Iraq – A National Security Legacy of Failure
It has been more than five years since the President declared victory in the battle for Iraq. Since that day, more than 4,200 American troops have been killed and Iraqi civilian casualties number in the hundreds of thousands. The financial costs of the war have been staggering, with direct costs running over $600 billion and long-term cost projections in the trillions of dollars.
Sadly these great sacrifices have failed to achieve the President’s initial goals of ridding Iraq of WMDs it did not have, eliminating a terrorist threat that did not exist, and bringing liberal democracy to the Middle East.
Instead, Bush’s decision to invade, and the subsequent chaos and violence introduced unprecedented instability, turning Iraq into a “cause célèbre” for international terrorism and empowering Iran. A further legacy of the Bush administration’s disastrous war has been a steep decline in U.S. global prestige in the Muslim world and among allies the U.S. had counted as its closest supporters. Even as a change in tactics helped produce dramatic reductions in violence, progress toward a stable Iraq continues to be undercut by conservative incompetence, which dates back to the war’s planning and the days that followed the invasion. In sum, the war and the ideology that informed it have compromised U.S. security, damaged U.S. broader interests, undercut our best principles, and violently altered the lives of countless Iraqis.
None of the Initial Goals of the War Have Been Met
There were no weapons of mass destruction. The rationale for launching a preventive war against Iraq was based on the premise that Saddam Hussein had and was actively seeking WMDs that would threaten the United States. Due to a combination of political pressure, cherry-picking of facts, and poor intelligence, these assertions turned out to be wrong and dramatically undermined America’s credibility around the world. [George Bush, 10/7/02]
There was no substantive relationship with al Qaeda. The bipartisan 9/11 Commission found that there was “no operational relationship” between Iraq and al Qaeda. Claims that 9/11 hijacker Muhammad Atta met with Iraqi agents in Prague turned out to be false. [9/11 Commission Report]
Liberal democracy has not spread throughout the Middle East. Iraq was supposed to be a model for the rest of the region, but instead it has experienced a sectarian civil war and is still riddled with corruption and instability. After some initial movements in 2004 and 2005 towards democracy in Egypt, Saudi Arabia and Lebanon, those positive steps have been reversed. [George Bush, 2/26/03]
The Complete Lack of Postwar Planning Led to Disaster
The Bush administration invaded Iraq with insufficient troops, and without garnering strong allied support. Despite warnings from General Erik Shinseki that the U.S. would need “several hundreds of thousands” of troops to occupy and invade Iraq, Bush administration planners sent only a fraction of that, partially a result of President Bush’s failure to build a robust UN coalition to fight the war. [USA Today, 2/25/03. AP, 3/17/03]
Post-war planning was completely inadequate. The Administration did little to prepare for post-war contingencies in Iraq and left the American military with the dangerous job of keeping the peace in a nation that was increasingly breaking apart along sectarian and ethnic lines. It exacerbated a dangerous situation by disbanding the Iraqi army and putting in place harsh de-Baathification standards, failing to secure massive weapons caches, misreading the dangerous insurgency at an early stage in the conflict, neglecting to train Iraqi security forces, and failing to produce significant quality of life improvements for the Iraqi people despite spending billions in American taxpayer dollars.
As a fierce insurgency grew, the Bush administration failed to adequately respond with a new strategy for more than three years. As CSIS expert Tony Cordesman explained, “The US aid effort behaved for nearly a year and a half as if insurgency was truly a small group of diehards or ‘terrorists.’ Even in late 2005, top US civilian policymakers split hairs over semantics to try to even avoid the word insurgency, fail to perceive that many Sunni Arab Iraqis see such an insurgency has legitimate causes, and choose to largely publicly ignore the risks of civil conflict and the developing problems in Shi’ite forces and political structures.” [CSIS, 12/9/05]
Tragic Human Cost
“The idea that it’s going to be a long, long, long battle of some kind I think is belied by the fact of what happened in 1990. Five days or five weeks or five months, but it certainly isn’t going to last any longer than that . . . It won’t be a World War III.” – Donald Rumsfeld, 11/15/02
Costs of Iraq War to American troops has been high. More than 4,200 American troops have lost their lives participating in Operation Iraqi Freedom, and roughly 30,000 have been wounded in action. [ICasualties.org, 12/16/08]
