ]

Training Iraqi Security Forces was the core element of the Bush Administration strategy in 2005 and 2006, but it went so badly it had to be scrapped. Military leaders in Baghdad planned to train 330,000 Iraqis for the Iraqi Security Forces. Once that was accomplished, those forces were to take control. Throughout 2006, Casey and top Bush Administration leaders touted the training as a success, asserting that eight of Iraq's 10 divisions had taken the lead in confronting insurgents. But in January of 2007 they acknowledged that the plan had failed and completely recalibrated the strategy. [McClatchy, 4/19/07 [4] ]

Evenhanded Enforcement of the Law

Iraqi Security Forces are often fighting for both sides. This past February soldiers killed a man setting a roadside bomb. When they searched the bomber’s body, they found identification showing him to be a sergeant in the Iraqi Army. “I thought, What are we doing here? Why are we still here?” said Sergeant Safstrom, a member of Delta Company of the First Battalion, 325th Airborne Infantry, 82nd Airborne Division. “We’re helping guys that are trying to kill us. We help them in the day. They turn around at night and try to kill us.” [NY Times, 5/27/07 [5] ]

The sectarian nature of Iraqi forces is making it impossible to use them effectively. U.S. commanders say sectarian agendas have hurt the reliability of Iraqi security forces in some cases. Distrust of the predominantly Shiite Iraqi police is so high in some Sunni districts of Baghdad that they cannot set foot in the areas except under U.S. military escort. [Washington Post, 6/4/07 [6] ]

Shiite police officers have been implicated in sectarian killings. Shiite policemen killed 70 Sunnis in Tal Afar as revenge for a bombing in a Shiite neighborhood. In Diyala province, one Iraqi Army officer, a Shiite, had been ridding the area of Sunnis, telling them, “If you don’t leave this area, we’ll come back and kill you.” [CNN, 3/29/07 [7] . NY Times, 3/31/07 [8] ]

American forces videotaped Iraqi policemen helping plant an IED. Angered by the attacks on his soldiers, Colonel Patrick Frank ordered a video camera hidden near an area where patrols had been hit repeatedly. When the video was examined after another attack, it showed two Iraqi policemen talking with companions, who were heard off-camera, apparently laying an explosive device. Minutes after the policemen were seen driving away, the camera showed a powerful bomb detonating as an American Humvee came into view. [NY Times, 6/4/07 [9] ]

Iraqi Police are spied on within their own headquarters. "When Colonel Frank went to the Ameel police station recently accompanied by a reporter and asked for help in capturing a local Shiite sheik believed to be behind the bombings, the police official he was meeting with spoke in a whisper. "They listen to us," he said, pointing to a ventilation grill on his wall. "I am in danger just by meeting with you." [NY Times, 6/4/07 [10] ]