Iraqi civilians have borne the brunt of the violence in their country. The World Health Organization (WHO) concludes that 150,000 Iraqi civilians were killed between April 2003 and the summer of 2006. Trend lines from other data suggest that the total casualty figure is well over 200,000 people and more than one percent of Iraq’s total pre-war population. [New England Journal of Medicine, 1/31/08. Financial Times, 1/10/2008. Brookings Institution, 12/11/08]
The Iraq war has spawned a refugee crisis of unprecedented scope. According to the United Nations Human Rights Agency (UNHCR), the number of Iraqis displaced from their homes numbers close to 4.7 million. 2.7 million are believed to be internally displaced, and roughly 2 million have fled to Iraq’s surrounding countries, destabilizing the region. [UNHCR, 2008]
Financial Impact Has Been Staggering
Direct war costs amount to over $600 billion. [Center for National Priorities, 2008]
Even the White House’s most realistic analysis was far lower than the actual costs of the war. Before the war many conservatives argued that Iraqi oil revenues would pay for much of the war. White House Economic Adviser Lawrence Lindsay’s aggressive pre-war estimate stated that the war would cost $100 billion to $200 billion. He was asked to resign. [MSNBC, 3/17/06]
The war has cost the overall economy $1.3 trillion ($16,500 per family of four) thus far and Nobel Prize winning economist Joseph Stiglitz estimates that it could rise to $3 trillion ($35,000 per family of four). The cost of war estimate from Stiglitz adds to conventional estimates, the value of losses in military readiness, increased recruitment costs, the cost of medical treatment for returning veterans, and other impacts on the economy. [Congressional Joint Economic Committee, 2/28/2008]
Bush Administration Disastrously Bungled Iraq’s Reconstruction
Bush administration’s planning for Iraq’s reconstruction was beset with problems. A “yearlong State Department study predicted many of the problems that have plagued the American-led occupation of Iraq,” but the report’s findings were “ignored by Pentagon officials.” The “military office initially charged with rebuilding Iraq did not learn of it [the State Dept. plan] until a major government drill for the postwar mission was held in Washington in late February, less than a month before the conflict began.” [NY Times, 10/19/03]
$8 Billion in reconstruction funding disappeared under the Bush administration’s watch.
According to Iraq’s Public Integrity Commission, roughly $8 billion of the country’s reconstruction funds were “wasted or stolen” between 2007 and the beginning of the invasion. [AP, 4/04/07]
Haliburton, after receiving no-bid reconstruction contracts from the White House, wasted hundreds of millions of taxpayer dollars. A 2005 report by Senator Byron Dorgan and Congressman Henry Waxman cited internal Pentagon audits that questioned “more than $1 billion of the company’s bills for work in Iraq.” [NY Times, 6/28/05]
The Decision to Invade Iraq Has Harmed U.S. Interests in the Region
Failed policies in Iraq have strengthened Iran. According to a Brookings Report by Ray Takeyh and Suzanne Maloney, because of the instability introduced by the U.S. invasion of Iraq, the country is no longer a “bulwark against Iranian influence,” and “Tehran now has acquired the means to influence all of the region’s security dilemmas.” [Brookings Institution, 12/08]
The region has been profoundly destabilized. Widespread sectarian violence combined with the movement of millions of Iraqi refugees has had a destabilizing effect on the entire region. Millions of Iraqi refugees have strained governments in Syria and Jordan, introducing instability that fuels unrest and challenges US relationships in the region. [IRIN, 6/28/07. Washington Post, 7/27/07]
Terrorism in the region is on the rise. The nation’s 16 intelligence agencies agree that the war in Iraq has made al Qaeda stronger by creating a recruiting tool and “cause celebre” for terrorists. Terrorism experts Dan Byman and Ken Pollack assert that “Iraq has fostered a new brand of jihad, providing a place where budding Salafi insurgents gain combat experience and forge lasting bonds that will enable them to work together in the years to come.” [National Intelligence Assessment, 7/06. Annals of American Political Science, July 2008]
The War in Iraq Has Been A Disaster for America’s Image
Global respect for the United States is evaporating, even among our closest allies. In 2007, only 30 percent of Germans had a positive view of the United States, down from 78 percent before Bush took office in January 2001. In Turkey, a Muslim democracy and NATO ally, only 9 percent had a favorable view, down from 52 percent in late 2001. Just 51 percent of Britons – our partner in Iraq and our most reliable ally – held favorable views of the United States, down from 75 percent before the Iraq invasion. [IHT, 6/27/07. Pew Global Attitudes Project, 6/27/07]
Our image in the Muslim world is hurting our ability to fight al Qaeda. In countries across the Muslim world, from Pakistan to Morocco, our image is so tainted that local politicians who work closely with the United States are viewed with suspicion or simply discredited, making it far more difficult for us to win the ideological struggle against al Qaeda. [Rand Beers, Testimony Before the Congressional Joint Economic Committee, 2/28/08]